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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
This work consists of four seemingly independent research tasks, using the British 
Household Panel Survey.  Firstly, we endeavour to ascertain the impact of personal 
characteristics on the concept of Job Mobility with respect to Hour Constraints. 
Descriptive evidence suggests that almost 40% of British employees are not happy with 
their working hours. Whether this fact can stimulate job mobility is of our primary 
interest. We then focus on job satisfaction in attempt to isolate those parameters that can 
have a decisive effect on it. We exploit a series of subjectively measured covariates in 
order to tackle unobserved heterogeneity and handle the issue of interpersonal 
judgements in a more consistent way. Additionally, we estimate job satisfaction profiles 
to see if the pattern of job satisfaction is different between those employees who changed 
job and those who did not. The third empirical chapter examines the issues of earnings 
profiles between the private and the public sector. We argue that the motivational basis 
for choosing either sector is fundamentally different and this fact should have an impact 
on the relevant earnings profiles. Public sector workers are expected to exchange a flatter 
earnings profile for non-pecuniary aspects of their job, including the satisfaction with the 
work it self. Finally, we look at the probability of becoming self-employed, conditional 
upon the receipt of a windfall and the consideration of social capital variables. We want 
to see if the inclusion of the latter can have any impact on the predicting power of 
windfalls, given that recent research highlighted the relationship between social capital 
variables and the probability of receiving a windfall.  
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Chapter 1  
 
 Introduction and Data description 
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 1.1 Introduction 
  
 1.1.1  Preface 
 
This doctoral thesis is the result of a research effort that took place at the 
University of Bath between 2004 and 2008. The scope of this presentation is to highlight 
issues related to job mobility, job satisfaction, earning profiles and windfall gains in the 
United Kingdom. These topics have already been examined in the literature to a certain 
extent but our scope is to emphasize several more interesting points and to suggest useful 
insights, providing (hopefully) interesting extensions.  
 
This research can not be considered finished by any means in the sense that in any 
work there is always room for improvements. Consequently, we prefer to look at it as a 
thorough background for the issues under examination and a stable basis for future 
considerations. For example, parts of the results presented here could be easily extended 
to accommodate a cross country comparison between countries or group of countries. For 
instance, the similarities between the British dataset we use (The British Household Panel 
Survey) and the European Community Household Survey make this task almost 
unavoidable.  
 
The work I would like to present in this Ph.D. Thesis consists of six chapters. This 
chapter aims to serve as a brief introduction to the topics we discuss later and to provide a 
short description of the dataset we use. All the empirical work can be found in chapters 
two to five. In particular we endeavour to ascertain the impact of personal characteristics 
on the concepts of job mobility with respect to hour constraints, job satisfaction, the inter-
relationship between windfall payments and social capital variables as well as earnings 
profiles.  The last concept is examined under the prism of differences between earnings 
profiles in the private and public sector. In the last chapter we conclude by summarising 
the empirical findings and suggesting topics for future consideration.   
 10
 
1.1.2 Chapter Two 
 
The initial scope of chapter two was to examine labour market flexibility, 
adopting a macroeconomic perspective. This is evident in the first pages of the chapter.  
However, this target was quickly modified by focusing more on microeconomic data, 
rather than solely relying on the analysis of macroeconomic indicators. I argue that a rich 
microeconomic dataset can be very informative thanks to the variety of variables that are 
collected on an individualistic basis. Such information may include marital status, wages, 
the type of job, working hours and so forth. Consequently, an appropriate empirical 
analysis should be in the position to isolate and determine the effect of these personal 
characteristics on the parameters of interest, in our case, hour constraints.  
 
But why would a researcher be interested in such a relationship?  First of all the 
questions we pose are of general social interest. Working time is an issue that has 
attracted much debate and controversy in the past and continues to be a top issue in the 
European agenda when discussions refer to labour market reformations. However we do 
not aim to examine the sociological or political aspect of the issue by looking how 
industrial relations evolved through the decades and the impact that this evolution had on 
working time. Without neglecting the strong influence that institutions play, we approach 
working time as being one of the determinants of labour supply. We then perceive a 
subjectively reported dissatisfaction with working time as a disequilibrium point on the 
labour supply schedule. The extent to which this disequilibrium can be a decisive factor 
for undertaking labour market action is of our primary concern. We define a labour 
marker action as job mobility, either within the same firm or between firms and abstract 
from other means of reactions which can not be easily identified and thus measured. For 
example, a worker that considers him/her self to be over-employed may develop adverse 
working behaviour which can include shirking, or/and absenteeism. A striking 
differentiation we seek is between prime age employees and those employees which are 
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young in age and have a relative low labour market experience. The reason for this 
categorization is the idea that the motivational and psychological basis for tolerating not 
desirable working conditions can be different between these two groups. Young people 
might be more interested in investing in human capital and thus abstracting from working 
time considerations. On the other hand, older employees could place more value in the 
leisure time. Additionally, the exact nature of working time constraints is examined and 
emphasized since working fewer hours than desired can have different implications for 
labour market behaviour than working more hours than desired. The former case differs 
from the latter in a wealth distributional sense since being underemployed yields, in 
general, less income.  
 
 1.1.3 Chapter Three  
 
Chapter three deals explicitly with job satisfaction and opens the discussion to an 
issue that has lately been in the epicentre of academic dialogue: the extent to which 
subjectively measured variables can be successfully used in an economic sense. After 
consulting several studies, we believe that a reasonably logical ground for doing so 
exists. Consequently, we econometrically estimate the determinants of job satisfaction in 
Britain, deviating from existing studies in the sense that we also assess the importance of 
different job satisfaction domains on the general level of job satisfaction. Few studies that 
have also been conducted on the same lines fail to separate their results from the fact that 
job satisfaction and other subjective measures can be spuriously related because they all 
depend on personality characteristics. This is tackled by using panel data techniques 
which allow personality characteristics like for example neuroticism, optimism, self-
esteem e.t.c. to be taken into account. We also provide separate estimates for men and 
women from a “conventional” job satisfaction specification, after controlling for 
“reference” income. 
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In an extension to our empirical methodology, we also consider job satisfaction 
differences between two consecutive periods. What we are interested to see is if the 
reasons for a change in the reported job satisfaction are statistically different between 
young employees and older workers.  
 
Finally, we estimate job satisfaction profiles in order to depict the dynamics of job 
satisfaction in relation to labour market decisions concerning changing jobs, either within 
or between employers.  
  
 1.1.4 Chapter Four 
 
Chapter four is an attempt to answer if there are differences in the earnings 
profiles that public and private sector offer. We provide a description of the two sectors 
of the economy and present the special characteristics that distinguish employment in the 
public sector from employment in the private sector. We argue that the motivational basis 
for joining each sector is fundamentally different which makes the choice of employment 
very much dependent on ethical considerations and the satisfaction that an employee 
derives from the actual work it self. We explain the upwards sloped earnings curve with 
reference to the theory of human capital and the agency theory. Finally, we estimate 
earnings curves for each of sectors and try to explain the reasons behind the differences 
we encounter.  
  
 1.1.5 Chapter Five 
 
The last empirical chapter brings into the epicentre of our interest the issue of self 
employment. This type of employment has some unique characteristics that make it more 
desirable for some people and less desirable for some other. For instance, running your 
own business can be associated with higher profits, self esteem, flexible working 
patterns, answering to nobody and several other attributes that can enhance job 
satisfaction. On the other hand, being an entrepreneur can be a risky choice in the 
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occasion of an economic downturn. It can possibly be expected that people who are 
highly risk averse would prefer to remain or enter paid employment rather than engaging 
into entrepreneurship. As it has been suggested in the literature, liquidity constraints are a 
binding parameter that can prevent potential businessman/women from setting up their 
own accounts. Furthermore, if a researcher wants to examine how available resources 
affect the probability of becoming self employed, he/she may fall in an endogeneity trap : 
there is always a possibility that earnings and the decision to transmit are jointly 
determined, in the sense that those who are at the same time more able and more willing 
to become self-employed are likely to have more initial wealth. This aspect is usually 
handled by examining how non expected wealth (for example a lottery gain) affects the 
probability of a self-employment transition. Our contribution to the literature is the 
simultaneous consideration of social capital variables and windfall payments as potential 
factors that affect the self-employment probability. By doing this we want to see if the 
latter act independently on this probability since recent research has indicated that the 
probability of receiving a windfall may be related with factors that can implicitly 
stimulate a transition to self-employment.   
 
1.1.6 Conceptual interlinks between the four empirical chapters
  
The four empirical chapters that we present can be considered to be ‘self 
contained’ to a high degree. In deed, reading them is not conditional upon having read 
any of the other chapters. However, this does not mean that they are completely 
unrelated. Each of them contains elements that are present throughout. In particular, 
subjectively measured variables are noticeably used in order to bring a more precise 
behavioural perspective in this study. To be more analytical, in the second chapter we use 
a covariate which corresponds to a subjective measure of job satisfaction. Survey 
participants are asked to rank their satisfaction with their job on a one to seven scale. In 
the third chapter, a more direct attention is placed on the notion of job satisfaction, since 
we use it as an independent variable. In chapter four, we consider those subjective 
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elements that may have an influence on both the selection of working sector (public or 
private) and the wage profile.  
 
Finally, in chapter five we suggest an alternative definition of job mobility (as 
opposed to change employer), namely the perspective of self employment. Consequently 
this chapter can be linked to chapter two given that self employment may result in a more 
flexible working schedule and to chapter three, in the sense that self employment can 
potentially lead to enhanced job satisfaction, if the entrepreneur highly values those 
employment attributes that characterise entrepreneurship.  
 
 
 1.2 Data Description  
 
The data set we use in this thesis is the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) 
which is being carried out by the ESRC UK Longitudinal Studies Centre with the 
Institute for Social and Economic Research at the University of Essex.  Several other 
large-scale data sets are available to the social science research community. For example, 
the German Household Panel (GSOEP), the French Household Panel (ESEML) the 
European Community Household Survey and the US Household Panel PSID. Such 
surveys permit research on topics related to a wide range of social dimensions.  
 
Repeated surveys like the above are usually referred to the literature as panel data 
or longitudinal data and most of the standard econometric textbooks use these two terms 
almost interchangeably.  In fact, the difference between these two terms is small. A 
longitudinal dataset may also be perceived as repeated cross-section study without 
disclosing dynamic information on specific individuals. For instance, in the US current 
population survey, subjects are not tracked over time. Such surveys are useful for 
understanding aggregate changes in a variable, such as the divorce rate, over time.  What 
makes a panel dataset particularly different from a repeated cross-sectional is the effort 
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made so that participants in a survey year are also re-interviewed in subsequent years. 
This can be very informative in identifying the time-varying economic, demographic or 
sociological characteristics of an individual on several social variables.  
 
 
The advantages of a panel data structure in a socio-economic survey like the 
BHPS can be summarised according to Taylor (2007) as follows:  
 
• Panel data  allow analysis of how individuals and households experience 
change in their socio-economic environment and how they respond to 
such changes 
• They allow an analysis of how conditions, life events, behaviour and 
values are linked with each other dynamically over time 
• They allow analysts to control for unobserved heterogeneity  
• Because all households member are interviewed, the effects of the 
interaction of changes at the individual level can be analysed for the 
whole household or for other individuals 
• Because sample members are followed as they leave their original 
household, panel data will provide unique information of household 
formation and dissolution 
 
The BHPS started in 1991 with the first wave and at present, the data for wave 
sixteen are under process. The main aim of the survey is to provide a representative 
sample of the population of Great Britain living in private households and to follow these 
individuals over subsequent years in order to provide data for the study of socio-
economic change. The same individuals were re-interviewed in successive waves and, in 
the case of a split-off from original households, all adult members of their new 
households were also interviewed. Children were interviewed once they reached the age 
 16
of sixteen. Consequently, BHPS is considered to be broadly representative of the British 
population as it changed through time.  
 
From 1997 (wave 7), the BHPS began to provide data for the United Kingdom 
Household Panel (ECHP). This automatically meant the inclusion of new participants 
whose first wave would be wave seven. The ECHP came to an end in 2001 since no 
alternative funding for the ECHP sub-sample was available.  
 
The primary sampling units of BHPS were chosen to be postcode sectors. A 
postcode sector is a geographical area defined by the first part of the postcode and the 
first number of the second part, e.g. BA2 7. Taylor (2007) provides a full description of 
the stratification procedure. There were four stages out of which 250 post codes were 
selected using a systematic procedure with the probability of selection being proportional 
to the postcode sector size.  
 
From a starting sample of approximately 5000 individuals in the first wave, more 
than 10000 were interviewed in 2005. Interviews usually take place on September each 
year or later in some few cases. This thesis utilises data from the first fifteen waves, 
namely from 1991 to 2005.  
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Chapter 2  
 
1 Hour Constraints, Age and Job Mobility
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 I would like to thank Dr Tim Hinks and Dr Thanos Mergoupis for useful comments on earlier drafts of 
this chapter. Comments from seminar participants at the University of Bath are also acknowledged.  
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2.1 Introduction 
The noticeable heterogeneity between European countries and the persistent high 
unemployment in traditionally strong economies such as France and Germany brings into 
the epicentre of any discussion issues related to labour market flexibility and the ways in 
which labour markets are structured across the European Union (EU). The source of this 
heterogeneity derives largely from issues related to local regulatory environments, since 
member states retain significant discretion in forming a labour market environment that 
adjusts to the special characteristics of each country. The levels of employment 
protection, active labour market policy, unemployment insurance and replacement-ratio 
differ significantly across countries2. At the same time, the labour policy is again not a 
matter of central European administration, as happens with monetary and fiscal policy. 
Denmark, for instance, has introduced a unique system of labour market institutions, 
combining a numerically flexible labour market with a substantial social, income and 
employment security. Direct comparison to the US labour market performance raises the 
unavoidable question of whether the source of the observable institutional differences 
results from the minimum level at which labour market intervention is kept in the US. 
Employment protection legislation in the US is among the less strict, while other 
indicators such as the replacement ratio and money spent on active labour market policy 
are at significant lower levels compared to many EU countries.  
 
Our aim is to ensure that our judgment is based on subjective microeconomic data 
rather than macroeconomic indicators that could be misleading and lead to biased 
conclusions according to our political or philosophical beliefs. By “subjective” we mean 
the type of information that has been generated from direct interaction between an 
interviewer and a respondent. For example, the reply to the question “How satisfied do 
                                                 
2 Table (2.1) provides recent information on European level for three variables that readers on labour 
market flexibility encounter often in the literature. For reasons of comparison we have also included the 
United States 
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you think you are from your employment” is without question subjective, since it will 
certainly vary between individuals. Freeman (2005) emphasizes the need to use 
individual information as well as simulation techniques in order to shed some light on 
controversial issues that many times monopolize interest in the economic literature. We 
thus use the British Household Panel Survey which contains information about the 
employment and individual characteristics of British workers.  
 
 
2.2 Labour Market Flexibility 
 
The term “flexibility”, although defined and discussed extensively in the 
literature3, needs careful attention. Indeed, subjective data could provide an alternative 
way of approaching the issue, since data collected at an individual level contains valuable 
information that could give a more precise picture of the various labour market 
characteristics, particularly from the viewpoint of employees who are both the subject 
and object of any potential reforms. Weak performance in terms of unemployment 
reduction and employment stability make flexibility an ambiguous term and emphasize 
the structural and dynamic aspect of the discussion. For example, mild employment 
protection (EPL) legislation might be desirable for employers but it does not necessarily 
guarantee satisfactory employment promotion, (Pissarides, 2001; Auer and Cazes, 2000). 
In any case, we focus on two characteristics of the labour markets, one from micro data 
and the other from macro data:  Explicitly on the divergence in the working hours that 
employers and employees desire (implying employment constraints) and implicitly on the 
sense that the European labour market experience has been far from uniform (Nickell 
1997).  
 
Like any other kind of intervention, we are unable to say a priori that any 
regulation will have an effect exclusively on one side of the market - economic theory 
                                                 
3 For instance see CBI (2001), Treasury study on EMU (2002) or Gylles Saint Paul (2002) 
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suggests that it is the labour market as whole that bears the effects and the relative 
magnitudes are therefore determined by the market forces . For example, an increase in 
the employers’ insurance contributions will vary significantly between employers 
according to age, tenure and experience. It is expected that the increase will be integrated 
(negatively) in the compensation of the recently employed workers and of those with low 
skills.  In this dimension, research greatly benefits from the use of longitudinal data and 
techniques that capture the subjective behaviour elements and implicitly indicate the 
direction of the potential reformations. It is nevertheless obvious that our conclusions 
must be seen through the prism of the aggregate economic performance behind which 
labour market flexibility is hidden.  
 
When talking about labour markets, the term flexibility is a priori believed to have 
a strong relation to deregulation and in general to the absence of any strong interference 
(direct or indirect) in the way a labour market functions. (Nickell, 1997; Glyn, 2003).  
Yet there are contradicting views on this matter, which probably strengthen the obvious 
conclusion that each case is unique (no golden rules for boosting economic performance) 
and there are also other factors besides economic ones that rule the behaviour of agents in 
a country. In OECD’s Jobs Report (OECD 1994), the view that unemployment problems 
arise form inflexibilities in the labour markets is highly supported. But although 
European labour environment is thought to be rigid, in 2001 9 European countries had 
lower unemployment than USA. Nevertheless, unemployment problems persist in 
populous and core monetary union countries as France and Germany. Our interest in this 
chapter is to see whether the macro-economic view of labour market flexibility, which is 
based on the analysis of aggregate data, is consistent with the signals that people actually 
receive from a labour market, apart from the difficulty of getting a job and the relevant 
compensation. Classic labour supply theory emphasizes on two dimensions, wage and 
working hours, suggesting that at a given wage an employee can choose the exact number 
of hours that maximize his utility. In practice, this discretion could be found only in self-
employed individuals since most firms offer wage-hours packages on a take it or leave it 
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basis. However, if employees can easily move either within or between jobs so that to 
determine his/her desired working attributes then flexibility is at adequate levels.  
Consequently, we examine to what extent hour constraints can be a job mobility 
triggering factor for British employees. In addition, we highlight the differences in job 
mobility between young and prime age employees and examine if these differences could 
be attributed to hour constraints.  
 
 
2.3 Supply-Side Flexibility and Working Hours 
 
According to CBI (2002) numerical flexibility is in good levels when firms can 
adjust the number of workers or hours worked in line with demand. In this sense, 
employers can choose among a variety of hours their employees will work, or in the 
extreme case, optimal behavior implies corner decisions for some workers, i.e. layoffs. 
But a labour market is not necessarily flexible if there is only a good degree of numerical 
flexibility. An alternative view of employment flexibility refers to the ease with which 
employees are able to change the aspects of their employment, and it could be seen as an 
effort to judge labour market flexibility from the supply side. In other words, we want to 
examine if a deregulated labour market is flexible for both employers and employees, 
 
Certain aspects of a job can make it more or less attractive. For example, in the 
British Household Panel Survey the question about whether an employee is satisfied with 
his employment considers factors such as the wage, job security, hour constraints etc. 
Undoubtedly, the relative importance of these characteristics varies among employees. 
We particularly turn our interest to working hour constraints. People have different 
preferences towards their desired working hours. Some consider themselves as ‘under-
employed’ while others believe that the hours that they are required to work are far more 
than the desired ones (i.e. ‘over employed’). Undoubtedly the balance between leisure 
and work is unique for each employee who faces a unique path of discrete choices based 
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on personal characteristics, and it is also affected by various exogenous factors. The 
working patterns in European Union concerning the working hours are governed by the 
relative regulatory mechanism. The European Working Hour Directive (EWTD) that has 
been embodied in the domestic labour law of EU countries, sets a ceiling of an average 
48 hours per week to the number of hours an individual is required to work. However, it 
is a common phenomenon that workers are unofficially and indirectly asked to work 
more than what the law dictates4. Thus, those who are self-characterized as “over-
employed” can be distinguished into two categories: The first consists of those who 
would be happy with the EWTD hours but due to employment requirements are forced to 
work more. The second consists of those whose actual working hours are in line with 
regulations but not with their preferences towards less employment. In both cases 
employment flexibility, as it is perceived from employers, is inadequate but for different 
reasons. Stewart and Swaffield (1997), using British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) 
data, provide evidence in favor of the hypothesis that individual job insecurity, fear of 
redundancy, and a scarcity of alternative job opportunities enables firms to force those in 
employment to work more hours than they would otherwise wish at the prevailing wage.  
A flexible labour environment could ensure that those who are dissatisfied with their 
working hours could easily move to a job closer to the working hours they wish. Ideally, 
this job change would occur within the same firm.  
    
More official control and monitoring aiming at reducing involuntary over 
employment would be beneficial for workers who are unemployed, as firms would have 
to hire more employees in order to cover their needs.  Alternatively, an employer could 
fire unwilling workers (if you consider an over-employed worker unwilling) and hire 
willing workers. The exact direction and magnitude of a firm’s response cannot be easily 
predicted. It is associated with the nature of the firm’s activities, the needs for skilled or 
unskilled workers, the investment on human capital and the degree of the employment 
                                                 
4 Additional working effort in the form of non-paid overtime can also be provided voluntarily as an attempt 
to increase the promotion likelihood within the same employer. See Landers et al. (1996) for a model 
featuring incentives to promote only associates who have a propensity to work hard.  
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protection regulation. In a low unemployment environment, the labor market could 
balance more effectively without the need for significant governmental intervention as 
employees would be in a stronger position to bargain not only for higher wages but also 
against lower paid (or even non paid), over-working.  
 
Moving to a less hours job could be either a discretional choice or a necessity. For 
example, women with school-age children may prefer part-time employment given their 
household and family constraints. In this occasion employees cannot be described as 
under-employed since this type of employment suits them best although they work less 
than the typical average employee. On the other hand, there are people who work fewer 
hours than the average, simply because they have difficulties in finding a way out to full-
employment. In 2004 the proportion of part-time workers in the UK who were in part-
time work because they could not find a full time job was 5.5 per cent, compared to an 
overall EU average of 14.4 per cent, although with a range from 2.4 per cent in Austria to 
41.7 per cent in Greece. (See Table 2.2).  
 
 
2.4 Hour constraints and Job Mobility 
 
A number of authors have provided evidence that the actual hours that people 
work are not in line with their preferences, at least for a significant portion of the labor 
force. Bell and Hard (1998) examine over employment in Britain from 1975 till 1994, 
Kahn and Lang (1995) using a survey sample for Canada, find that underemployment is 
prevailing and in general hour constraints are common among a substantial fraction of the 
labor force (two out of five employees). This study, although static, gives useful insights 
and heads our discussion towards interesting routes. Boheim and Taylor (2004) report 
that over-employment is more common in the UK amongst workers, something that is 
also verified by Blundell et. al. (2005). In addition, the latter study also takes into 
consideration the compensating wage differentials when a job does not satisfy the 
worker’s hour preferences. Souza-Poza and Hennebeger (2002) provide an empirical 
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analysis of hour constraints in twenty one countries using 1997 data from the 
International Social Survey Program (ISSP). They find that underemployment is 
prevailing in most countries with the noticeable exceptions of Denmark, Norway and 
Switzerland and U.K. Euwals (1999) adds to the working hour constraints literature 
considering a female sample from the Dutch socio-economic panel. He finds that within 
firms mobility driven by hour constraints is relatively low between women. Interestingly, 
there is scarcity in the literature concerning the issue of working hours constraints for 
young employees. On the contrary, other issues of the youth labor force have been 
investigated, for example technological progress and training (Bartel and Sicherman, 
1998), job mobility in relation to wage differentials (Flinn, 1986) or the general impact of 
the young workers in the labour market (Shimer, 2001)  
 
The purpose of this chapter is similar to the existing studies:  To examine labor 
market mobility but in relation to working hour constraints. However, instead of looking 
at differences between male and female employees, we base our analysis on a young-
prime age worker comparison. The distinguishing features of young workers from a 
sociological and psychological point of view have been outlined elsewhere (e.g .Barling 
& Kelloway, 1999). Here we are interested particularly in the characteristics of the youth 
labour force that are related to the labour market.  If anyone questions the rational behind 
this categorisation he/she should first have a look at the unemployment rates. These 
figures reveal that unemployment for young employees is much higher than 
unemployment for prime age employees, According to Eurostat, for the fifteen EU 
members in 2005, youth unemployment rate was 16.7% compared to an average 6.6% for 
prime age employees. For the UK, the relative figures were 12.9% and 3.3% respectively. 
Consequently we would be interested to see if apart from the unemployment rates, 
differences can be also found in employment constraints and the ability between the two 
groups to change job in order to alleviate those constraints.  
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5Although employees in EU consider the hours they work  as a crucial aspect of 
their working life (Eurobarometer, 2001) we are not sure whether this element can be 
either a necessary or sufficient factor that could stimulate labour mobility especially for 
the young employees.  We try to approach the above question by examining the degree of 
young employees’ ability to move freely along their supply curve and determine their 
desired working patterns in terms of the hours they work. In this point some 
considerations arise: Kahn and Lang (1995) report hour constraints by tenure and 
conclude that the desire to work fewer hours increases with tenure and that the desire to 
work more hours declines with tenure. Assuming that young employees are generally low 
tenure employees, this implies that young people would generally be underemployed. 
Theoretically this can be debatable if someone considers that the value of the marginal 
product of a worker declines with tenure. If this is the case, at the early stages of 
employment the value of the marginal product exceeds the given wage and employees 
would like to work less. Later, when the marginal productivity falls, a worker would wish 
to work more hours. Hour constraints that young employees face can also be linked with 
the employment protection legislation. If strong EPL exists, this generally works in favor 
of prime age males and against young workers and prime age women, (OECD, 2004). 
Young employees would thus find it more difficult to respond to over-employment which 
is imposed by employer’s preferences.  
 
 
2.5 Data  
Our data consists of the first thirteen waves of the British Household Panel 
Survey (BHPS) covering the period from 1991 to 2003. We use an unbalanced panel and 
since we are interested in the working hours, all self-employed have been excluded as, by 
definition, they have more freedom in determining their working patterns. Individuals 
aged less than 18 are also not included in the analysis primarily because although they 
might be working, are still not in a sustainable employment path, can be financially 
                                                 
5 See Oswald (2002) for a summary on Job Satisfaction within EU Employers 
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dependent and could therefore contribute to biased conclusions. We have not excluded 
people over 60, provided they are on employment and not retirement, but we have 
eliminated those who work in the armed forces. Employers over 65 years old are also 
included, but they are a very tiny fraction of the whole sample, around 0,60%. Finally, 
any respondent should have questioned at least two consecutive times. This restriction is 
obvious since we want to capture labor market transitions between two consecutive 
periods. The question we are particularly interested in is the following: “Thinking about 
the hours you work, assuming that you would be paid the same amount per hour, would 
you prefer to work fewer hours, work more hours, or the same number of hours?” From 
how the question is posed it guarantees that respondents understand that any reduction in 
hours worked would be associated with a proportional fall in earnings and thus prevents 
them from making assumptions about variations in their labor income. Those who prefer 
to work more are classified as underemployed, those who prefer to work less are 
classified as over-employed while respondents happy with their existing working hours 
are classified as unconstrained. If the answers to these questions are associated with the 
special characteristics of each respondent and the easiness of moving between jobs, there 
can be some implications, which both influence labor supply and policy making. Strong 
employment protection is usually an effective shield against unfair dismissals, 
discriminations and expropriation of the labor force. However, if employment protection 
and other employment rights are based on a specific length of job tenure, then employees 
would be especially reluctant to move between jobs and hence define the most preferred 
for them hours-wage trade off.  
 
 
2.6 Hour Constraints for Young and Prime Age employees 
 
For the BHPS sample across waves 1-13, it seems that a substantial portion of the 
labour force is not happy with their working hours. As Table 2.3 shows, almost 40% 
percent do not supply the hours of work they would prefer, with 32.4% wishing to work 
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less and just 7.49% wishing to work more. Furthermore, if we consider separately young 
and prime-age employees, far more young people wish to work more hours at the 
prevailing wage while there is also significant difference in the percentages of people 
declaring themselves to be unconstrained. 
 
Table 2.3 
Preferences over working hours, BHPS , 1991-2003 
  
 
 Young Employees Prime Age Employees Total 
 (<25, n=7981) (>25<65 , n=56156) (n=56156) 
    
    
work less 20,42% (1618) 34,79% (16630) 32,4% (18248) 
    
work more 13,73% (1088) 6,53% (3119) 7,49% (4207) 
    
unconstrained 65,85% (5275) 58,68% (28426) 60,11% (33701) 
    
Notes : Cross Sectional Sample Weights applied. Chi-Squared Test for independence show that the differences 
are significant at the 5% level of significance. 
 
Over-employment is for both categories prevailing but with some difference in the 
relative magnitude. This result can be implicitly compared with the above mentioned 
findings by Kahn and Lang (1995) if we adopt the assumption that tenure is positively 
correlated with age. However, in the overall sample from Canada these authors find that 
underemployment rather than over employment is the dominating feature, which is the 
opposite of what we have found for Britain.  
 
A different classification can be examined on the basis on whether the hours 
preferences change according to whether employment is part-time or a full-time.6 41% of 
young employees who hold a part-time job would wish to work more compared to almost 
15.2% for the prime age employees. These numbers change dramatically if we consider 
people working full-time as shown in Table 2.4.  For young employees, the percentage 
drops to 10.9% while for prime employees to 4.1%.  
                                                 
6 Part time employment is considered for employees who work for less than 25 hours per week and full 
time employment for employees who work more than 25 hours per week. (Eurostat definition) 
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Table 2.4 
Preferences over working hours by type of job and age category – BHPS 1991-2003 
      
       
 Young Employees  Prime Age Employees 
 part time full time  part time full time 
        
       
Work less 9,80% 21,7%  11,60% 41,37% 
       
Work more 41,1% 10,9%  15,10% 4,12% 
       
unconstrained 49,10% 67,50%  73,30% 54,51% 
        
       
  
The prevalence of underemployment amongst part-time constrained young 
employees is revealing. Primarily it shows that a significant portion of young people 
would wish to work more hours, possibly at a full employment and not part time status. 
One could thus speculate that a substantial fraction of the young labour force is working 
part-time simply because it cannot find a way into full employment. The impact that this 
fact has on the labour supply is obvious, since workers are deviating from their optimal 
labour supply choices and if the part-time job is not directly related to specific skills, the 
way towards a desirable employment profile becomes more difficult as time goes by. 
Considering the prime age category, it seems that part-time employment is a discrete 
choice rather than an obligation as 73.3% of respondents declare themselves as happy 
with the hours they work (74.5% for women, 63.0% for men). A comment on the higher 
percentage for women would be that females might prefer part-time employment as it 
provides the required flexibility for family care household activities. Black (1989) finds 
that few women use part-time employment as a stepping-stone to full employment while 
Higgins et al. (2000) find empirical support for the belief that part-time work helps 
women balance work and family. 
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2.7 Dynamic analysis of hour constraints for Young and Prime Age 
employees 
 
  Following the analysis of Boheim and Taylor (2004), we also want to see the 
impact of past year’s hour constraints on next period constraints. Obviously, someone can 
handle hour constraints by changing the hours he/she works. But this is not always 
feasible as it involves job changing, either within the same employer or between different 
employers. Table 2.5 shows that between young employees, a 29,5% of those initially 
under-employed who increased their working time, remained under-employed in the 
consecutive period as well.  At the same time, under-employed young workers who did 
not alter their working hours remained under-employed at a larger percentage, 36,7%. 
Evidence for underemployment between t and t+1 are similar between the two age 
groups. On the antipode, over-employment seems far more difficult for employees to 
overcome. More than a half of people who are over-employed at t are still constrained at 
t+1, no matter if they reduce the hours they work and irrespective of how we split the 
sample according to age. It is also worth noting that 68,7% percent of prime-age workers 
who are over-employed at t and did not reduce their labour supply, are still facing hours 
constraints the following period. The same figure for young employees is 52,5%.  
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Table 2.5 
Hour constraints at t+1 by hour constraints at t and changes in working hours 
between t and t+1, BHPS, 1991-2003 (row %) 
 
  Hour constraints at t+1 
Young Employees (<25) Prime Age Employees (>25) 
       
Under- 
Employed 
Over 
Employed 
Under 
Employed Hours constraints at t Over-Employed Unconstrained Unconstrained 
Unconstrained at t 16 9.5 73.8 21.6 4.9 73.5 
Under-employed at t and increased 
work hours between t and t+1 14.7 29.5 55.7 16.3 23.6 60.1 
Under-employed at t and did not 
increase work hours between t and 
t+1 
8.3 35.6 56.1 12.7 38.6 48.7 
Over-employed at t and decreased 
work hours between t and t+1 40.6 8.2 51.2 55.7 3.4 40.8 
Over-employed at t and did not 
decrease work hours between t and 
t+1 
52.5 4.3 43.2 68.7 1.6 29.7 
 
Explanations on why many workers (both young and prime age) report them selves 
happy with the hours they work next period may vary. It could be either because they 
have moved to a different job offering the same working hours but different wage 
compensation or simply because they got used to the idea of working more hours than 
they would ideally desire. For the first explanation, Blundel et.al. (2004) find only partial 
support for the hypothesis that over-employed or under-employed quitters receive 
compensating wage differentials if their new job does not satisfy their hours preferences. 
But such arguments must be treated with caution. An employee can consider his response 
to whether he feels unconstrained or not independent of a wage promotion. In other 
words, a wage compensation for working more hours might ease the pain but does not 
cure the source of the pain which in this case is over employment. For the second 
explanation, Akerlof and Dickens (1982) using elements from the psychology science 
describe that people tend to gradually reject situations that could be harmful or 
unpleasant, making themselves believe that they are not. In psychology, this situation is 
described under the term “cognitive dissonance”.  
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 Cognitive Dissonance has drawn extensive attention by researchers and is 
considered to be a dominant issue in the psychology literature. Although the first term 
“cognitive” does not need much clarification since it could easily be replaced by the word 
“mental”, the second term deserves a more rigorous treatment. Dissonance is used to 
describe a situation where a person believes that the way he is behaving (or thinking) is 
not consistent with what could be subjectively or socially (and in a sense objectively) 
acceptable. For example, people who have been diagnosed with high cholesterol are 
generally advised by doctors to maintain a low fat diet. However it is very likely that 
some of them could not resist if they are offered a chocolate cake. Eating the cake leads 
without doubt to a dissonance since there is an obvious contradiction between the 
medical perception about what is bad for the health and the final action.  
 
 The more interesting part of the theory comes from the observation that people 
who experience this kind of contradiction have the tendency to create additional reasons 
or justifications in order to support their behaviour. In the cake example, this tendency 
could take the form of concluding that additional exercising could compensate for the 
adverse (in medical terms) choice.  
 
 The projection of cognitive dissonance in the labour market is straightforward and 
the relevant examples can be numerous since they may involve issues that decrease job 
satisfaction at first place. Consequently, dissatisfaction with the actual work it self, job 
security or job payment is likely to create a sense of discomfort at the first stages of the 
contractual relationship. At later stages though the dissatisfied employee is likely to build 
a conceptual self-resistance by comparing him self to other employees who may be in 
worse situations or by simply interpret his contradiction in terms of a threat to the self-
concept. This could simply take the form of “I am smart reasonable person” or “I made 
the right decision”. In terms of working hours, a dissatisfied employee is likely to 
experience at first a contradiction or a logical inconsistency since we can hardly expect 
that he/she would be indifferent to hour constraints. Undoubtedly the extend to which 
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over-employment or under employment adds to the discomfort that an employer feels 
from work is very subjective. But assuming that for some employees, hour constraints is 
a significant source of job distress, cognitive dissonance would suggest that these 
employees will gradually adopt such beliefs so that to justify the contradictory states.  
 
 So far, our discussion suggests that the theory if cognitive dissonance is highly 
dynamic since it examines how individuals change perceptions over time as a response to 
exogenous stimulus. An also dynamic psychological perspective can be offered by the 
theory of “learned helplessness” which was initially suggested by Seligman (1975). For 
some researchers it can be considered as the polar case of cognitive dissonance. We 
won’t entirely adopt these views since these theories are very broadly defined and 
someone can easily refer to specific cases where the results may or may not converge. 
The theory of “learned helplessness” means a condition of a human being or animal in 
which it has learned to behave helplessly, even when the opportunity is restored for it to 
help it self by avoiding an unpleasant or harmful circumstance to which it has been 
subjected. To give an intuitive example, consider a case where passengers in an aeroplane 
experience a life threatening mid air incident but after some really terrifying moments 
they manage to land safely. It is very likely for most of the passengers to avoid flying in 
the future as a result of their traumatic experience. However, for the pilots (who were 
actually controlling the aeroplane and contributed to the safe landing) this may not be 
necessarily so. In fact, most of the pilots who have been involved in serious incidents, are 
quickly back on duty.  Projecting this notion into the labour market, the theory of learned 
haplessness would suggest that an employee, who faces hour constraint and is 
particularly unhappy with it, will remain unhappy even if this constraint is removed 
without him or her being actually involved. This could account for cases where 
dissatisfaction for the job persists, even if someone is happy with all implicit and explicit 
factors that affect job satisfaction.  
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For our research purposes, we believe that “cognitive dissonance” can be 
analytically useful in explaining why those who were constrained in the first place, 
declared themselves unconstrained in the next period even though they did not alter the 
number of their working hours. However, “learned helplessness” can not be used 
explicitly in our framework since in this chapter we only examine the discrete choice to 
change job and not the persistence of dissatisfaction given that hour constraints have been 
alleviated. In other words, we look at the ex-ante conditions that led someone to take 
action and not the ex-post variation of the respondent’s subjective beliefs.  
 
Coming back to our dataset, we explore the 13 first waves of the BHPS and we 
find that 36.7% of employees who became unconstrained at time t+1 happened to have 
changed job. In contrast, 24.8% of respondents remained constrained at time t+1, even 
though they had changed job. Of those, almost 69% received a positive wage differential 
but with seemingly little contribution on the subjective perception about the hours they 
work.  
 
A more detailed examination of the wage differentials should aim at examining 
the relative variation in the wage differentials according to whether a job change has 
occurred – i.e. do those who change job enjoy larger wage increases than those who do 
not change job. If this is this case, there is a meaningful basis for including the wage 
compensation as a control variable when predicting future labour market status. Again, 
the BHPS evidence is revealing. Excluding those who have had a reduction in their 
annual compensation7, and also setting an annual upper bound of 10000 pounds in the 
level of the wage increase8, we find the following: The average (unconditional) 
difference in the compensation that job movers between t and t+1 received (at this time 
we only look up at those who received a positive differential) is £405 (19546 cases). In a 
                                                 
7 Normally this reduction is not in the sense of a wage cut, inflation, increased taxation or insurance 
contribution can lead the net compensation result to be negative 
8 We do this in order to exclude extreme observations that maybe due to special circumstances like an 
employee with very specific and hard to find skills.   
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parallel comparison, this figure drops to an average of just £181 for job stayers (9464 
cases), thus, a wage promotion is not necessarily associated with job alteration. There are 
also employees who had negative wage differentials despite changing job. That means 
that even when annual pay falls, there could be other job attributes that make the new job 
more attractive and compensate for the income loss. This argument is also supported by  
Altonji and Paxson  (1988).  
 
  
2.8 Moving within and Between Jobs  
An employee would leave his/her job if the utility of doing so exceeds the utility 
he gains from the existing work less the cost of change. Voluntary termination of an 
employment relationship has been analyzed both within a job matching and human 
capital framework (McLaughlin, 1991; Harper, 1995). The BHPS enables us to identify 
job changes within and between employers, and to investigate to what extent this labour 
mobility results from any kind of dissatisfaction employees might feel about the hours 
they normally work. Normally it is not in an employer’s interest to loose employees 
whose tenure, and thus experience, is relatively high.  The disruption in the production 
sequence can be a source of significant loss for the firm since the replacement procedure 
involves time consumption and firm-specific training (i.e. turnover costs). But an 
employee might benefit from a displacement if he/she possesses skills that are not only 
firm specific but also industry specific. In this sense, both parties have incentives to see 
human capital as a shared investment (Hashimoto 1981). The decision of an employee to 
terminate his employment with a firm also depends on the existence of alternative 
choices, his family profile, the probability or expectations of determining alternative 
working characteristics within the same firm, any possible wage compensation and many 
other relative individual attributes. For instance, the required time that someone needs to 
reach his working place is important as someone might consider the inconvenience of 
travelling a long time to work every day as a contributing factor to his/her overtime 
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problem. But our initial scope is to ascertain if hour constraints are a triggering factor for 
a job change. From the first thirteen waves of the BHPS (covering the period between 
1991 and 2003), we deduce the following information regarding job change: Taking the 
sample as whole, approximately 28% did so between t and t+1. From those, 30% were 
promoted while a 35% changed employer. Figure 2.1 considers job changing between the 
two age categories, the young employees and the prime age employees, across the 13 
waves of the BHPS.   
 
 
Figure 2.1 
Job mobility of young and prime age employees, BHPS, waves 1-13. 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Year
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
(%
)
<25
>25
 
 
As it is evident, job mobility for employees below 25 years old is greater than mobility 
for employees above this threshold. There is also an upward trend in the percentage of 
people who change job between two consecutive periods. Thus, the 32.3% of young 
people who changed employment in 1991, reached a substantial 45.1 percent in 2003. 
Clearly job mobility is affecting more those people who are relatively new in the labour 
market. This evidence can be viewed from two sides. Positively, if we assume that a 
young person given a potential dissatisfaction with certain aspects of his/her job, has 
discretion in moving either between or within jobs in order to comply with his/her 
preferences. Moreover, young employees are less constrained by familial considerations 
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than older employees. Negatively, as a sign of mismatch in the labour market and 
possible expropriation of young employees. In this case we consider the reasons that did 
not make the employment matching successful at first place. It could be that some aspects 
of the job such as working hours, remuneration, the non-wage benefits, were 
unsatisfactory. Table 2.6 links jobs changing and hour constraints according to age.  
 
 
 
 
Table 2.6 
Job Change and Hour Constraints according to age. BHPS, waves 1-13 (column %) 
 
Employees <25  Employees >25  
Constrained at t-1  Constrained at t-1 
      
No job change 55.04  73.83 
Job change between t and t-1 44.96  26.17 
 
 
It is evident that from all those young employees who declared constrained in the 
previous period, a 44.96% changed job in the subsequent period. The relevant percentage 
for employees above 25 years old is just 26.17%. Of course, these figures are not 
conditional upon personal characteristics or any other control variables. This is exactly 
what our analysis is aiming at: we want to formally examine if hour constrains are indeed 
a decisive parameter that can stimulate job mobility.    
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2.9 Analytical Framework and Estimation Results 
 
 2.9.1 Analytical framework 
Our analytical framework consists of two parts. In the first part we adopt the 
approach by Boheim and Taylor (2004) and we identify five (k= 1 to 5) future labour 
market categories given that the individual was employed in the previous period: 
a) Employment within the same employer  
b) Out of the Labour Force  
c) Unemployment   
d) Employment within the same employer but different job (promotion) 
e) Employment in different employer 
All this categories are mutually exclusive by construction. Consequently we consider the 
following specification for identifying the impact of age and hour constraints on each of 
these categories :  
'
, , 1 , 1i t k k it k it i it i ty a Under Over age uκ κβ γ δ+ += + + + + +b xκ    (1) 
The term at the right side of (1) corresponds to the categories mentioned above. At the 
left hand side, ‘Under’ corresponds to underemployment at period t while ‘Over’ to over 
employment at  period t. Variable ‘age’ is a dummy variable indicate whether the 
individual is over 25 years old and x is a vector of other control variables. Finally, the last 
term is the stochastic disturbance.  
We differentiate our interest here from the work of Boheim and Taylor (2004) in 
the following way:  Instead of estimating two separate samples for women and men, we 
first consider the sample as a whole, adding a dummy variable corresponding to whether 
a person is a prime age employee.  In a second specification, we consider a random 
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effects probit in which the dependent variable receives the value ‘1’ if the employee has 
changed job between two periods and the value ‘0’ otherwise. In this case the analytical 
framework (and the estimation) is much simpler but the analytical usefulness of the 
results is broader since we allow for a less detailed description of the type of job change.  
It must also be noted that in a regression for just the sub-sample of young 
employees we did not encounter any significant results in terms of the effects of either 
underemployment or over employment. This is not necessarily discouraging, if we 
particularly consider that the sample size for young employees for categories (b) and (c) 
is very small and may lead to meaningless or biased results. Secondly, for categories (d) 
and (e) which identify job mobility, the non significant coefficients serve as an evidence 
that hour constraints, although present for a noticeable fraction of young employees, are 
not likely to stimulate job mobility.  
The multinomial model we estimate first, examines the extent at which hour 
constraints can either lead someone out of work (unemployment, out of the labour force) 
or stimulate job mobility after explicitly controlling for a prime age employee effect and 
various other characteristics. 
 
The probability that each of the 4 categories (j) will be realized is given by: 
'
,
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Year dummies are also included to account for the possibility that labour market 
dynamics could be partially explained by annual unobserved variations, though in general 
those dummies tend to be insignificant. Finally, since multinomial logit is based on the 
assumption of the independence of irrelative alternatives (iia) we also account for that 
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9using a Hausman test  (Hausman and McFadden, 1984). Results turned out to be strongly 
insignificant (in favour of Ho) indicating that adding or removing one category doesn’t 
have a relative impact on the relation of any other two categories.  
 The variables that are used to explain labour market transition apart from hour 
constraints and age are presented in table 7. Briefly, we control for tenure, academic 
qualifications, non paid overtime, paid overtime, marital status, overall job satisfaction, 
full time employment, promotion opportunities, sex, union membership and house 
ownership.    
  
2.9.1.1 The Effect of hour constraints 
Table 2.8 presents the results from the multinomial specification.  If constrained 
individuals have relative freedom in choosing the last two categories (i.e. evidence in 
favour of job mobility), then there is sufficient flexibility in the sense that employees can 
move closer to their preferred labour supply curve. Before discussing the regression 
results, we should remind that labour mobility is much greater amongst those aged below 
25 than it is for workers above this age.  But the motivation for this mobility can hardly 
be attributed to hour constraints since hour constraints coefficients (not reported) for the 
multinomial logit concerning young employees are statistically insignificant.  
 
Considering the whole sample (including both young and prime age employees), 
our multinomial results emphasise the importance of underemployment as relative 
motivating force for changing the terms of employment. Although a significant portion of 
UK employees find themselves working more hours than they would prefer, relatively 
few would change job due to just this factor. And this result is conditional upon keeping  
overall job satisfaction constant.  
 
                                                 
9 The general idea behind this test is to estimate the logit model twice, on the full set of alternatives and on 
a specified subset of alternatives. If IIA holds, the two set of estimates should not be statistically different 
and the null hypothesis is verified under a chi-square distribution.  
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Consequently underemployment does have some statistical power when it comes 
to job changing. To be specific, it is a both positive and at significant factor in motivating 
a job change between two consecutive periods. Although the t statistic of the estimated 
coefficient is not very large, it is within the decent levels of statistical acceptance and the 
coefficient gives a taste of the expected direction of change for an underemployed 
employee. Also, it comes to no surprise that the variable that identifies full time jobs is 
strongly, negatively and highly significant as part-timers do not always work voluntarily 
(as it has already been shown in table 2.2) and underemployment is the most observed 
status for them.  
 
2.9.1.2 The effect of education 
Education is included in the specification by having 6 dummy variables 
corresponding to whether the individual has a higher degree, university degree, teaching 
or other higher qualifications, A levels, O levels and CSE with reference to any other 
type of education, including no education at all.  The multinomial results indicate that 
education does not have any power in predicting transition into unemployment or exit 
from the labour force.  This evidence might seem unrealistic but two factors must be 
taken into account: Investment in education becomes important when transition takes 
place from unemployment to employment. In the opposite case, even if the young worker 
is employed within a firm that anyway requires less academic qualifications, the choice is 
discrete and possibly based on the lack of alternative income sources or/and family 
support. In this case flexibility is defined by the easiness of finding a qualifications 
compatible employment.  
 
Our results strongly indicate that education does matter when it comes to 
employment mobility, both within and between employers. More specifically, having 
obtained higher education (An MSc or a PhD) does play a significant role, especially 
when the decision comes to moving between employers (i.e. promotion). To be more 
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precise, there is a positive and significant coefficient implying that possessing higher 
education qualifications increases the possibility of changing employer. At the same time, 
we have to point out that having A-levels qualifications is also positively significant, but 
at the margin. For within-employers mobility, education at any level is (as expected) a 
very strong parameter. In all cases whoever obtains a university degree does gain a 
comparative advantage in having a good discretional power in moving either within or 
between jobs.  Thus, there is a good indication that “investing” in a university 
qualification provides (apart from a potentially elevated expected average wage) a good 
degree of flexibility. Mincer (1991) using PSID also argues that education is a key 
element in affecting labour market characteristics. He found that university education not 
only does reduce the chances of unemployment but it also associated with higher wages 
and promotion opportunities.  
 
2.9.1.3 The Effect of tenure 
Theoretically, tenure can not be ignored as a variable that affects the possible 
future labour market status. Human capital framework (Becker, 1962) implies that firms 
may invest in “on the job” training, expecting increased marginal productivity in future 
periods. In this sense, an employer would be reluctant to terminate a long employment 
relationship. Recent evidence for Britain suggests that the more recent the labour market 
entrant, the more likely the job will end, (Booth et al. 1999). Our results also tend to 
verify the view that the higher the tenure, the less the chance will be that someone will 
find him/her self unemployed. However we have to mention two results, one that is 
unexpected and the other that was quite predictable:  Tenure is negatively and 
significantly associated with promotion opportunities in a job. Thus a long-term 
employment relationship does not necessarily have positive effects in terms of promotion 
opportunities. Again we need to interpret this very carefully and explain the possible 
reasons for this result providing the following arguments: 
1) Some times it is not very clear when a promotion takes place and also 
the term promotion by itself holds a subjective interpretation. A wage 
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increase or a differentiation of duties can simply not be reported by 
respondents as a promotion while some times the employer might 
consider himself having been even demoted.10  
2) Not all the firms have the same hierarchical structure. In some of them 
we can find many descriptions of job duties with similar characteristics 
while in others three or four descriptions for the whole job range would 
be enough. Similarly , not all the firms have the same employers size 
3) Finally and maybe most importantly, it would be rational to assume that 
if we consider the chances of promotion as a function of tenure it would 
have been a decreasing one but at a severely reduced rate, implying a 
concave relationship. Getting a promotion  in the very first years in the 
job wouldn’t be as difficult as it can be when the tenure increases as 
more people would compete for (the few) higher positions.  
 
To examine the extent at which our third comment can have any 
descriptive validity we rely on the BHPS database. Figure 2.2 shows that tenure 
does have a strong and diminishing effect on the chances of either being promoted 
or changing employer. Most changes occur within the first years of the 
employment relationship, even within the first months.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 See Gibbons and Waldman (2006) for an excellent study on wage and promotion dynamics.  
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For stayers it is relatively more difficult to alter their status as tenure increases. 
Comparing also the average compensation that job movers received we find out that 
those who moved before completing a year in the job received (on average) £311 pounds 
while workers whose tenure was between 7 and 10 years received £370 pounds.  
 
 To conclude with the effect of tenure on the future labor market status, we have 
provided descriptive justification for the fact that our regression coefficients are at the 
same time negative and very strongly significant which arises from the very high 
concentration of job separations around 0 and 1 year of tenure. This should not be 
interpreted as a sign for flexibility, at least in our terms.  It just shows that those who 
change their employment do so at the very early stages. And it definitely does not mean 
that whoever desires a different job can easily move towards it. There could also be 
constrained (by the broad sense) workers who either cannot or do not wish for other 
reasons to leave their current employment position.  
 
 
2.9.1.4 The effect of age 
Our initial objective was to see whether there would be any significant difference 
in the explanatory power of the controlling variables (and especially the constraints in 
working hours) if the sample was restricted to just those who are relatively new in the 
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labor force. However, by conducting the analysis only for people between the age range 
18-25 we did not come up with significant results. To an extent, it was quite predictable 
for mainly two reasons, one statistical and the other intuitive: 
1) Young employees belonging to the first category of our multinomial 
specification are very few (just 39 for exiting the labor force) so any 
results would be, without question, biased.  
2)  When searching for a job, young employees can be expected to place 
emphasis on job attributes such as compensation, the actual work, 
opportunities for promotion etc. The importance of dissatisfaction with 
working hours may appear at a higher age and tenure so this particular 
factor does not appear to be the reason for job mobility, at least for 
employees below 25.   
 
By placing a dummy variable indicating whether an employee is over the age 25, 
we want to see if being a prime age employee gives any additional chances of moving 
between employment states, in comparison to young workers.  In both cases there is 
statistically significant evidence that the possibility of moving within and between 
employers is much lower for prime age people, compared to young workers. This comes 
as no surprise as the mobility of young people is much higher. Changing jobs is also 
diminishing with tenure (Figure 2.2) and consequently a young person can more easily 
find him/herself in a new working place but (to mention once more) not due to working 
hour constraints. Older employees can be more rigid in changing jobs due to firm specific 
reasons, family considerations or/and the underestimated psychological effect of getting 
used to a certain daily activity. The internal fear of facing the difficulties of a new start 
can without doubt become a severe obstacle. Consequently it should have been 
something more important than working hour constraints to motivate an employee with a 
considerable age and tenure to change employment.  
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2.9.1.5 The effect of other factors 
In the model specification, many other variables have been introduced so that to 
make the approach to hour constraints as precise as possible. Although we may have not 
encountered any predicting power of over-employment, we have come across significant 
results in terms of the controls that have been used. We have already mentioned job 
satisfaction, tenure, working full time and part time, age and education. Now we turn our 
look to wage issues, overtime (paid and non-paid), union membership, family conditions 
job sector and promotion opportunities. Undoubtedly, many other specification 
parameters can be used, it is on the researcher’s discretion to form the specification in a 
meaningful and consistent way by highlighting the variables that are more likely to affect 
the outcome.  
 
 The relative compensation that an employer receives in exchange for the amount 
of labor he/she offers is positively related with a within jobs movement and negatively 
with a between jobs movement.  In other words, an increase in wage increases the 
chances of an employee to receive a promotion in his/her current working place and 
decreases the probability for the same employee to change employer. This result can be a 
supporting argument for the efficient wage theory according to which employers may pay 
wages above the market clearing levels in order to increase productivity and decrease the 
quit rates. In addition, it is essential to clarify that the promotion opportunities variable is 
measured before the actual job change takes place. If this was not the case, an obvious 
issue of endogeneity would arise since we should normally expect from employees who 
have just be promoted, to report that enough promotion opportunities exist at their 
working place.  
 
 Union membership is positive for people getting promotion and negative for 
workers who change employer. It may be seen as a factor that increases job security and 
thus making the working relationship much more stable. Furthermore, working in the 
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private sector of the economy also raises the odds for job mobility. Public sector 
employment may again offer a more stable working environment in which movements 
between jobs are not so common.  
 
Being married imposes a barrier for between jobs movements, regardless the 
employment status of the spouse. If the spouse works, then the chances are significantly 
decreased. This variable is not significant for mobility within the same employer. 
 
An important parameter that is likely to influence a within job change is whether 
there are enough opportunities for promotion within the same job. The coefficient is 
positive, extremely well determined and of very considerable magnitude. This result may 
sound as a tautology but for us is a good sign supporting that subjective variables like this 
one have an analytically useful content.  
 
 Finally, we check if owning a house can have any effect on job mobility. Oswald 
(1997) and Gregg et al. (2000) show that owning a property does have an impact on labor 
mobility, in the sense that those who are renting would find it much easier to move for 
employment purposes. The dummy variable we use to account for house property is 
insignificant in both types of job change. However, it has a positive effect on the 
probability of being out of the labour force and a negative effect on the probability of 
being unemployed.  
 
 
 2.9.2. An alternative probit specification for job mobility 
 
The second part of the analytical framework consists of estimating two probit 
models (in a random effects setting), one for the sub-sample of young employees and the 
other for the sub sample of older employees. In this case the depended variable receives 
the value ‘1’ if the employer has changed job between period t and period t-1 and ‘0’ 
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otherwise. We then regress this dummy variable against a set of explanatory variables, all 
measured at time t-1. We adopt a less complicated framework than the previous 
multinomial one, though more broad results can be derived. We use the same set of 
explanatory variables as before and we want to see the impact that these variables have 
on the probability of job change, for employees less than 25 years old and for employees 
above this threshold.  
 
Tables 2.9 summarizes the results from the probit regressions. As far as young 
employees are concerned, underemployment at t-1 does not have any statistical power in 
predicting a job change at period t. On the contrary, over-employment significantly 
reduces the chances for changing job in the next period. At the same time, working 
overtime (but without being paid for this extra work) is likely to affect the probability of 
job mobility. Job satisfaction as expected negatively affects the likelihood of changing 
jobs. All educational categories are non significant while working in the private sector 
has a significantly positive effect. According to our results, sex does not have any 
predicting power, at least for the sample of employees who are below 25. Finally, full 
time work is associated with a reduced probability of a job change while house ownership 
has a negative and significant coefficient.   
 
In comparison to young employees, we encounter some noticeable differences 
when we examine the regression results from the sample of workers above 25. To be 
more specific, it is under-employment rather than over-employment that can statistically 
explain part of job mobility. But in this case, whoever is under-employed in period t-1 is 
more likely to be in a different job in the next period. Working full time is negatively 
affecting job mobility, in contrast to young employees. University education is strongly 
increasing the probability of being in a different job, working over-time without being 
paid is not significant and being a male worker is negatively associated to job mobility.  
Also, a spouse that does not work is a parameter that negatively affects the probability of 
changing job. Similarities are in the form of job opportunities (negative), working in the 
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public sector (positive), house ownership (negative), job satisfaction (negative), 
workplace union (insignificant) and job tenure (negative). 
 
 
2.10 Conclusion 
  
 Our analysis using the BHPS indicates that hour constraints do exist among 
British employees at substantial levels. Almost 40% of workers do not work the hours 
they desire, meaning that the labor supply they actually offer is different than the desired 
one. The purpose of this chapter was to examine if hour constraints can constitute a 
decisive parameters that can stimulate job mobility.  We found good statistical basis 
supporting that although over-employment is most commonly reported, it is 
underemployment that has some explanatory power. Furthermore, we split the sample at 
an arbitrarily chosen age, in order to see if for employees below 25 years old, hour 
constraints act differently upon job mobility than they do for employees above this 
threshold.  We found evidence that for this particular age group, hour constraints do not 
contribute significantly to job mobility. Given that young employees’ mobility is much 
higher compared to prime age employees, we conclude that it is driven by other more 
important for this group parameters. In broad terms, job mobility can be attributed to a 
continual process of finding an ideal working place. However future research should 
investigate if apart from hour constraints, young employees differ in any other manner 
and the relative impact that this may have to job mobility.  
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Table 2.1 
Employment Protection Policy, Unemployment Benefits and Active Labour Market 
Policies 
Expenditure on Active Policies 
(%GDP)*** (2001) Country EPL Index (range: 0-2) (1998)* Replacement Ratio** (2003) 
Austria 1.1 38.9 0.446672 
Belgium 1 46.5 1.278109 
Denmark 0.7 63.8 1.5820**** 
Finland 1 54.8 0.941816 
France 1.3 61.2 1.297295 
Germany 1.65 37.5 1.20692 
Ireland 0.5 38.05 1.137705 
Italy 2 57.08 0.633805 
Netherlands 1.35 70.78 1.736762 
Norway 1.55 64.9 0.787231 
Portugal 1.94 69.3 0.61**** 
Spain 1.91 63.15 0.843559 
Sweden 1.8 77 1.389294 
United Kindom 0.35 18.3 0.37618 
United States 0.1 29.5 0.145493 
 
* Data taken from Nickel et al. (2005), originally from Nicoletti et al. (2000) 
** Source: OECD. Based on the replacement ratio in the first year of an unemployment spell averaged over three family 
types. 
*** Source: OECD 
****  2000 data 
 
 
 
Table 2.2 
Involuntary Part-Time employment in Europe 
 
Country Total Employment Employees Below 25 
Austria* 2.38% 1.07% 
Belgium 13.36% 27.60% 
Germany 12.40% 16.35% 
Denmark 10.48% 5.94% 
Spain 17.65% 20.57% 
France 18.65% 22.53% 
United Kingdom 5.51% 7.77% 
Greece 41.69% 38.31% 
Ireland 7.30% 7.37% 
Italy 27.61% 36.48% 
* 3.77% 5.68% Netherlands
Norway 6.95% 7.16% 
Portugal 17.08% 32.47% 
Sweden 16.46% 24.40% 
 
Source: OECD 
* 2003 Data 
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Table 2.7 
Variable List and Definitions 
 
 
 
Variable  Definition 
    
Under employment 
 Dummy variable taking value "1" if the individual wishes to work more 
hours at period t 
Over employment 
 Dummy variable taking value "1" if the individual wishes to work less hours 
at period t 
Job Tenure  Measures years of work within the same employer 
House Ownership 
 Dummy variable taking value ‘”1” if the respondent owns the property 
he/she lives in and “0” 
Otherwise 
Job Satisfaction 
 Corresponds to overall job satisfaction measured between "1" (lowest)  
and "7" (highest) 
Full Time Worker  Dummy variable taking value "1" if the individual works full time at period t 
Non Paid Overtime 
 Dummy variable taking value "1" if the individual works overtime 
 and does not receive overtime payment 
Paid Overtime 
 Dummy variable taking value "1" if the individual works overtime  
receives overtime payment 
Spouse Works  Corresponds to the case where the spouse of the respondent works 
Spouse does not Work  Correspond to the case where the spouse of the respondent doesn't work 
Higher education  The respondent holds a higher education qualification (MSc, Phd) 
University Degree  The respondent holds a University degree 
Teaching,hnd,hnc 
 The respondent has either teaching qualifications or he/she holds a 
higher national diploma or a higher national certificate 
A levels  No university education but A levels 
O level  Corresponds to O level education 
Cse  Corresponds to a Certificate of Secondary Education 
Job Sector 
 Dummy Variable taking value "1" if the respondent works 
 in the private sector 
Union   Union present at working place 
Promotion Opportunities 
 The individual believes that there are enough promotion opportunities 
 in his/her current job 
male worker  Dummy variable taking value "1" if the respondent is male 
prime age worker  Dummy variable taking value "1" if the respondent is above 25 years old  
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Table 2.8 
Multinomial Results 
                        
 Out of Labour Force at t  Unemployed at t  Moving within at t  Moving Between at t 
 Coefficient T statistic  Coefficient T statistic  Coefficient T statistic  Coefficient T statistic
Variable                        
Underemployment -0.31 0.79  0.14 0.33  0.24 2.82**  0.19 2.54** 
            
Over-employment 0.48 3.26***  -0.39 1.04  -0.03 0.67  -0.077 1.54 
            
Job Tenure -0.012 0.94  -0.12 2.18*  -0.1 14.71***  -0.2 20.97*** 
            
House Ownership 0.57 2.05*  -0.19 0.57  0.06 0.99  -0.25 1.9 
            
Job Satisfaction -0.075 1.42  -0.29 3.09***  -0.019 1.07  -0.25 16.4*** 
            
Full Time Worker 0.6 3.15***  -0.48 1.2  0.76 8.98***  0.05 0.84 
            
Non Paid Overtime -0.36 2.02*  -0.6 1.17  0.29 5.33***  -0.06 1.01 
            
Paid Overtime -0.48 2.4*  -0.32 0.92  0.16 3.1***  -0.004 0.08 
            
Spouse works 0.52 1.46  -0.59 1.08  -0.012 0.15  -0.27 2.95** 
            
Spouse doesn’t work 0.96 5.52***  -1.72 3.65***  0.06 1.28  -0.09 1.77* 
            
Higher education 0.9 2.14*  -0.87 0.82  0.57 4.27***  0.075 0.51 
            
University Degree 1.1 3.88***  -0.82 1.53  0.68 7.34***  0.34 4.02*** 
            
Teaching, hnd, hnc 0.53 1.97*  -1.28 2.7**  0.5 5.86***  0.14 1.82* 
            
A levels 0.48 1.95*  -1.09 2.57**  0.45 5.45***  0.09 1.24 
            
O levels 0.44 1.31  -0.91 1.39  0.52 5.06***  0.09 0.91 
            
Cse 0.97 3.92***  -0.83 1.43  0.21 1.73*  0.17 1.74* 
            
Job Sector 0.37 2.16*  0.37 0.84  0.21 3.8***  0.28 4.61*** 
            
Union  0.27 1.65  -0.25 0.73  0.13 2.7**  -0.24 4.66*** 
            
Promotion opps. 0.36 2.49**  0.16 0.53  0.94 18.24***  0.05 1.08 
            
male worker -2.56 10.3***  0.17 0.54  -0.09 1.97*  -0.07 1.49 
            
Prime age worker -0.58 2.32**   -0.83 2.38**  -0.27 4.07***   -0.38 6.01*** 
Constant term -5.17 9.53***  -2.93 2.65**  -3.64 19.70***  -0.24 1.52 
Observations 28276 
LR X2(128) 3552.43 
Pseudo R2 0.0969 
Log Likelihood -16547.223 
Hausman test for iia passed  passed passed  passed 
Notes : Base category is being employed in both periods within the same employer. Specification also includes 12 
year dummies. All control variables are measures at t. Reported t values are in absolute value.  
Table 2.9 
Probability of Job Change: Binomial Random Effects Results 
            
 Employees <25  Employees >25 
 Coefficient T statistic  Coefficient T statistic
Variable            
0.11 1.75* 0.19 5.37*** Underemployment  
      
-0.12 2.39* -0.02 1.07 Over-employment  
      
-0.2 13.48*** -0.07 33.19*** Job Tenure  
      
-0.12 2.4* -0.09 3.63*** House Ownership  
      
-0.18 10.92*** -0.13 20.1*** Job Satisfaction  
      
-0.23 2.88* 0.12 4.77*** Full Time Worker  
      
0.13 2.1* 0.011 0.46 Non Paid Overtime  
      
-0.03 0.66 0.004 0.22 Paid Overtime  
      
-0.18 0.97 -0.046 1.4 Spouse works  
      
-0.07 1 0.017 0.86 Spouse doesn’t work  
      
-0.03 0.17 0.18 3.5*** Higher education  
      
-0.06 0.57 0.21 6.23*** University Degree  
      
-0.071 0.66 0.1 3.6*** Teaching, hnd, hnc  
      
-0.055 0.51 0.08 3.15*** A levels  
      
0.031 0.24 0.05 1.41 O levels  
      
-0.039 0.28 0.07 1.72* Cse  
      
0.147 2.43* 0.17 7.43*** Job Sector  
      
-0.039 0.83 -0.03 1.56 Union   
      
0.094 2.04* 0.13 6.88*** Promotion opps.  
      
0.012 0,30 -0.76 3.79*** male worker  
      
1.27 6.88*** 0.026 0.43 Constant term   
Observations 3915  25182 
LR x2(df) 413.45 (31)  2614 (31) 
0.0764 0.0894 Pseudo R2   
Notes : Specification also includes 12 year dummies. All variables are measured at t. Reported t stats are in 
absolute values. *,**,*** denote significance at 5%,1% and <1% respectively
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Chapter 3  
 
11 Re-examining job satisfaction – Evidence from the UK
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 I would like to thank Dr Tim Hinks, Dr Thanos Mergoupis and Dr Chrisostomos Florackis for useful 
comments on earlier drafts of this chapter. Comments from seminar participants at the University of Bath 
are also acknowledged 
 54
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter we related job mobility with hour constraints. We looked 
explicitly at whether constraints in the hours people work can stimulate job mobility. 
Given that a proportion of the working population does vary its employment status 
between two periods12, we endeavoured to ascertain if this mobility was result of “under-
employment” or “over-employment” after controlling for various other factors.     
 
In this chapter, we focus explicitly on overall job satisfaction placing it on the left 
hand side of our analytical framework. The primary scope of this work is to seek 
statistical justification for the consideration of potential job satisfaction determining 
variables. Although this task has already been examined in the literature, we offer new 
insights by considering a set of subjective covariates that aim to capture heterogeneous 
elements across individuals. We also provide a more extensive list of “conventional” 
covariates compared to previous studies. Finally, we take advantage of the panel 
dimension of the BHPS by using the relevant panel data techniques 
 
A particular famous contribution on the interdependence between economics and 
psychology is due to Akerlof and Dickens (1982)13. Using the notion of “cognitive 
dissonance” they argue that people have preferences not only over the states of the world 
but also over their beliefs about the states of the world. If we accept for example the fact 
that some jobs are more dangerous than some other, it is still likely to find workers within 
a dangerous working place who do not take any precautionary measures for their safety. 
Projecting this notion into job satisfaction, some workers who might work long hours or 
face in general adverse working conditions may have a tendency to underestimate their 
                                                 
12  The relevant information we derive from the thirteen BHPS waves is that 28% of our sample changed 
job between two consecutive periods.  
13 See also Bruni and Sugden (2007) for a very recent consideration of the relationship between economics 
and psychology 
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situation. Obviously such an action, as Akerlof and Dickens (1982) explain, involves a 
benefit and a cost. The benefit comes from the fact than those who believe that they are 
reasonably happy with their jobs avoid the constant unpleasant feeling that a certain or 
many job attributes gives them displeasure. On the other hand, if they convince 
themselves that they are happy with their jobs they may make costly judgement errors 
due to the transparency between their beliefs and the true state of the world. This is 
obvious in the case of a dangerous job where the cost is measured by the probability of 
being injured or even killed.  
 
A close paradigm from the viewpoint of job satisfaction can be the tendency of 
some workers to underestimate the fear of being laid off. By doing this, these workers 
may avoid the constant fear that a low job security working place implies but they still 
have to face the increased risk of being laid off.  
 
The inclination to underestimate situations or, in Akerlof’s and Dickens’s 
phraseology, “to have a preference over beliefs” is certainly varying between individuals. 
Workers that work in the same firm and face the same working conditions may look at 
things under a totally different prism in the sense that some are in general more optimistic 
than the others and tend (as mentioned above) to look “at the bright side of life”. 
Consequently this could be an individualistic contribution to the anyway subjectively 
reported job satisfaction that has to be taken into account.  
 
Psychologists may also argue that even if a worker is unhappy with some aspects 
of his/her working life, the adaptive nature of human mental function could be 
“responsible” for alleviating this unhappiness in subsequent periods. In other words, after 
a year in the job, the employee is well possible to think that things are not as bad as they 
seemed at first sight. Among these lines is a recent theoretical application of cognitive 
dissonance to the labour market by Watson et. al. (2005). Considering a standard job 
search model where workers maximise expected life time utility, these authors explain 
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why the earnings of workers can be restricted by their labour market perception. 
However, an econometric estimation of such effects can be difficult since they vary from 
individual to individual and it is not clear how they could be explicitly taken into account.   
 
An issue of consideration is the fear that a subjectively measured variable (such as 
job satisfaction) carries “noise”. In signal processing or computing, this term is used to 
describe data without meaning. In terms of subjective variables the skepticism lies on 
whether answers to questions like “How satisfied are you with your work” or “How 
satisfied are you with your life” elicit meaningful information. Bertrand and Mullainathan 
(2001) provide some examples which indicate that the answers in similar questions can 
be potentially sensitive to the words used or the ordering of the questions. However, they 
point out that the fact that economists cast doubts on the use of subjectively measured 
variables “is based on a priori skepticism rather than on evidence”. In deed, 
considerations about “noise” traditionally made economists less keen to rely on 
subjective variables to a great extent.  This is the reason that no much work has been 
done in this direction. Yet, the scenery is rapidly changing. Following the pioneering 
work of Freeman (1978) and Hammermesh (1977), many studies have tried to examine 
how job satisfaction is related to both time-varying and time-constant variables. Some 
focus explicitly on a specific parameter, e.g. trade union membership (Borjas, 1979, 
Bender and Sloane, 1998, Bryson et.al. , 2004) or gender (Clark, 1997 , Donohue and 
Heywood, 2004) while other offer a broader (Clark, 1996) and cross-country (Diaz-
Serrano and Vieira, 2005, Souza-Poza and Souza-Poza, 2000) perspective.   
 
As previously, we support the idea that subjectively measured variables enclose 
valuable information. Oswald (1997) argues that economists should not avoid dealing 
with data on subjective feelings. One of the reasons is that subjective well-being 
measures correlate with observable phenomena (i.e., reported job-satisfaction values are 
not just ‘noise’). This view can be particularly plausible if supporting evidence is found 
for the predicting power of these variables. Freeman’s (1978) and Clark’s et.al. (1998) 
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studies are along these premises.   Moreover, psychologists (and sociologists to a lesser 
extent) have been using such data for many years. Quoting Blancflower and Oswald 
(1999), ‘It seems difficult to believe that economists have a more acute understanding of 
the limitations of well-being statistics than do the thousands of psychologist who use 
such data in their own research’ 
 
Using subjective variables in an econometrics framework is not new. We have 
already made use of this approach using job satisfaction as control variable while 
considering the subjective view of employers on whether they are constrained in the 
hours they work. But the dependent variable (labour market transition), although 
individually reported it was not reflecting any subjective feeling. In the job satisfaction 
case, when a respondent is being asked to value the satisfaction he/she derives from the 
working place the analysis becomes more complicated and the validity of results can be 
sensitive, especially if this answer is used as dependent variable. Bertrand and 
Muleinathan (2001) argue that when objective variables are used on the left hand side, 
measurement problems may bias the regression results. For example, if for a reason rich 
people (on average) tend to underestimate their financial status14 then the estimated 
coefficient will just capture the measurement error and convey no information 
whatsoever about their actual satisfaction on their financial situation. But measurement 
errors are well likely to exist even when using “conventional” covariates.  
 
The contribution of this chapter can be synoptically summarised in the following 
points: 
a) We provide a literature overview of considering job satisfaction as an 
economic variable, indicating the possible dangers of doing so and 
presenting relevant studies supporting the idea that analyzing job 
satisfaction can in fact be useful in the discipline of economics. 
                                                 
14 For example in a hypothetical question “How satisfied are you with your financial situation" 
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b) We verify previous results on job satisfaction as far as some classic 
explanatory variables are concerned. For example, women report 
consistently higher job satisfaction rates than men, (Blanchflower and 
Oswald, 1999; Clark 1996,1997). However, by using subjectively 
measured covariates we aim to decompose these previous broad results 
and tackle heterogeneity in a more consistent way.  
c) We examine job satisfaction differences between periods and across 
individuals in order to isolate the specific effects of employment and 
individual characteristics on job satisfaction. This task is greatly 
assisted by the nature of our panel data set 
d) We estimate job satisfaction profiles to examine how job satisfaction 
alters through job tenure, based on whether the employee has changed 
job or not. Although it is expected that a job change will yield a 
positive effect on job satisfaction, it is not quite certain (and has not 
addressed in the literature, at least to the best of our knowledge) if this 
positive effect will persist or not.  Further, we decompose the job 
satisfaction profile with reference to the whether the employee has 
experienced a job change within the same employer (a promotion for 
example) or between employers.  
 
 
3.2. Job Satisfaction as an economic variable 
 
The issue of job satisfaction has drawn extensive attention from a variety of social 
science disciplines, especially psychology. Locke (1976) provides an extensive and 
holistic summary of the psychological literature on this issue and recommends possible 
ways of specifying a relationship between job satisfaction and other characteristics. Most 
of the studies discussed by Locke, propose correlations between job satisfaction and a 
single variable of interest rather than using the more formal statistical methods of 
multivariate regression analysis favoured by economists. However, the survey reveals, at 
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least from a qualitative point of view something not quite unexpected vis. the negative 
relationship between job turnover and job satisfaction.  
 
 Far fewer studies in the economics literature have placed this variable into the 
epicentre of discussion. Freeman (1978) estimated a model to test whether low levels of 
job satisfaction can predict future quits. The panel nature of his datasets (NLS and PSID) 
made it possible to relate satisfaction in one year with future mobility. In this context, 
Freeman used logit regressions to calculate how the probability of quits is affected by job 
satisfaction. He found that one standard deviation15 change in the satisfaction variable 
reduces the probability of quits by almost 40 percent in PSID and 12 percent in the NLS. 
At the same time, these effects were from a statistical point of view very well established. 
Freeman’s (1978) comment was that “subjective expressions of job satisfaction are 
significantly related to future overt behaviour, which makes satisfaction at least 
potentially analytical useful.” 
 
Dissatisfaction with a job can be linked to job mobility to the extent that an 
employee can easily move to a different working place or change job within the same 
establishment. Leaving job mobility aside, a number of studies have found that worker 
dissatisfaction can have significant “knock-on” implications for worker behaviours. If a 
dissatisfied worker is unable to change job for a number of various reasons (for example, 
high unemployment rates, firm specific training, family considerations), it has been 
suggested that adverse behaviour such as absenteeism can occur (Vroom, 1964) and 
mental health problems can arise, Locke (1976). Dissatisfaction with the job could also 
be associated with lower effort in the working place and shirking, (Weiss 1980; Akerlof 
and Yellen 1986). It is perhaps not surprising that reduced levels of job satisfaction can 
have a profound (negative) impact on the employment relationship from many aspects. A 
satisfied employee would be less willing to voluntarily quit from his job and at the same 
time a satisfied worker would be keen to invest in firm specific-human capital. Such 
                                                 
15 The reason for this interpretation is the z-score transformation of the satisfaction variable he used.  
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action could be perceived as a sign of commitment from the employer’s side and may be 
rewarded16.  
 
Job satisfaction as an economic variable needs careful treatment, especially if it 
used within an economic context because individual responses can be subjective to noise. 
If, for instance, an individual is generally comfortable with his/her working place but 
something unpleasant (in terms of employment relations, e.g. dispute with the manager) 
happened in the job exactly the day before he/she got interviewed, it might be argued that 
his/her response will not be independent of this incidence and that if the employee had 
been asked the same question a week or so later, the response might be quite different. 
Pushing this argument further, Taylor (2006) finds that even the day of the week on 
which a respondent is interviewed plays a significant role in explaining job satisfaction 
variations. By the same token, if panel data is used, year to year variation in job 
satisfaction could be due to a self error measurement.  (a different year to year reported 
level of job satisfaction implying the same utility), especially if there is a plethora of 
possible choices in the questionnaire, e.g. a job satisfaction index ranging from 1 to 10.  
 
So far, mainly due to data unavailability, economists could implicitly approach 
job satisfaction looking at variables such as wage promotion, employment protection, 
promotion opportunities and so forth. However there is no reason why we should 
consider job satisfaction as a monotonic transformation of one of these (and probably 
other variables). If this was the case an employee with a higher wage should, ceteris 
paribus, have a higher job satisfaction compared to an employee with a lower wage. But 
two workers with different wages can have the same job satisfaction (keeping the 
observable parameters constant) if the one with the lower wage has lower expectations 
towards his wage than the employee with the higher wage.  
                                                 
16 An interesting perspective linking macroeconomic theory and job satisfaction comes from Hamermesh 
(2001) who argues that workers with high job satisfaction have a lower incentive to undertake 
precautionary saving. This idea could be valid in two cases, if high job satisfaction is related to job security 
and to the extent that job dissatisfaction can stimulate quits. 
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3.3 Utility and Job Satisfaction 
 
It is reasonable and within the scope of economic rationality to suggest that the 
utility that an individual derives does include job satisfaction as well as other variables.  
In this case the utility function can simply take the static form:  
 
 =  v ,z + u(w ,h ,x ,s ,eUi i i i i i i i)  + εi     (1) 
 
The first part which includes vi, is a vector which relates non-work aspects of life to 
overall utility. This vector can include both constant as well as time variant parameters. 
For example being married can be considered to be unrelated to job satisfaction but is 
expected to affect life satisfaction. So any link between marital status and job satisfaction 
is indirect and may work through general life satisfaction. The second part involves all 
the possible aspects of working life that contribute in a direct manner to job satisfaction. 
Thus, the utility function can be decomposed into many life-time aspects as well as a 
variable containing job satisfaction. At the same time job satisfaction can be multi-
dimensional, defined by a sub-utility function that could include satisfaction with 
working hours (h), promotion opportunities (x), monthly payment (w) , employment 
security (s) plus a vector z that contains all the other observable parameters. The last 
element (ei) is the individual specific term that includes all the other parameters that are 
not observed but are expected to differentiate the job satisfaction classification between 
respondents, even if they share exactly the same observable characteristics that a 
researcher would explicitly control for in an econometric modelling.  
 
 The dependency path between characteristics and job satisfaction can be modelled 
in many ways, simple or complex.  An econometric model of the form of equation (1) can 
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be simply considered if the researcher assumes strict exogeneity. In other words, the 
explanatory variables are assumed to affect job satisfaction directly and in the same 
manner such that job satisfaction is additively contributing to the overall utility. This 
logic is consistent with an additively separable utility function. A more complex and 
perhaps more realistic approach would be to allow for an interaction between individual 
specific observed elements and the determinants of job satisfaction. For example, job 
stability (determinant) could be highly appreciated by a middle age, married with 
children employee (characteristics) but might perhaps be of less concern to a young 
employee.  
 
For this discussion to be complete, two more issues must be presented: First, the 
error term ei which appears in the utility function related to job satisfaction. This term 
depicts all the unobserved factors that might potentially affect job satisfaction but which 
are not related to the observed parameters. It is equivalent to the tastes shifter factor we 
encounter in general consumption functions and obviously, in an econometric sense, 
affects the constant term but not the slope. It potentially depicts issues related to the 
personality of each respondent and could, in an abstract way, account for the fact that a 
respondent can generally be more optimistic than the other. Secondly, the error parameter 
ε  that appears in the general utility equation must be independent of ei i . If this is not the 
case, then the same personality characteristics would be taken into account twice, leading 
to underestimation of the parameters of interest.  
    
 
3.4 The Relationship between Life Satisfaction and Job Satisfaction 
 
One potentially interesting area of investigation is the influence of overall 
satisfaction on job satisfaction in the sense that an individual who is happy with his/her 
life might be able to tolerate in general adverse employment situations. However, such a 
consideration could prove problematic for mainly two reasons. Data on overall life 
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satisfaction are usually not available (and if they are, similar issues to those with any 
subjective variable may arise) and secondly (and most importantly) no one can guarantee 
that the model will be reserve causality proof. In other words, for some workers job 
satisfaction can be the main determinant of overall happiness. 
 
Using data from the latest addition (wave 14) of the BHPS we examine whether 
there is a noticeable common path in the reported life overall and job satisfaction. Table 
3.1 presents a cross tabulation between these two variables. While it is natural to assume 
that job satisfaction is part of the overall life satisfaction, for some people these two 
aspects can be totally unrelated. Indeed, we can identify three respondents who although 
being completely satisfied with their jobs, are totally unhappy with their lives. Of course, 
these respondents could be treated as outliers in a sample of 7800 people.   
 
Looking at the relationship between life satisfaction and job satisfaction sheds 
light to the idea that there might be other aspects (unrelated to job satisfaction) of life that 
weight heavily in the subjective life satisfaction index and consequently affect job 
satisfaction. To make this clearer, assume two individuals sharing identical working 
profiles. If one of these two individuals had a pleasant disruption of a sequence of 
expected incidences (child born), then there is a high chance that he/she could have 
reported a higher job satisfaction than the other colleague, influenced by the rise in the 
total life satisfaction and not directly by the incidence it self. Undoubtedly this argument 
can work in the opposite direction when, apart from the implicit effect, there is also a 
direct effect coming from the projection of this incidence on the aspects of the 
employment, most often the wage and the working hours.  
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Table (3.1)  
 Job Satisfaction and Life satisfaction . BHPS, 2004, row data (%)
 
 
Coming back to table 3.1, it is not clear whether there is a strong correlation 
between these two variables, apart from the fact that most responses are distributed 
around 5 and 6 which denote a good level of life satisfaction. Given that there are few 
responses at lower levels, it would probably be risky to argue in favour of any causal 
relationship in the classical linear sense. After mentioning that by using the chi squared 
test of independence this hypothesis is not rejected, one can observe that very low levels 
of job satisfaction do not necessarily imply low levels of life satisfaction. But as job 
satisfaction increases, there is both redistribution of life satisfaction between the higher 
scales (5,6,7)  as well as significant increase in the percentage of those who report the 
highest life satisfaction. For example, from those employees who report job satisfaction 
of 1 (the lowest) in 2004, 53.41% have a life satisfaction of 5, 6 or 7. But for the same 
year, reporting the highest job satisfaction (7) is associated with a massive 89% of good 
life satisfaction (5,6 or 7). These figures show that there is a positive relationship between 
job satisfaction and life satisfaction with an estimated correlation coefficient of 0.330, 
significant at even 1%. As mentioned above, the exact direction of the dependence 
between these two variables can not be made clear by this simple tabulation. One could 
 
  
   
                                               Satisfaction with Overall Life 
         Job Satisfaction  
 2 3 4 5 6 7    not satis at all 
          
  3.41 5.68 14.77 22.73 22.73 22.73 7.95 not satis at all  
 1.41 1.41 15.49 23 35.21 18.31 5.16 2  
 0.85 4.06 15.6 26.28 31.84 19.87 1.5 3  
 0.62 2.89 8.25 20.82 40.21 22.47 4.74 not satis/dissatis  
 0.47 1.8 5.4 17.27 41.4 29.67 4 4  
 0.17 0.78 3.38 9.92 33.39 43.25 9.12 5  
  0.23 0.91 1.7 7.84 16.82 38.98 33.52 completely satis  
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argue that the shape of relationship depends on the level of job satisfaction. For example 
moving from 6 to 7 in the JS index results in an important increase for those who report 
the highest life satisfaction, from 9,57 to 32,95 %. In other words, the pattern of 
dependence becomes more clear and strong at the highest level of job satisfaction. 
 
In any case, the high degree of heterogeneity between individuals and the fact that 
table 3.1 provides unconditional cross tabulations makes us sceptical about using life 
satisfaction as a control variable in a JS equation. If we had a priori knowledge that some 
individuals consider life satisfaction as being independent of job satisfaction, we could 
use life satisfaction data in order to isolate any unobserved effects on job satisfaction 
coming from the thought that general life happiness can make someone feel happier with 
his work, keeping all the other parameters constant.  Frijters et al (2004), using the 
German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) find that major life changes (for example birth 
of a child, becoming divorced, death of a family member and so forth) have a significant 
impact on subsequent life satisfaction levels. Consequently, life satisfaction (LS) could 
potentially (as long as the non reserve causality criterion is met) serve as a proxy for time 
varying observed and unobserved heterogeneity.  One might question why LS has to 
account for both, observed and unobserved factors since observed parameters can enter 
the econometric specification directly.  The answer is that subjective variables (like LS) 
that act as proxies for life events can be much more useful in terms of the economic 
analysis since they encapsulate the relative importance that each person attributes to life 
events which is difficult to be revealed otherwise. The rest of heterogeneity can be dealt 
with either random or fixed effects, depending on the assumptions that the researcher 
makes. In what follows, we will not consider life satisfaction as an explanatory variable 
in order to avoid any simultaneity problems.  
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3.5 Job satisfaction and employment -individual characteristics 
 
3.5.1 Gender differences in job satisfaction 
 
An important scope of our analysis is to examine if job satisfaction varies 
significantly across different demographic groups, males and females, young and old. 
Using the BHPS, Clark (1997) provides a comparative study on job satisfaction between 
men and women. His evidence suggests that women report significantly higher job 
satisfaction than men. However, this study is static and restricted to the first BHPS wave 
so, important information on how job satisfaction varies across time and between women 
and men is not revealed. The dynamic element is important and directly related to the 
explanation that Clark gives for this paradox: Women usually enter the labour market 
having, in general, lower expectations than men. These expectations may not necessarily 
refer only to wages but are unavoidably extended to other aspects of working life. 
Consequently, the pleasant and unexpected gap between the expected and realised 
working condition is the source for the statistically different levels of job satisfaction 
reported by women.  
 
If this argument holds, one might expect expectations to move along a social 
adjustment path. Female labour supply rose significantly during the last decades17, 
corresponding to a structural social change characterised by equality in the educational 
opportunities (at least in the UK) and increased participation in all aspects of economical 
and political life. Although there is evidence that discrimination does exist, especially 
when it comes to wages and promotion opportunities18, the general feeling is that the 
working place for women is much better than it used to be some years ago. Taking this 
assumption as the starting point, we should observe differences in the reported 
satisfaction by comparing two periods on a time scale of 13 years. To be more specific, 
                                                 
17 Blundell and McCardy (1999) provide evidence on the rise in the volume of labour women supply during 
the last decades.  
18 Jones and Makepeace (1996) argue that women and men on the same managerial level do not have 
significant wage differences. It is rather the difficulty of women to reach these levels that define the terms 
of discrimination  
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we consider the first (1991) and the latest (2004) wave of the BHPS to see whether the 
job satisfaction gap between men and women has narrowed. The following table 
summarises the evidence: 
 
 
Table 3.2 
Job Satisfaction by gender. BHPS, 1991- 2004, Column data  
 
  1991    2004  
  Males Females Total  Males Females Total 
        
not satisfied 39.3% 29.1% 34.4%  10.9% 10.2% 10.6% 
2 2.0% 1.5% 1.7%  2.7% 2.9% 2.8% 
3 5.7% 3.3% 4.6%  7.8% 6.4% 7.1% 
neither sat/nor dis 14.4% 10.5% 12.5%  8.9% 5.4% 7.2% 
5 21.1% 16.8% 19.0%  23.4% 18.5% 20.9% 
6 27.6% 25.9% 26.8%  46.6% 51.9% 49.3% 
complete satisf. 25.2% 39.1% 31.9%  9.6% 13.8% 11.7% 
 
* The sample has been weighted using the BHPS provided cross-sectional weights. 
* Chi2 test for independence between genders is significant at the conventional 5% level.  
 
Comparing job satisfaction in the early 90’s with job satisfaction in the mid 00’s there 
seems to be a very significant decline in the percentage of those who declare totally 
satisfied with their work. Both genders are simultaneously affected by this evolution, 
men’s satisfaction at the highest level dropped by 15,6% while for women the equivalent 
difference was  25.3%. At the same time, there is a noticeable decrease in the reported 
total dissatisfaction with work, again for males and females. Although the total figures 
for both genders haven’t changed significantly if we jointly consider the categories 6 and 
7 (complete satisfaction), the distribution has in fact changed for those who report lower 
job satisfaction.  The difference in the reported satisfaction is still here but is it not of the 
same magnitude as before. Women on average still report higher job satisfaction than 
men. However, the majority of the responses have moved from the 7th scale to the 6th one 
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which is undoubtedly much more preferable than having a substantial percentage of 
totally dissatisfied workers. 
 
 In the literature, these differences were explained in terms of self-selectivity into 
the labour market and, as mentioned above, expectations differences between the 
genders, since controlling for relevant variable still leaves the female variable with a 
positive coefficient, Clark (1997).  Our argument is that social adjustment from one side 
(increased levels of female labour supply) and improvement of working conditions on the 
other would have made the magnitude of these impacts modest in relation to earlier years. 
And the under reference period has been quite acknowledged (at least for the UK) 
(Treasury, 2002) for the deregulation of economic activity which is relevant for our 
analysis when it comes to the labour market. If this approach is correct the gender 
element that has remained in the job satisfaction consideration is more likely to be 
attributed to the actual psychological characteristics of women. Interestingly, this element 
disappears when we consider young women, higher educated workers, workers in 
managerial positions and workers at male-dominated environments as Clark (1997) and 
Souza-Poza and Souza-Posa (2003) report.  
 
 
3.5.2 Union Membership effects in job satisfaction 
 
The impact of unions in economic life has been discussed excessively in both 
empirical and theoretical aspects19. Most studies have focused on the pecuniary aspects 
of the decision to actively involve in a union body. In this point it must be mentioned that 
the general framework normally applies to every worker, regardless of whether this 
worker belongs or not to a trade union. For example in France20 union density accounts 
only for a 10%, but the coverage extends to the impressing 95% by law. It is true that 
negotiations that take place at a high decentralized level are expected to cover a large 
                                                 
19 See A. Booth (1995). “The economics of the Trade Union”. Cambridge University Press 
20 Information derived from Table (2) in Nickell et.al. (2005).  
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percentage of the working population. These negotiations deal with a very generic 
framework of workplace aspects like minimum wages, insurance issues and so forth. 
However, issues that are specifically related to each firm’s characteristics can only be 
discussed collectively within the firm through a workplace union. By joining a trade 
union, a member can express dissatisfaction with pecuniary or non-pecuniary aspects of 
the job. Thus a dissatisfied worker instead of quitting, remains in the job, joins the union 
and expresses his/her complaints through various voice mechanisms provided by their 
union (exit-voice). 
 
 An early contribution to the relationship between job satisfaction and union 
membership is accredited to Borjas (1979). Using a sample from the Natural 
Longitudinal Survey of Mature Men he finds out that union members report on average 
lower job satisfaction. Moreover, dissatisfaction (within union members) increases as 
seniority rises. This fact is indeed puzzling. Someone would expect that seniority should 
have a diminishing effect on job dissatisfaction since job separations are most likely to 
occur at the early stages of the employment relationship. So, if someone is not happy 
with the a priori non-observable characteristics of a job he/she could quit in order to 
search for a better matching. To our view, these results can be related to the effectiveness 
of the workplace union. By joining such a union, the employee might have augmented 
expectations regarding the possibilities of differentiating his/her employment terms in 
both a pecuniary and non pecuniary manner. If these expectations are not realised then 
the same dissatisfaction that led to membership at first place is coming back to surface. 
Consequently, a proper examination of the effect of unionism on job satisfaction 
shouldn’t be simply of cross-sectional nature for the simple reason that the dynamic 
characteristics of this involvement are neglected. As a final remark on this, Bender and 
Sloane (1998) also emphasize the importance of controlling for satisfaction with the 
union in order to isolate job satisfaction. Freeman (1976) offers an explanation on why 
the nion coefficient in a job satisfaction equation is likely to be non-zero. Since the initial 
scope of unionism is to provide mechanisms for workers’ voice to be heard effectively, 
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reported dissatisfaction “is not genuine in the sense that it leads to quits, but instead a 
device through which the union can tell the firm that its workers are unhappy and are 
demanding more” , Borjas (1979:25).  As with women, the union variable can be a choice 
variable, especially in jobs where unpleasant conditions are de facto present. Bryson et.al. 
(2004) consider the 1998 sample of the British Workplace Employee Relations Survey. 
At first, they find a significant negative (-0.135) coefficient for the union variable. But 
when they account for potential endogeneity in the model, the element that allows the 
correlation of unobserved factors between satisfaction and membership equation absorbs 
almost all of the impact (-0.124). In other words there are reasons to believe that the 
correlation of omitted variables (which cause dissatisfaction) with the dummy variable 
that indicates whether someone is a union member or not, results in this coefficient being 
significantly negative.  In this case, it is the reported low job satisfaction that stimulates 
union membership rather that a causal (positive) impact of membership on job 
satisfaction.  
 
 The above analysis had explicitly assumed that the unions’ contribution into a 
worker’s well being refers to the non-monetary features of job, since the pecuniary 
aspects are more or less known, before the contractual relationship. In fact, what this 
negative sign expresses is an expectation parameter that things in the workplace will be 
improved. In this sense, when estimating a job satisfaction equation, a union parameter 
could be avoided, provided that a large numbers of controls have been used so that even 
if a union variable had been there, its impact would have been insignificant. Of course, 
this would require adjustments not only for individual heterogeneity but also for 
heterogeneity in the working place. The latter would be possible only in studies that 
match employers’ characteristics with employees attributes. In the BHPS such discretion 
is not available, however there are other ways to approximate workplace conditions like 
dummies for the industry category, public sector or private sector, size of firm e.t.c. 
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 3.5.3 The age factor 
  
One strong consensus which results from the seminal job satisfaction study by 
Clark (1997) is that a U-shaped relationship between age and job satisfaction exists. It is 
now well expected in most empirical studies (not necessarily related to labor markets) to 
see the age factor entering the list of explanatory variables in a quadratic form. If this 
hypothesis holds, job satisfaction although higher for young employees, diminishes with 
age until it reaches a minimum point from which it start ascending again. The above 
mentioned studies though fail to differentiate between a pure age effect and a tenure 
effect. Since these two aspects are expected to be correlated, some of the tenure features 
are wrongly attributed to age. High tenure can have both negative and positive effects for 
some employers and this could be confusing when age becomes the parameter of interest. 
The age variation in job satisfaction can be related to the process of changing jobs (either 
between employers or within employers). In this manner, those who manage to switch 
jobs must be expected to have increased job satisfaction in comparison to the satisfaction 
they were reporting before changing job. Since changing jobs is more often observed in 
young ages (and low tenures), being an employee above a certain age and a certain tenure 
implies on average higher job satisfaction. If this was not the case, the employee would 
had already changed job at earlier stages of his/her working (and physical life) when 
family constraints (and probably other constraints) wouldn’t be in place. This discussion 
also highlights the term flexibility as it was defined in the previous chapter, namely the 
ability to change jobs as a way to move closer to the desired working place 
characteristics. With the difference now that not only the two broad aspects of labor 
supply are taken into consideration (working hours, wage) but issues such as job security, 
the work it self, individual heterogeneity and so forth.  
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3.6 Predicting subsequent transitions  
 
 The relative power of job satisfaction to determine future labor market 
movements have been merely assessed. Although Freeman (1978) was among the first 
economists to examine this issue, it was only after two decades that relevant research 
evolved, primarily thanks to the availability of suitable datasets and the improvement of 
computational techniques. A reader who is unfamiliar with the relevant literature is likely 
to ask about the need of considering an intermediate subjective variable since one could 
just examine the impact of seemingly more relevant variables such as wages or 
promotion opportunities. As far as wages are concerned, we mentioned earlier that 
previous efforts in the literature to consider the actual wage as a determinant of job 
satisfaction were unsuccessful. Promotion Opportunities on the other hand can be a good 
sign of a more stable relationship in the sense that expectations for a better employment 
future could be a discouraging parameter for job quits, even of current working 
conditions are non the desirable ones.  Clark, Yeorgellis and Safney (1998) argue that job 
satisfaction can be a suitable proxy for the non-pecuniary aspects of a job that cannot be 
measured. In fact, the monetary attributes of a job such as the wage, the overtime 
premium, the insurance contributions etc are normally known before the contractual 
working relationship takes place. Even some trivial non-pecuniary issues are known in 
the labor market since each firm usually carries a good or bad reputation, for example in 
terms of the promotion opportunities it offers, the possibilities for in-the-job training 
ethical rewards, overtime (paid or non paid) employment and so forth. However, the 
exact nature of this dimension is unknown ex-ante and most importantly we also do not 
know the projection of each worker’s personality on these non-pecuniary issues. For 
example, the relationship with the co-workers is an important parameter of the working 
environment and every single worker wishes to get along with people surrounding 
him/her. Unfortunately this is not always feasible due to the incompatibility of personal 
characteristics.    
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 Akerlof et al (1988) using the National Longitudinal Survey  report that, at least 
for the United States, switching jobs (without an intermediate unemployment spell) is not 
usually accompanied by a significant upwards wage change. On the contrary, many 
workers report no change while some others mention even wage cuts.  More 
interestingly, the latter despite the fact that they suffer wage cuts they achieve gains in 
overall job satisfaction. In this sense, job satisfaction can act as a proxy for all those 
elements that cannot be considered directly but play a significant role in decisions related 
to the future labor market status. Non-Pecuniary aspects of work can also be intra-related, 
for example promotion opportunities might be expected to depend on the signals that the 
employers receive from their workers in the form of voluntarily over-working. The non-
pecuniary rewards can be either time-varying, following a cycle, or time constant. 
Unquestionably, this distinction can be unique for each worker. Finally, linking an 
individual’s a priori evaluation to their subsequent behavior serves to validate the 
interpersonal comparison of such subjective measures in cross sectional data. If panel 
data is available, more information can be used and the unobserved aspect of the 
individualistic heterogeneity can been captured.  
 
As mentioned above, Freeman (1978) provided the novelty for the relationship 
between satisfaction in the working place and quits. However, in the analytical 
framework he provided, he used job satisfaction as a continuous variable which 
differentiates his work from subsequent efforts. For instance, Clark et. Al. (1998) 
evaluated an ordinal version of job satisfaction, although the meaning of the results did 
not change significantly. And in any case, behind any ordinal subjective reported measure 
of job satisfaction there is a unique latent realization for each employee. Of course, being 
dissatisfied in general doesn’t imply an instantaneous movement either within the labor 
force (change employer or being promoted within the same employer) or out of it. A wide 
list of constraints makes such a decision a complex one. Having children for example or 
repaying a loan carries a great need for a stable flow of cash. Working security in this 
case weights more heavily than working hours or promotion opportunities. However, if 
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there were no costs related to searching for a job and moving to a new one, it should be 
expected that workers would move continuously up to the point where their job 
satisfaction would reach the maximum level. 
 
 
3.7. Data Set and Descriptive Statistics 
 
We use the first fourteen waves of the British Household Panel Survey, so the 
period between 1991 and 2004 is taken into consideration. The sample consists of all 
individuals above 18 who are in the labor force (either employed or unemployed) but 
excludes the self-employed since the determinants of job satisfaction can be different for 
them. An individual must have at least been questioned for two consecutive periods. This 
restriction is imposed by the panel data structure of the job satisfaction model in order to 
capture the heterogeneous elements. Also, the nature of some independent variables (for 
example, job change) requires this restriction. 
 
 Table 3.3 provides a summary along with the basic statistical properties of some 
key variables that can potentially be related to job satisfaction. The purpose of this 
categorization is to give a first descriptive taste of how job satisfaction is distributed 
across the population, given some observable characteristics. All the usual suspects are 
there, from sex and gender to education and workplace size. Note here that only the latest 
wave has been taken into consideration.  
 
 Job satisfaction is, as expected and discussed earlier, in higher levels for women 
than for men and this difference is statistically significant at the conventional 5% level. 
Women on average have a satisfaction of 5.52 (in the 1 to 7 scale) while men a job 
satisfaction of 5.29. In terms of age, differences are marginal for the first three categories, 
namely the employees below the age of 56. For the latter, job satisfaction boosts to an 
impressive 5.63 which is the highest job satisfaction level we encounter in this analysis. 
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An issue of selectivity is again (as for women) the primary suspect for this significant 
(even at the 1% level) difference. Senior employees could decide to stay in the job only if 
the feel very happy about it. And this happiness which is reflected in the satisfaction 
levels can be decomposed between an observable factors effect and an unobservable 
factors effect. In the former case, a senior employee remains in the labor force simply 
because the terms of his/her labor supply is much better than average. But an employee 
could still be willing to remain active even if the workplace characteristics do not differ 
from those of an average younger employee. In this case, the job itself becomes a source 
of pleasure and is probably not associated with payment, promotion or other 
considerations. In other words, the feeling of being productive and socially useful at this 
age could overwhelm any other job parameters. 
 
 When the discussion comes to working hours descriptive statistics show that those 
who work more hours than they desire (over-employed) report on average less job 
satisfaction  (5.08) than employees who consider themselves unconstrained (5.59). This 
difference shows the importance of this aspect of labor supply in job satisfaction. 
Underemployed employees (i.e. those who work less than they desire) are located in the 
middle, reporting an average job satisfaction of 5.29.  
 
In relation to the rest of parameters in table 3.3, there is statistical difference as to 
whether the employee is white or non white.  Married people report on average higher job 
satisfaction than the single ones but this could be attributed to life satisfaction. Having 
children on the other hand does not influence job satisfaction differentials. Finally, firm 
size gives a significant F value, with the highest level of job satisfaction located in the 
firms that employ less than 10 workers.   
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3.8. Analytical framework and estimation considerations 
 
In order to identify the determinants of job satisfaction in Britain we use an 
ordered probit framework. This model has been used in the majority of all previously 
mentioned studies. An alternative approach which is not popular among the economists 
(but has been used widely by psychologists) would involve a treatment of job satisfaction 
as a cardinal variable. Cardinality implies that the difference between a 3 and 4 in job 
satisfaction for a person would be the same as between a 6 and a 7 for a different person. 
On the other hand, using ordinal measures of job satisfaction is equivalent to assume that 
it is unknown what the relative difference between satisfaction answers is but individuals 
at least share a roughly common interpretation of each possible answer. In principle, the 
true satisfaction level between two respondents can be different, even if both of them 
report the same ordered satisfaction score. The assumption of ordinality is supported by 
psychological findings. Diener and Lucas (1999) find that in experiments where 
participants were shown pictures of other individuals, they could identify whether the 
individual shown to them was happy, jealous, etc. Also in a study by Van Praag (1991) 
which is mentioned in Carbonell and Frijters (2004), participants translated verbal 
variables (good, very good) into roughly the same numerical values.  
 
 One attractive feature of panel data is that individual heterogeneity can be 
accounted and controlled for. The term heterogeneity simply means that there are 
unobserved individual elements that are correlated with the observed parameters and thus 
educe biased estimations for the parameters of interest. But even if the unobserved 
components are not correlated with the covariates, using panel data would result in 
correlated errors, especially if the individual specific heterogeneous error is time 
constant.   Following Carbonell and Frijters (2004) we present the different assumptions 
about the unobserved parameter (heterogeneity) as well as the relationship between the 
unobservable and the observable parameter:  
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1) Time-varying unobserved factors are related to observables in an unknown way. 
This assumption is highly realistic but inference is of course impossible since we 
don’t know the exact nature of dependence. An example for this could be the way 
people form their expectations and the impact that this has on observable 
parameters 
 
2) Unobserved factors that do not vary over time are influencing the initial levels 
(and not the changes) of observed factors.  
 
3) Unobserved factors that do not vary over time are uncorrelated with the 
observable characteristics.  
 
The last two assumptions are mentioned in the panel data literature as fixed effects 
and random effects respectively. Estimators based on panel data sets are quite often more 
accurate than from other sources since individual heterogeneity can be taken into 
account. By the term heterogeneity, economists usual refer to person specific aspects that 
are not explicitly measurable. In the satisfaction case (either job or life satisfaction) any 
answer that lie on personal judgments must be considered with caution since it can be 
influenced by variant and time-invariant elements. Ideally, someone would prefer to use a 
fixed effects approach combined with an ordered probit or logit specification. The 
justification for doing so lies on the suspicion that observed and unobserved elements 
might be correlated. However, all job satisfaction panel studies use random effects, 
mainly due to the unavailability (until recently) of an efficient ordered probit fixed-
effects estimator. Some authors (Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 1998) have adopted the 
approach of transforming the ordinal variable into a binary one, that takes the value of 
one above (or under) a specific threshold which is arbitrarily chosen. It is apparent that in 
this case the fixed effects estimation can be conducted without any computational 
problems but precision is lost. The reason is that only people who can move across the 
specific threshold are taken into consideration. Alternatively, adding subject dummies to 
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a standard ordered probit model would yield inconsistent estimations, unless there is a 
large number of observations within each group, Greene (2004).  
 
A breakthrough in the job satisfaction literature (or in any panel studies with a 
categorical dependent variable) has emerged due to Carbonell and Frijters (2004). These 
authors propose a fixed effects estimator which consists of a simple alteration of the 
standard Chamberlain’s (1980) fixed effects approach. Of course, the usual drawback is 
that time-constant parameters (for example sex and age) are dropped out and can not be 
estimated.  
 
 3.8.1 Random Effects Ordered Probit 
 
 The random effects model imposes the (strong for some authors) restriction of 
orthogonality between the observed and unobserved features of the determinants of job 
satisfaction. Job satisfaction is modeled as: 
 
* '
it it itJS β ε= Χ +   i=1,….,N; t=1,…..,T     (2) 
 
Where  is the latent outcome, X*itJS  the determinants of Job Satisfaction and εit it the 
composite error. This approach is described by Butler and Moffitt (1982). Their 
specification involves a composite error term that consists of εit = uit + ν  where ui it is 
normally distributed with mean zero and is independent across all periods and all 
individuals.  The other term, ν , captures individual i  heterogeneity and is assumed to be 
constant across all the periods for the same person. Additionally, it is independent across 
individuals and uncorrelated with all the explanatory variables Xit , in all periods. The 
variance of the composite error is 2 2 1u v
2
vσ σ+ = +σ
2
2 2( )u u
ν
ν
σρ σ σ= + with  . In other 
words, ρ depicts the proportion of the total error variation that can be explained by the 
individual random effect21.  
                                                 
21 We adopt the normalization  so that ρ is estimated directly.  2 1uσ =
 79
In the question “How satisfied in general are you with your Job “the ordinal 
response S given by individuals is assumed to be dependent on the unobservable cardinal 
level of job satisfaction each individual has in mind. More specifically, depending on the 
individualistic thresholds, the probability that someone will report a job satisfaction in the 
range 1-7 is given by : 
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For J=2,3,4,5,6 while F denotes the cumulative density function of the normal 
distribution.  
 
The maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters in (2) are obtained by maximizing 
the log likelihood function with respect to the unknown elements and the covariance 
matrix. Generalizing from Buttler and Moffit (1982) by setting  and  
 , the likelihood function can be written as: 
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Where f is the density function of the normal distribution and F denotes the equivalent 
CDF. Since in our case T>2 an approximation must be used, in particular this is dealt 
with the Gauss-Hermite quadrature.22  
  
 
22 Description of the Gauss-Hermite quadrature procedure far exceeds the scopes of this analysis, see Liu and 
Pierce (1994) “A note on Gauss-Hermite quadrature” for an excellent example on a binomial logit model where 
the explanatory variable is measured with error.  
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 3.8.2 Fixed Effects Ordered Logit 
 
 Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) suggested a deviation from the likelihood 
function which is used to estimate the standard binary fixed effects logit model proposed 
by Chamberlain (1980)23.The idea is to introduce both individual fixed effects ai and 
individual cut-off points. These authors showed that in this sense the fixed effects ordered 
logit can be reformulated as a fixed binomial logit with the fixed effects and the 
individual specific thresholds removed from the likelihood specification.  
 
 
3.8.3 A cardinal approximation of ordinal categories 
 
 Using an ordered probit specification for the alternative ordinal job satisfaction 
categories is a method to impose cardinality in an abstract manner. The  index that we 
mentioned above is latent in the sense that it is not observable. What we actually observe 
is the seven response categories corresponding to different levels of
*
itJS
*
itJS  and this 
satisfaction index must lie within a specific region, (c , ci-1 i). For example, for an 
individual with a JS index of 6, the actual job satisfaction must lie within the region (c5, 
c6).  Note that the bounds are arbitrarily chosen since are based on arbitrary assumptions, 
namely the normality of the error term and the structural form of the model.  
 
 Obviously, if the categories them selves were to be examined , a regression of 
each of these categories against the set of covariates (without considering the latent 
mapping) would imply nothing less but a generalization of the linear probability model 
with all the inconvenient statistical properties that follow. For exactly the same reason it 
would be unattractive to have an ordinal variable as an explanatory one since we would 
ideally like to have the variable explained on the whole range of the real axis. For this 
reason Terza (1987) and Van Praag and Ferrer -i- Carbonell (2004) proposed the idea is 
to transform the ordinal variable on the basis of the conditional expectation. The variable 
                                                 
23 Chamberlain’s (1980) estimator is a conditional likelihood estimator which conditions the probability of 
observing the job satisfaction level on their sum. By doing this, the individual specific effect is removed 
from the likelihood function.  
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is thus transformed into a continuous one by using an assumption about its distribution, 
usually the normal. More formally, if we denote the transformed variable as JS , the 
conditional expectation of the ith 24 interval is given  as 
1
1 1
1 1
( ) ( )( | )
( ) ( )
i
i i
i
n c n cJS E JS c JS c
N c N c
−
−
−
−= < < = −  
Where n is the density of the normal distribution and N is the respective cumulative one. 
The cut off points can be estimated as maximum likelihood estimates out of the 
percentage of the sample observed in each category. For example if hypothetically 20% 
of the people in the sample are in category 1 then the c is calculated by solving N-
1(c1)=0.20 . If the second category adds 5% more then the second cut off point is 
calculated by N-1(c2)=0.25. Obviously, there is a problem with the last cut off point since 
the corresponding cumulative probability adds to 1 and consequently the inverse of the 
cdf cannot be defined. An option to bypass this issue is to use half the frequency of this 
category.  
 
Consequently, using this method, one can obtain seven transformed values, each 
of which corresponds to one of the original satisfaction levels. Then, each individual can 
be assigned with one of the transformed values depending on the original value he/she 
had. In what follows, we will not consider this approach25 since we are primarily 
interested in the statistical significance of the subjective covariates, the direction of their 
impact on the overall job satisfaction as well as their ‘ability’ to account for observed and 
unobserved aspects of working life. Since these are not affected by the above mentioned 
transformation we present this method for the completeness of our presentation.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24 For a full derivation see Terza (1987), appendix 1. A comprehensive discussion can also be found in Van 
Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004).   
25 We are grateful to Dr Naga for useful discussions and suggestions on this issue.  
 82
 
3.9. Empirical Strategy and Job Satisfaction Results 
 
 
3.9.1 Subjective Covariates for the job satisfaction sub-categories  
 
The vast majority of the job satisfaction literature use non categorical independent 
variables in attempt to determine the explanatory parameters of job satisfaction. In this 
chapter we deviate from the norm and we move one step further by also considering 
ordinal subjective variables on the right hand side of the job satisfaction equation. This 
approach has been used in the past by Sousa- Poza and Sousa Posa (2000)26, Van Praag 
et. al. (2003), Ahn and Garcia (2004) and Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004) but 
with different data sets.  
  
In particular, we use subjective information about the employees’ feelings 
concerning various aspects of their employment. In this sense we use three variables that 
capture the satisfaction with the payment, security and the work it self. Initially in the 
BHPS there were seven distinct sub-categories of job satisfaction. Apart from the three 
mentioned questions, respondents were also asked to evaluate their satisfaction with their 
manager, the ability to use their own initiative and the promotion opportunities. These 
three questions were discontinued after the seventh wave (1997).  
 
Each survey participant is asked in the following manner:  
 
‘I'm going to read out a list of various aspects of jobs, and after each one I'd like 
you to tell me from this card which number best describes how satisfied or 
dissatisfied you are with that particular aspect of your own present job’  
 
                                                 
26  In their specification the subjective covariates are used as dummy variables.  
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Consequently, respondents give an answer on a 1 to 7 scale with (1) denoting complete 
dissatisfaction and (7) complete satisfaction. A reply of (4) would mean that the 
employee is neither satisfied nor dissatisfied with the particular aspect of his/her job. The 
question about the overall job satisfaction then follows: 
 
‘All things considered, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your present job 
overall using the same 1 - 7 scale?’ 
 
 It is apparent that this particular ordering of questions is deliberately chosen so 
that the final question about the overall satisfaction with job would be considered 
conditionally on the previous responses about the satisfaction with the sub-domains. 
These sub-domains are by definition distinct in nature and are expected to have a separate 
effect on the overall job satisfaction. Van Praag et al (2003) using the German Socio-
Economic Panel (GSOEP) verify the strong and positive contribution of a variety of life 
satisfaction parameters to the overall life satisfaction. To be more specific, they examine 
the relative impact of job, financial, house, health, leisure and environment satisfaction. 
This particular analysis of life satisfaction can raise criticism since some of the above 
mention sub-domains are likely to be correlated and not entering the specification in a 
strictly exogenous and separable manner. For example, financial satisfaction can be 
related to job satisfaction, to the extent that the remuneration from paid employment 
comprises a significant part of the total wealth. In the same token, health satisfaction can 
affect leisure satisfaction and environment satisfaction can be potentially linked to house 
satisfaction, health satisfaction or even leisure satisfaction. If this is the case, the 
estimated parameters will not provide an accurate view of the separate and distinct 
contribution of each of these variables to the overall life satisfaction.   
 
 In the context of our analysis, the sub-domains of job satisfaction can be 
considered to be separable. For example, satisfaction with job security can not be 
explicitly linked to satisfaction with security and working hours. Of course there can 
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always be a potential relationship between working hours and job security if an 
employee, by working more hours wants to give a signal to the employer about his 
devotion and reduce the probability of a lay off. The translation of this scenario into 
satisfaction indexes can not always be clear and will differ across employees.  In any 
case, we treat the subjective explanatory variables as self-contained and we assume that 
they are nested in a distinct and separable way within the overall job satisfaction.  
 
3.9.2 The advantage of using qualitative and subjective covariates 
 
By using this subjective break down of job satisfaction, the coefficients on other 
explanatory variables become much more precise for the reason that they act directly on 
job satisfaction and do not represent the impact of any other non observable parameters.  
 
An additional advantage is that subjective covariates can be used as a method to 
account for heterogeneity between employees apart from the usual panel data techniques. 
The majority of studies that examine job satisfaction (or life satisfaction), acknowledge 
that just the levels of some variables are not enough to explain variations in satisfaction. 
Instead, it is argued that some of the explanatory variables should be considered in 
condition to some reference basis, although this reference basis has to be chosen 
arbitrarily.  
 
 A paradigm of such reference basis is the reference income. When examining the 
impact of wage on job satisfaction, Clark and Oswald, 1998 and Hamermesh, 2001 
(among the others) argue that part of the overall satisfaction variation is not accounted 
for, since employees compare their earnings with the earnings of a group that they 
consider relevant to them. For some workers this group can be their family, friends, work 
colleagues etc.  
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It does not come to a surprise then that the study by Clark and Oswald (1996) 
found that the actual wage is particularly weak as a determinant of job satisfaction. In an 
attempt to take into consideration the impact of the relevant wage in job satisfaction, they 
estimated a standard Mincer type wage equation and derived the predicted wage for each 
of the individuals in the sample. The ratio of the predicted wage to actual wage was then 
included in the job satisfaction equation in a log form as an additional covariate. 
Estimation results verified the importance of using the comparison income as an 
additional variable since it acquired a negative and significant coefficient. In addition the 
magnitude of the income variable was raised significantly. Although our approach is 
concentrated on assessing the usefulness of subjective covariates, for the shake of 
comparison we also estimate a satisfaction with work equation as described above.  
 
Even if a researcher uses the reference wage as a control variable, there is still a 
considerable amount of information that is not taken into consideration. For example, the 
reference wage does not reveal anything about the worker’s expectations towards the 
wage promotions. Although the wage offered to an employee could generally be 
controlled (and many times imposed by collective agreements) by the contractual 
relationship at the time of hiring, the exact nature of promotion dynamics are not always 
expected to be a priori known to the employee. Consequently, no matter how high her 
initial wage was, an employee might become dissatisfied if she doesn’t get the wage 
promotion she believes that corresponds to her effort. In addition, if the distribution of 
wage promotions within the firm is rather unequal (i.e. some employees doing similar job 
or giving the same effort are paid differently) then the dissatisfaction with this aspect of 
job becomes stronger. Of course such detailed payroll data are not available and even if 
they were, it would be impossible to identify a case similar to one mentioned above.  
 
 By using subjective data on the subjective satisfaction with the payment, a very 
large proportion of this heterogeneity is taken into account since the response is 
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subjective and thus relative and probably based on personal comparisons. By using this 
methodology there are also two advantages:  
 
1) There is no reason to rely on individual payroll data which can 
sometimes become ambiguous (difficult to separate net payment from 
gross payment and other contributions). 
 
2) Secondly ,and probably most importantly, this methodology becomes 
essential if we assume that each employee has a unique expectation 
about his wage which is defined as the present discounted value of the 
worker’s current and expected future salary over the expected working 
life. In this sense, a change in wage capable to stimulate increase in job 
satisfaction must refer to deviations in a worker’s pay from its expected 
path. For example, if an employee is hired in a firm where the usual 
wage rise is 10% per year of tenure but for a single year the board 
decides that wage promotions should not exceed a 5%, then although 
there is a numerical increase in the wage, from an employee perspective 
this could be considered as a wage cut.  
 
 
 
 3.9.3 Estimation results 
 
Table 3.6 presents job satisfaction results under three specifications. All estimated 
versions are consistent with a random effects (RE) ordered probit approach, as presented 
above.  Although someone could allow for different slopes between individuals27, we do 
not adopt such a strategy due to the small average number of waves for each respondent 
and the difficulty in the interpretation of the results.  
                                                 
27 Boes (2006) offers a generalised random effects ordered probit code in STATA that allows the slopes to 
vary between groups.  
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As already mentioned, the distinguishing feature of this study is the use of 
subjective measures as explanatory variables28. Apart from all the variables that usually 
enter the right hand side of the job satisfaction equation, we consider: In specification (1), 
subjective data on satisfaction with payment. In Specification (2), apart from the 
satisfaction with payment there is also a variable that measures satisfaction with job 
security. Finally, column, (3), includes satisfaction with the work it self. We do not 
consider the questions concerning the satisfaction with four other sub domains.  For the 
three of them (own initiative, promotion opportunities and relations with the manager) 
information is not available after 199729. As far as the satisfaction with the working time 
is concerned, we use instead two dummy variables which indicate whether the employee 
thinks he is over-employed or under-employed, relative to be unconstrained.  
 
Our results show that the variable related to the satisfaction with the work it self 
gets the higher significance and magnitude compared to all the other subjective 
measures30. This should not come to a surprise since satisfaction with the work it self 
may capture a variety of correlations between unobserved parameters and overall job 
satisfaction. To give an example, an employee working in a public sector job may be 
doing so for reasons related to the ethical or moral side of the job. In this respect, what 
matters most to this employee is the feeling of being devoted to a scope that is considered 
to be idealistic. Consequently the reward that such employees receive could be better 
described in terms of the public recognition that he/she enjoys rather than in terms of any 
monetary benefits.  Of course, even in the private sector where firms’ interests are not 
necessarily associated with a common social scope, being happy with the actual nature of 
the job is very important, as the results indicate.  
                                                 
28 For reasons of consistency we also estimate a random effects regression without subjective variables 
(table 3.5). The results indicate that compared to the “subjective” specifications, the coefficients for most of 
the relevant variables are higher in magnitude.  
29 Running an additional regression for the time perion 1991-1997 including these variables showed that at 
least one of the missing subjective variables can be replaced by the dummy that indicates the promotion 
opportunities since this dummy became insignificant after the inclusion of the ordinal variable. 
30 Similar results supporting the importance of the satisfaction with the work it self can be found in 
Nicoletti (2006) and Souza Poza and Souza Poza (2000).  
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 Control variables have been selected in such a way that the most important 
parameters related to the workplace characteristics can be taken into account. Akerlof et 
all (1998) also mention the importance of the non-pecuniary aspects of a job in 
determining job satisfaction. In this sense, all specifications include variables that 
account for: the firm size (size), promotion opportunities (jobopps), travel time to the job 
(travel1-travel4), participation in a bonus or a profit sharing scheme (bonus) and whether 
the employee is a member of a union or not (union). In relation to other more broad 
characteristics, we account for age, age squared, sex, house tenure, education, marital 
status and job status of spouse, part time job and whether the employee has recently 
changed job, either within or between employers. Finally, regional, year and occupational 
dummies are present as usual.  
 
In specification (1) we exploit only subjective information about the payment and 
whether the employee feels constrained in relation to the hours he/she works. The ordered 
probit results show that satisfaction with payment affects overall job satisfaction 
positively, highly and significantly. Moreover, being constrained in the desired working 
hours has a significant negative coefficient with over-employment resulting in greater 
dissatisfaction relative to underemployment, ceteris paribus. What is interesting is that 
the coefficients of variables capturing hour constraints are roughly the same for columns 
(1) and columns (2) and slightly different for column (3). This is a good sign that the 
three subjectively measured variables are perceived to be discrete in nature. A small 
portion of this dissatisfaction with working hours is likely to be captured by the 
satisfaction with the work it self variable but in general employees can effectively 
distinguish this aspect of job from other non-pecuniary aspects. The estimated 
coefficients for over-employment and under-employment indicate that working more 
hours than you actually desire has larger impact (negative) on job satisfaction compared 
to working less than you actually desire. This result should not come to a surprise since 
over-employment is prevailing in the U.K. (see chapter 2).  
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The establishment size also affects negatively the overall job satisfaction and all 
the categories have roughly the same magnitude. This result by it self is of course 
meaningless. But the exact characteristics associated with a large firm that have a 
negative impact on job satisfaction are unknown. This is verified by specification (3) 
which includes the satisfaction with the work it self. It seems that this variable absorbs all 
the explanatory power of the firm size variable which now becomes insignificant. The 
same applies for the promotion opportunities and to some extent to the public sector 
variables. The latter remains significant in all specifications but significance drops 
slightly in regression (2) and noticeably in regression (3). This fact is potentially 
suggesting that public sector employees derive job satisfaction to a great extent from the 
actual work they are doing.   
 
To conclude with the employment aspects, we discuss union membership and 
working part time, relative to working full time. Participating in a union provides a 
negative and significant effect in column (1) and (2), (even with a noticeably reduced 
coefficient) but insignificant for (3). All the independent effect of unionism in job 
satisfaction in column (1) seems to have been embodied in the satisfaction with the work 
it self. To place this differently, being happy with the actual work it self is the crucial 
parameter that is likely to discourage employees to join a working place union.31 Finally, 
part time employment would be expected to increase happiness with job in the case 
where undertaking a part time job is a discreet choice stimulated by personal 
characteristics. In this sense, the notion of labour market flexibility can be highlighted 
since part time employment becomes a choice and not a necessity. In other words, people 
decide to work in a part time job because they appreciate the employment characteristics 
of these jobs and not due to unavailability of suitable full time jobs. It has been 
mentioned before that for some countries, a large proportion of those working part time 
would prefer to work in full time job. Evidence especially from column (2) of table 3.6 
                                                 
31 To verify this we also estimated a regression with ‘satisfaction with the work it self’ being the only 
subjectively measured variable, apart from the dummies accounting for over-employment or under 
employment. The coefficient on unionism still remained insignificant.  
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suggests that this could not be the case for the British labour market since being a part 
time employee increases the chances of being in a higher job satisfaction category.  
 
 
3.9.3.1 The effect of demographic characteristics 
 
Apart from the satisfaction with payment, being a woman increases the chances of 
reporting higher satisfaction level. This result of course is not surprising and could be 
related to the selectivity issue mentioned earlier. But since women’s satisfaction is not the 
main interest here there is not a particular reason to account for this using for example a 
two-steps Heckman model dealing with self-selectivity. 
 
 Coming to education, there is evidence that the more educated you are, the more 
the chances of reporting lower job satisfaction  relative to someone who has no 
educational qualifications. The reason for this could be the fact that employees with 
higher education is possible to have augmented expectations from their job compared to 
employees with lower or no qualifications. Moreover, coefficients on educational 
background do not vary significantly even when information about satisfaction with 
security and the work it self is used (columns 2 and 3). The tendency though is for these 
coefficients to reduce in magnitude when satisfaction with the work it self is introduced, 
possibly indicating that some individuals with educational qualifications are not happy 
with their actual occupation. For example, an English literature graduate finding her self 
working in sales.   
 
Having children has some minor implications for job satisfaction only for 
specifications (1) and (2).  But any significance is lost for the specifications (3). Finally, 
our results tend to verify the perception (Clark et al, 1996) that the relationship between 
age and job satisfaction is a u-shaped one.  
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 3.9.4 Subjective covariates, random effects, fixed effects and 
unobserved heterogeneity. 
 
Random Effects estimation tackles unobserved heterogeneity explicitly, using the 
methods and assumptions described in section 3.8.1. In comparison to other studies, RE 
may not be of such importance since the subjective variables we are using absorb a large 
portion of it. This argument can be supported by looking at the estimated value of ρ 
which, as discussed previously, gives an indication of the proportion of the variance 
explained by unobserved individual heterogeneity. In this sense, the value of 0.33 that ρ 
takes in (1) means that 33% of the total variance in job satisfaction can be attributed to 
the time invariant, individual specific unobserved term. When we also use the satisfaction 
with job security as a covariate, the value of ρ becomes 0.29 implying that this covariate 
by it self can account for a portion (even small) of the unobserved heterogeneity. Finally, 
as collumn (3) indicates, the most profound effect in tackling heterogeneity comes from 
the inclusion of the satisfaction with the actual work. In this case ρ becomes 0.16 
showing that an even larger percentage of unobserved factors that influence the variation 
of job satisfaction could be handled by using this subjective variable.  
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As far as fixed effects are 
concerned, table 3.7 provides the results 
from regressing overall job satisfaction 
against subjective and objective 
covariates, allowing for time invariant 
parameters to be correlated with the 
covariates.  
Table  3.7 – J.S, Fixed Effects Ordered Logit, 
BHPS 1991-2004 
Varable coef t value 
Satisfaction with Payment 0.4837 37.69 
Satisfaction with Security 0.441624 34.47 
Satisfaction with the work it self 1.12553 62.47 
Job Tenure -0.02629 6.09 
Over-employment -0.59691 16.07 
Underemployment -0.30501 4.59 
Promotion Opportunities 0.239404 6.22 
Job change 0.2 4.98 
Observations 41387 
LR 13132.8 
Pseudo R2 0.3755 
Notes:  
1) All reported coefficients are strongly significant at the 
1% level. 
2) The vector of the additional covariates is the same used 
in the Random effects estimation 
 
Now the coefficients of the estimated 
parameters are even larger which can be 
attributed to the fact that most of the rest 
of explanatory variables lack significant 
within variation. Even so, the relative 
importance of the satisfaction with with 
the work it self is again emphasized. It 
must be mentioned that these results 
(either in a random or a fixed effects 
setting) need not necessarily apply to all 
European Countries. Differences in 
terms of ordering the most important 
aspects of a job are well possible to 
arise. For example, in some countries 
satisfaction with job security can 
become the most decisive reason for 
explaining variations in Job Satisfaction. 
For instance, a recent European level 
study by Nicoletti (2006) finds that job 
security is more important in 
Ireland,Italy, Greece, Spain and 
Portugal. This finding is undoubtedly 
striking and is raising research questions 
(above the scope of this chapter) about 
the reasons for this differentiation.   
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3.9.5 Estimates from a “conventional” specification  
 
As we mentioned above, we also estimate a conventional job satisfaction equation 
in a form similar to that of Clark and Oswald (1996). However, we do not restrict our 
view to just the first wave of BHPS as these authors did.  Of course we include 
educational32 and occupational dummies as well as the usual year dummies among the 
other demographic characteristics. In an additional specification, there is a variable that 
refers to the non-wage and household income.  The reason for doing so is to ensure that 
the level of non-earned income is taken into account since some employees possessing a 
substantial amount of non-labour or household wealth may have such preferences that 
even with a low wage (and thus a substantial gap between actual and comparison wage), 
may still want to participate in the labour force without considering their remuneration as 
a source of job dissatisfaction.  
 
Table 3.8 presents the results from a specification that is almost identical to the 
specification in table 3.6 apart from the fact that the subjective covariates have been 
replaced by the wage (lnwage) and the reference wage (lnreference).  In addition, apart 
from the full sample estimates we also present separate results from males and females.  
 
It is evident that both the wage and the reference wage act on job satisfaction 
significantly and in the expected direction. To be more specific, a higher wage is 
associated with an increased probability of being in a higher satisfaction category. The 
same applies for the reference wage since the higher the gap between the wage and the 
reference wage, the higher the probability of being in a lower job satisfaction category. 
Interestingly, when we experiment with a specification that also includes the satisfaction 
with payment (results not reported) , the reference wage becomes totally insignificant.  
                                                 
32 As far as the educational variables are concerned, we use an augmented specification compared to table 
3.6.  Some educational categories that had been nested within other categories are now presented 
separately.  
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 Comparing the results with those of Clark and Oswald, our estimates for the wage 
and the reference wage are significantly elevated. Obviously we use all available BHPS 
waves and the range of explanatory variables is more extended for both the wage and the 
job satisfaction equation. Nonetheless, our estimates converge when it comes to age and 
sex. Moreover the wage variable remains significant even if we take out the reference 
wage, something that is not happening in the Clark’s and Oswald’s paper. This of course 
is difficult to interpret but a first guess leads again to suspicions about the structural 
synthesis of both equations.  For example the union variable is included in both of them. 
However the inclusion in the wage equation aims to capture the influence that unionism 
has on wage while in the job satisfaction equation can be related to non pecuniary aspects 
such as job security or working conditions that can be related to job satisfaction and 
without the union variable wouldn’t be taken into account.  
 
Finally, as mentioned above, we split the sample between males and females. The 
reason for doing so is to examine whether some variables are particularly important for 
each of the two genders, as far as job satisfaction is concerned. We notice that the 
magnitude of wage variable is less for women than it is for men but significant in both 
cases. However, the variable that captures the reference or comparison wage becomes 
now insignificant for women.  This indicates that for women the relevant pay does not 
constitute a statistically significant parameter that affects job satisfaction, at least in this 
kind of econometric setting. It would be too strong to support that women are not 
interested in the comparison wage but this result could potentially point out a self-
selection process in the sense that women on average sort them selves into better paid 
jobs in which the gap between the payment and the relevant payment is higher.  
 
The union variable is similarly negative and significant for both genders but it 
seems that the age is a more decisive job satisfaction parameter for men than it is for 
women. An interesting result comes from the variable that captures the contribution of 
the employment status of the spouse. For women, if the spouse works, it is an 
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insignificant parameter for increased job satisfaction while for men it becomes 
significant. It looks like women in paid employment do not condition their job 
satisfaction upon whether their spouse works. But men could be feeling much more 
satisfied through a pecuniary channel, meaning that the additional income flowing into 
the household is a sufficient parameter for alleviating a possible dissatisfaction about 
their payment. Of course there could also be a net life satisfaction effect (which 
subsequently influences job satisfaction) just from the fact that the spouse works! 
 
 The insignificance in the variable that indicates full time employment is a sign 
that on average (and considering all other parameters constant) women do select 
themselves into employment type according to a job satisfaction criterion. If for instance 
women had on average strong preference towards part-time employment but were forced 
to work full time due to the unavailability of suitable part-time jobs, we would expect a 
negative and significant sign in the full time job dummy.  
 
 In the last column of table 3.8, the job satisfaction equation for women is 
augmented by two additional variables, the household income and the non-labour income 
(in a natural logarithm form), for the reason we explained above. Both of them get a 
significant coefficient at the 5 and 1 percent level respectively. Moreover the wage 
variable becomes know less significant (at 5% from less than 1% that it was before) 
while the magnitude drops slightly. However, an analogous specification for men 
produced (result not reported) an insignificant coefficient for the household income and a 
significant one for the non-labour income. This can be evidence supporting a social view 
for the breadwinning role of men.  
 
3.4 Explaining Job Satisfaction differences between two consecutive periods 
– Fixed effects estimation 
 
 The results presented so far have focused on a detailed examination of the 
determinants of life satisfaction. The scope of this chapter is also to identify the 
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determinants of changes in job satisfaction. In other words, what makes people report a 
different satisfaction level in the next period? Could it be, for instance, a change in life 
satisfaction or would simply an increase in the satisfaction with security be enough for 
reporting higher satisfaction levels in the next period? This analysis could be useful in 
answering some questions about potential labour market reformations, if of course the 
main concern of policy makers is to maximize the utility people derive from their 
working place. For example, would an increase in job security be more appreciated by 
young employees or prime age employees?  
 
Our efforts to answer these questions can be assisted by the panel nature of our 
dataset. The econometric approach will be implemented with a fixed effects estimator 
which essentially is a first differences estimator which takes into account the variation 
between period t and t-1.  In principle, fixed effects estimation for multiple categories is 
usually dealt with a conditional logit (CL) approach. However in our case two difficulties 
appear:  One of the main assumptions of the CL is that the characteristics of the 
categories affect the individuals’ likelihood of being in them. For example, if the 
dependent variable is the choice between goods, the price of each of the goods clearly has 
an impact on the likelihood of selecting one category, since the price is not the same for 
all the goods.  On the other hand, when income is the variable of interest, the standard 
multinomial logit is sufficient since income is uniquely identified for each individual. 
Our specification fits better the latter. The reason is that the expected sign of the variables 
coefficient must necessarily be the opposite for the alternative categories, if we want to 
have a meaningful interpretation.  
 
 To be more analytical, we look at differences in job satisfaction for a single 
individual between two consecutive periods. We classify these differences in three 
categories: The first one includes those individual who didn’t report any difference in job 
satisfaction between 2 periods. The second one involves all people who reported a 
decrease in their job satisfaction while the last category refers to employees who reported 
an increase in their (subjective) job satisfaction between two periods. We then deploy a 
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multinomial logit model with reference to the first category and since fixed-effects 
estimation means that time-invariant parameters like age necessarily drop-out, we run 
two separate regressions, one for young employees and the other for prime age 
employees. Similarly, one can do the same for different groups like men and women or 
married and single employees.  At this point we need to stress out that in the literature (at 
least to the best of our knowledge) there is scarcity in studies examining the determinants 
of the differences in job satisfaction and as explained above, there is a good ground for 
policy applications in these terms.  
 
In this case we deal with heterogeneity in two levels and following the same 
logic: Firstly, personality traits are well possible to have an impact only in the levels of 
job satisfaction but not in job satisfaction differences. The reason is that by taking first 
differences across individuals, the researcher can remove all time invariant (unobserved) 
factors that were (potentially) correlated with the repressors in our previous static 
estimations. Secondly, our strategy involves again the use of subjective dependent 
variables. As explained and argued before, this can account for many heterogeneous 
issues such as interpersonal comparisons and expectations formation.  
 
Table 3.9 presents how the probability of reporting either an increased or 
decreased satisfaction differential between 2 periods is affected by the differences in 
various explanatory factors. For example, the first line of the table shows that for young 
employees, an increase in the satisfaction with payment is associated with a 15.6% 
probability of reporting higher overall job satisfaction. This detailed breakdown is useful 
since it allows comparisons between explanatory variables and population groups.  
 
The multinomial marginal effects results show that the differences between young 
and prime age employees are small when it comes to the probability of reporting an 
increased JS but the differences become noticeable for the probabilities of reporting a 
decreased JS.  An increase in satisfaction with payment stimulates an increase in the 
probability of reporting higher job satisfaction in the next period. The relative figures are 
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15.6% for the young and 15.1% for prime age employees. This difference in the predicted 
probability of reporting an increased JS level goes up when we examine satisfaction with 
security. More specifically, an increase in job security for the young, raises this 
probability by 15,7% in comparison to a 13.2% for the prime age workers.  
 
 Among all subjective measures we use, what seems to have the most significant 
predicting value is the satisfaction with the work it self. The figure is around 30% for 
both groups. But for this JS measure, what distinguishes young and prime age employees 
is the expected magnitude in the probability of reporting a diminished job satisfaction in 
relation to the previous period. If satisfaction with the work it self does increase between 
two consecutive periods, the probability that the cohort of young employees will report a 
lower overall JS drops by 18.4%, while the percentage for employees above 25 is 11.  
The relevant figures for satisfaction with job security are 7.1% and 3.9% respectively. It 
is evident then that for young employees, security and the work it self weight much more 
heavily than they do for prime age employees. This result makes sense as it would be 
realistic to assume that workers at the early stages of their employment life have less 
searching experience than senior employees and are more likely to end up to a job that 
does not fulfil their expectations towards security and the actual aspects of the work.  It 
must be mentioned that a control for a job change between two periods is included since 
moving to a new job is expected to have a positive impact on job satisfaction. This effect 
is positive and significant for both cohorts.  
 
 Hour constraints on the other hand can be a serious consideration for employees 
above 25 but not for young employees. Of course, moving from working hours 
dissatisfaction to satisfaction is welcome as it is associated with a 7.4% more chances of 
reporting higher JS in the next period for the young and 8.6% for the old. But at least for 
the former, it does not reduce the probability of reporting a lower job satisfaction. 
However for the senior employees, the opposite is the true since the relevant coefficient 
is negative and significant (-0.276). Finally all the other controls have either a small or an 
insignificant impact. Briefly, we also controlled for full time to part time and part time to 
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full time transition, changes in commuting time, movements between the public and the 
private sector, and job opportunities.  
 
 
 
3.5 Job Satisfaction Profiles  
 
 This last section of the chapter is concerned with the estimation of job satisfaction 
profiles. Although it is evident from table (4) that tenure is negatively related to job 
satisfaction, there has been no research (at least to the best of our knowledge) as to 
whether this negative relationship exhibits a positive or a negative rate of decrease.  Our 
previous result also provided strong statistical support that whoever changes a job has an 
increased probability of being on a higher job satisfaction scale the period after the job 
change. However, it is not clear whether this increased job satisfaction persists or drops 
again as a consequence of a fatigue or disappointment effect. Evidence in favour of a 
convex relationship would support the notion that the job satisfaction of an employee 
diminishes up to a point when it starts to increase again. This behaviour could be 
consistent with the idea of cognitive dissonance that was discussed in the prologue of this 
chapter.  
 
 For these reasons we estimate a job satisfaction equation in which job tenure 
enters the specification in both a quadratic and a linear manner (along with all the usual 
explanatory variables) while age is taken into account only linearly. In this sense we 
examine the non linear relationship between job satisfaction and job tenure under the 
condition that age remains constant. We do not use a quadratic specification for age since 
it is likely to be a degree of correlation with the squared transformation of tenure.  
 
 The estimated results for the job satisfaction equation are evolved from an ordered 
probit setting. On the left hand side of the equation we use differences in job satisfaction 
between two consecutive periods while the usual subjective covariates are present on the 
 100
other side, along with the standard personal and demographical characteristics. What we 
are particularly interested to examine is if the inclusion of the dummy variable that 
indicates a job change has any kind of impact on the rate at which job satisfaction 
increases or decreases over tenure.  
 
 The pattern of job satisfaction after a job change is an issue that has been 
overlooked in the relevant literature. It is evident that four distinct outcomes could 
emerge:  
a) Job satisfaction continues to fall at a decreasing rate (possibly at a less 
decreasing one, compared to the job satisfaction pattern in the  previous 
job. 
b) Job satisfaction falls at an increasing rate, implying a concave 
relationship with tenure. 
c) Job satisfaction follows an upward path which peaks at a certain tenure 
and then starts falling again.  
d) Job satisfaction keeps falling as tenure increases with no trend reversing 
signs.   
 
In our empirical approach we estimate job satisfaction differences between two 
consecutive periods33. We then regress this difference against a set of dummy variables 
that account for three levels of satisfaction with the payment, security and the work it 
self. These levels are distinguished as “dissatisfaction” (which is the reference category), 
“neither satisfaction or dissatisfaction” and “satisfaction”. On the 1 to 7 scale, the first 
level accounts for job satisfaction from 1 to 3, the second level  for job satisfaction equal 
to 4 and the last level from 5 to 7. The rest of the variables are the same as in the previous 
specifications apart of course from the squared version of tenure and the omission of age 
squared.  
                                                 
33 Consequently now only those respondents who are interviewed for at least two consecutive periods are 
included in the sample 
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Table 3.10 presents the results of the estimated parameters in four specifications. 
The first column depicts the relationship between the change in job satisfaction and a 
quadratic specification of job tenure conditional on job change. In the second column, job 
satisfaction is not conditioned upon a job change and thus the tenure parameters are free 
from this effect. The last two columns arise from a virtually same specification as in 
column one but with a focus on those employees who moved within and between 
employers respectively.  
 
Our results clearly indicate that the job satisfaction pattern differs significantly 
between those who change jobs and those who do not. Job movers face an upwards 
sloping satisfaction profile which indicates that they experience a trend of positive job 
satisfaction differentials between subsequent periods, apart of course from the lump sum 
injection on the levels of job satisfaction. On the contrary, workers who stay within the 
same job (and do not get promoted) experience a u-shape job satisfaction profile which 
obviously implies that the path of negative initial satisfaction differentials is reversed 
after a certain value of tenure. Finally, as shown in figure 3.1, earnings profile differs 
according to whether employees have moved within or between jobs. In this sense, 
employees who moved within their firm have a more flat satisfaction-tenure curve than 
employees who changed employer.  
 
Figure 3.1 
Job Satisfaction Profiles – BHPS, 1991-2004 
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3.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we examined the issue of job satisfaction from various angles in an 
attempt to provide literature with a more accurate view on this issue since we explicitly 
consider subjectively measured variables concerning job sub domains. Our results 
indicate that all subjective variables enter the job satisfaction equation in a very 
significant manner. It is also evident that among all subjective covariates, the satisfaction 
with the actual work is the most important determinant of job satisfaction. Nevertheless, a 
sense of scepticism should arise from both the high magnitude of this variable and its 
significance. Our robustness analysis shows that the inclusion of subjectively measured 
variables has a significant impact only upon those variables which are intuitively related 
with them. We argue that this is a good sign in favour of the hypothesis that subjective 
measures are in deed picking up part of the individual heterogeneity, i.e. those factors 
that have a decisive impact on people’s job satisfaction but cannot be easily quantified or 
revealed in a survey.  
In an interesting extension, we also considered job satisfaction differences 
between two consecutive periods in order to decompose the reasons for reporting a higher 
or a lower job satisfaction in the next period. We split the sample between young and 
prime age employees to find that both groups have striking similarities in terms of the 
determinants of next period job satisfaction. Finally, the examination of job satisfaction 
profiles showed that changing a job can have a positive effect on the evolution of job 
satisfaction but at a diminishing rate. In any case, whoever changed employer is more 
likely to experience a steeper job satisfaction profile, compared to an employee who 
changed job within the same employer. 
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Table 3.3 
Job satisfaction in the U.K. – BHPS, 2004 
 
 
34 35Variable Sanple means  % (raw numbers) Mean Satisfaction (SD) T-Test/F test  
     
Sex
Female 51.87 (3835) 5.52 (1.23) 7.85***  
Male 48.13 (3559) 5.29 (1.28)   
     
15-25 years old 14.48 (1057) 5.31 (1,35) 11,50*** 
26-45 years old 52.64 (3843) 5.4 (1,23)   
46-55 years old 20.90 (1526) 5.37 (1,27)   
56+ years old 14.48  (875) 5.63 (1,22)   
     
white 97.66 (7635) 5.41(1,50) 2.114 
non white 2.34 (183) 5.19(1,52)   
     
no qualifications 9.12 (657) 5.58 (1.30) 5,24*** 
Higher degree 35.21 (2536) 5.37 (1.24)   
First degree 17.66 (1272) 5.36 (1,25)   
gce a levels 12.91 (930) 5.29 (1.34)   
gce o levels 17.80 (1282) 5.48 (1.22)   
cse 3.40 (245) 5.46 (1.20)   
other 3.90 (281) 5.42 (1.28) 
     
Married 55.40 (4104) 5,49 (1.18) -6,62*** 
non married 44.50 (3290) 5,30 (1.35)   
     
No children 62.78 (4642) 5.39 (1.29) 1.88 
One child 16.89 (1249) 5.42 (1.23)   
two or more children 20.33 (1503) 5.46 (1.20)   
   31.82***  
Overemployed 32.03 (2355) 5.08 (1.34) 
Underemployed 5.89 (433) 5.29 (1.29)   
Unconstrained 62.08 (4564) 5.59 (1.18)   
     
     
Firm Size    
1-9 19.05 (1391) 5.55 (1.27) 11,13** 
10-49 30.64 (2237) 5.50 (1.21)   
50-99 11.49 (839) 5.34 (1.21)   
100-199 10.49 (766) 5.24 (1.31)   
200-499 11.62 (848) 5.33 (1.27)   
500-999 6.34 (463) 5.20 (1.32)   
>1000 10.36 (756) 5.30 (1.28)   
     
 
                                                 
34 Longitudinal Weights applied : The longitudinal weight reflects the population at the time of sample selection, 
and is generally the most appropriate for longitudinal analysis which compares data from more than one year. 
The panel’s longitudinal weight is recalculated each year to take into account further non-response or attrition 
occurring that year. 
35 *** : denotes significance at 1% level , ** : denotes significance at the 5% level.  
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Table 3.4 
Variables Description 
jbsat2 Satisfaction with payment 
jbsat4 Satisfaction with security 
jbsat6 Satisfaction with the work it self 
Age  Age 
Age square (Age * Age)/1000 
sex Being female (relative to being male) 
Job tenure Years of experience in current job 
Soc2 Occupational Dummy : Professional Occupations 
Soc3 Occupational Dummy : Associate Professional and Technical  
Soc4 Occupational Dummy : Admin and Secretarial 
Soc5 Occupational Dummy : Skilled Trades 
Soc6 Occupational Dummy : Personal Service 
Soc7 Occupational Dummy : Sales and Customer Service 
Soc8 Occupational Dummy : Process, Plant and Machine Operatives 
Soc9 Occupational Dummy : Elementary Occupations 
hours2 Being over-employed (relative to being unconstrained) 
hours3 Being underemployed 
travel2 Travel time to work :15-30 minutes (relative to 15 min or less ) 
travel 3 31-45 minutes 
travel 4 46 or more 
jobopps Promotion opportunities at the working place 
bonus Whether the employee participates in a profit sharing or a bonus scheme 
sect2 Working in the public sector (relative to working in the private sector) 
sect3 Working in the armed forces and NGO’s 
size2 Employees working in the job place : 10-50 (relative to 10 or less)  
size3 51-100 
size4 101-500 
size5 501-1000 
size6 1001 or more 
child2 Having one child (relative to no children) 
child3 Having two ore more children 
house Renting ( relative to own the house)  
union Union present in the working place   
educ2 Higher degree (Msc, PhD etc) (Relative to no education) 
educ3 First degree (BA,BSc) and teaching QF 
educ4 A levels 
educ5 O Levels 
educ6 CSE’s 
educ7 Other qualifications 
spouse2 Spouse doesn’t work (relative to no spouse) 
spouse3 Spouse works  
Change Having changed job in the previous period 
Jbpt Working part time 
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Table 3.5 
Job Satisfaction without Subjective Covariates, BHPS 1991-2004 
        
Random Effects Ordered Probit 
variable coef  tstat 
-0.01***  7.77 Job Tenure 
0.232***  12.82 Sex 
-0.025***  6.27 age 
  9.61 agesqr 
-0.469***  39.17 hours2 
-0.244***  11.87 hours3 
-0.03*  2.35 travel2 
-0.015  0.75 travel3 
-0.054*  2.53 travel4 
0.208***  11.79 sect2 
0.241***  5.04 sect3 
-0.042**  2.82 size2 
0.318***  27.27 jobopps 
-0.128***  6.69 size3 
-0.151***  7.57 size4 
-0.156***  8.11 size5 
-0.148***  6.37 size6 
0.064***  3.68 child2 
0.126***  6.61 child3 
-0.002  0.09 house 
-0.115***  7.87 union 
-0.259***  9.68 educ2 
-0.417***  13.27 educ3 
-0.306***  9.92 educ4 
-0.181***  6.41 educ5 
-0.075  1.71 educ6 
-0.174***  4.54 educ7 
0.092***  3.93 spouse2 
0.074***  4.48 spouse3 
0.175***  13.81 change 
0.115***  6.38 jbft 
-2.94***  33.76 μ1 
-2.426***  28.044 μ2 
-1.812***  21.01 μ3 
-1.369***  15.88 μ4 
-0.497***  5.77 μ5 
1.275***  14.76 μ6 
0.399***  75.138 ρ 
YES Year dummies 
88026.3 Log likelihood 
4594.13 Likelihood Ratio 
63451 Observations 
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Table 3.6 
Job Satisfaction and Subjective Covariates, BHPS 1991-2004 
                   
 
R.E Ordered Probit R.E Ordered Probit 
  
R.E Ordered Probit
(1) (2) (3) 
  variable Coef t value Coef t value coef t value 
 
 0.38*** 100.35 0.34*** 87.66 0.27*** 73.08 Jbsat2 
 
   0.28*** 74.48 0.24*** 64.03 Jbsat4 
 
     0.66*** 138.05 Jbsat6 
 
age  -0.32** 7.92 -0.02** 3.82 -0.02** 5.76 
 
 0.000532** 10.26 0.0003215** 6.43 0.0003033** 6.74 age square 
 
 0.22** 12.00 0.18** 9.94 0.14** 9.43 sex 
 
 -0.0093** 7.27     Job tenure 
 
 0.0049 0.18 -0.0017 0.06 -0.04 1.68 soc2 
 
soc3  0.04 1.37 0.03 1.11 0.00041 0.02 
 
 -0.14** 5.57 -0.14** 5.67 0.03 1.57 soc4 
 
 0.00 0.11 0.02 0.68 0.06 2.59 soc5 
 
 0.12** 4.14 0.09* 3.21 0.08* 3.22 soc6 
 
 -0.15** 5.13 -0.19** 6.51 -0.03* 1.26 soc7 
 
soc8  -0.18** 5.88 -0.15** 5.01 0.04 1.59 
 
 -0.13** 4.17 -0.14** 4.34 0.06 2.22 soc9 
 
 -0.42** 34.59 -0.43** 35.18 -0.35** 29.65 hours2 
 
 -0.14** 6.69 -0.10** 4.95 -0.16** 7.71 hours3 
 
 -0.04* 2.99 -0.03 1.93 -0.02 1.72 travel2 
 
travel3  -0.05 2.28 -0.01 0.46 -0.01 0.56 
 
 -0.13** 5.82 -0.08** 3.70 -0.07** 3.58 travel4 
 
 0.18** 9.38 0.13** 6.75 0.06** 3.59 sect2 
 
 0.09* 1.69 0.01 0.13 0.01 0.18 sect3 
 
 0.26** 21.16 0.16* 12.83 0.10** 8.43 jobopps 
 
bonus  0.02 1.72 -0.00269 0.21 0.01 0.77 
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Table  3.6 continued  
size2 -0.03 1.90 -0.03 2.09 -0.01 0.98 
 
 -0.12** 6.12 -0.12** 6.09 -0.06 3.24 size3 
 
size4  -0.16** 7.54 -0.15** 7.31 -0.08** 4.15 
 
size5  -0.16** 8.03 -0.15** 7.43 -0.06* 3.03 
 
 -0.15** 6.31 -0.13** 5.39 -0.06 2.47 size6 
 
 0.06** 3.53 0.06* 3.22 0.03 1.83 child2 
 
 0.11** 5.67 0.10** 5.06 0.05* 2.66 child3 
 
house  0.06* 3.39 0.05* 2.89 0.04* 2.96 
 
union  -0.14*** 9.37 -0.09** 5.85 -0.01 0.95 
 
 -0.32* 11.67 -0.29** 10.79 -0.23** 9.68 educ2 
 
 -0.51** 15.33 -0.47** 14.57 -0.31** 11.06 educ3 
 
 -0.35** 11.14 -0.32** 10.44 -0.25** 9.60 educ4 
 
educ5  -0.21** 7.39 -0.21** 7.36 -0.15** 6.43 
 
educ6  -0.13* 3.10 -0.12* 2.90 -0.11 3.06 
 
 -0.21** 5.43 -0.19** 5.10 -0.17** 5.16 educ7 
 
 0.08 3.21 0.07* 2.97 0.05* 2.23 spouse2 
 
 0.04 2.39 0.02 1.31 0.01 0.91 spouse3 
 
change  0.13*** 9.67 0.16** 11.89 0.10** 7.72 
 
jbpt   0.04 2.32 0.05 2.69 0.10** 5.84 
μ1  -1.98 21.25 -0.60 6.48 1.77 20.67 
μ2  -1.42 15.36 -0.01 0.10 2.55 29.90 
μ3  -0.74 7.98 0.72 7.76 3.51 41.06 
μ4   -0.2445 2.65 1.24 13.37 4.18 48.72 
μ5  0.71 7.70 2.24 24.15 5.41 62.18 
μ6  2.61 28.07 4.21 44.83 7.58 85.06 
  0.33 56.24 0.29 50.81 0.163 24.97 ρ 
Year dummies  YES YES YES 
Log likelihood  -75128 -72325.00 -72325.00 
Likelihood Ratio X2  14817.5 20423.36 40515.01 
Observations  57813 57813 57813 
 
Notes: T statistics are given as absolute values. *,**,*** denote significance at 5%  , 1% and <1% respectively. 
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Table 3.8 – Job Satisfaction and Reference Income – BHPS, 1991-2004 
                        
 Ordered Probit  Ordered Probit  Ordered Probit  Ordered Probit 
 pooled sample  women  men  women (2) 
variable Coef t value  Coef t value  Coef t value  Coef t value
ln monthly income 0.213*** 11.30  0.141*** 4.07  0.132*** 5.31  0.116* 2.14 
            
ln reference income -0.122*** 8.08  0.047 1.44  -0.099*** 5.45  0.017 0.31 
            
ln household income          0.065* 2.34 
            
ln non-labour income          0.018** 2.97 
            
age -0.039*** 13.81  -0.058*** 14.07  -0.032*** 7.74  -0.059*** 9.37 
            
sex 0.227*** 20.73          
            
agesquare 0.001*** 16.46  0.001*** 16.02  0.000*** 9.60  0.001*** 10.83 
            
hours2 -0.444*** 43.90  -0.414*** 29.41  -0.477*** 32.62  -0.429*** 20.78 
            
hours3 -0.244*** 13.25  -0.197*** 7.40  -0.267*** 10.40  -0.208*** 4.95 
            
travel2 -0.070*** 6.63  -0.057*** 3.77  -0.068*** 4.59  -0.080*** 3.56 
            
travel3 -0.076*** 4.79  -0.027 1.28  -0.119*** 5.03  -0.03 0.97 
            
travel4 -0.124*** 7.51  -0.148*** 6.75  -0.077** 3.06  -0.140*** 4.36 
            
Higher Education  -0.411*** 12.81  -0.353*** 8.25  -0.504*** 10.29  -0.316*** 5.27 
            
Higher Qualifications -0.246*** 14.08  -0.256*** 10.59  -0.239*** 9.36  -0.301*** 7.94 
            
University Degree -0.409*** 18.65  -0.399*** 13.01  -0.425*** 13.36  -0.421*** 9.10 
            
Nursing Qualifications -0.347*** 12.12  -0.359*** 6.54  -0.346*** 9.70  -0.366*** 4.82 
            
A levels -0.280*** 14.43  -0.287*** 10.57  -0.274*** 9.73  -0.308*** 7.37 
            
O levels -0.160*** 9.24  -0.165*** 6.59  -0.168*** 6.94  -0.221*** 5.63 
            
CSE (2-5) -0.062* 2.36  -0.048 1.36  -0.099* 2.48  -0.067 1.14 
            
Commercial Qualific. -0.099** 2.94  -0.106 0.83  -0.139*** 3.75  0.045 0.27 
            
Other Qualifications -0.089 1.48  -0.157 1.86  -0.014 0.16  -0.448*** 3.55 
            
soc2 -0.063** 3.16  -0.071** 2.70  -0.019 0.62  -0.094** 2.64 
            
soc3 -0.055** 2.99  -0.079** 3.11  -0.01 0.38  -0.085* 2.41 
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soc4 -0.222*** 13.07  -0.335*** 12.56  -0.150*** 6.28  -0.327*** 8.33 
            
soc5 -0.090*** 4.55  -0.105*** 4.52  -0.052 1.09  -0.134*** 3.84 
            
soc6 -0.011 0.55  -0.122*** 3.94  0.048 1.70  -0.054 1.17 
            
soc7 -0.203*** 9.11  -0.237*** 6.73  -0.164*** 5.36  -0.189*** 3.58 
            
soc8 -0.248*** 11.92  -0.232*** 9.23  -0.319*** 8.06  -0.236*** 6.21 
            
soc9 -0.201*** 8.65  -0.244*** 7.64  -0.163*** 4.66  -0.240*** 4.69 
            
sect2 0.119*** 9.01  0.122*** 6.19  0.130*** 7.08  0.133*** 4.67 
            
sect3 0.146*** 3.59  0.068 1.20  0.225*** 3.85  0.12 1.51 
            
size2 -0.025* 2.14  -0.032 1.80  -0.019 1.16  -0.009 0.32 
            
jbopps -0.255*** 25.98  -0.293*** 20.85  -0.229*** 16.54  -0.277*** 13.36 
            
bonus 0.049*** 4.65  0.047*** 3.33  0.050** 3.10  0.042* 2.03 
            
size3 -0.126*** 7.95  -0.117*** 5.28  -0.126*** 5.55  -0.073* 2.23 
            
size4 -0.148*** 9.02  -0.137*** 6.07  -0.151*** 6.32  -0.163*** 4.90 
            
size5 -0.142*** 9.24  -0.122*** 5.80  -0.159*** 6.95  -0.079** 2.61 
            
size6 -0.138*** 7.13  -0.166*** 6.33  -0.105*** 3.58  -0.165*** 4.44 
            
child2 0.074*** 5.52  0.082*** 4.10  0.085*** 4.53  0.082** 2.82 
            
child3 0.111*** 8.28  0.077*** 4.06  0.162*** 8.31  0.119*** 4.21 
            
house 0.018 1.54  0.052** 3.06  0.006 0.33  0.059* 2.04 
            
union -0.155*** 13.96  -0.140*** 9.11  -0.155*** 9.58  -0.121*** 5.33 
            
spouse2 0.120*** 6.93  0.051* 2.12  0.189*** 6.79  0.038 1.10 
            
spouse3 0.081*** 6.95  0.002 0.14  0.132*** 8.52  -0.03 1.09 
            
change 0.122*** 11.42  0.142*** 9.25  0.107*** 7.11  0.128*** 5.52 
            
jbpt 0.017* 2.04  0.057** 2.76  0.000 0.04  0.116*** 3.49 
μ1 -2.694*** 30.97  -2.986*** 25.46  -3.144*** 25.39  -2.695*** 11.08 
μ2 -2.261*** 26.14  -2.531*** 21.72  -2.731*** 22.18  -2.267*** 9.35 
μ3 -1.743*** 20.21  -1.990*** 17.13  -2.235*** 18.22  -1.708*** 7.05 
μ4 -1.387*** 16.10  -1.584*** 13.64  -1.934*** 15.78  -1.302*** 5.38 
μ5 -0.696*** 8.08  -0.878*** 7.57  -1.253*** 10.24  -0.598* 2.47 
Table  3.8 continued  
Table  3.8 continued  
μ6 0.704*** 8.18  0.529*** 4.56  0.153 1.26  0.835*** 3.45 
Year Dummies YES  YES  YES  YES 
Log likelihood -81765.337  -40784.3  -40710.7  -18610 
Likelihood Ratio 6262.12  2584.23  3334.55  1337.22 
Observations 55863  27111  28752  12517 
Notes: Compared to previous results we use an augmented specification for the education variables. T statistics are given as absolute 
values. *,**,*** denote significance at 5%  , 1% and <1% respectively 
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Table 3.9 
 Job satisfaction differences, BHPS 1991-2004: multinomial marginal effects  
 
  
 Young employees (<25)  Senior employees (>25)
 Probability of JS ↑  Probability of JS ↓  Probability of JS↑  Probability of JS ↓
                
        
Satisfaction with Payment ↑ 0.156 (8.42)**  -0.074 (-3.77)**  0.151 (22.19)**  -0.054 (-8.28)** 
        
Satisf. with security ↑ 0.157 (8.48)**  -0.071 (-3.74)**  0.132 (19.70)**  -0.039 (-5.96)** 
        
Sat. with the work it self ↑ 0.30 (15.51)**  -0.184 (-10.27)**  0.299 (40.96)**  -0.11 (-18.69)** 
        
Constr. --> Unconstrained 0.074 (3.76)**  -0.001 (-0.08)  0.086 (11.96)**  -0.276 (-4.03)** 
        
F.time to P. Time Trsansition 0.328 (0.74)  -0.043 (-0.93)  0.032 (2.12)*  0.013 (0.84) 
        
Job Change between t and t-1 0.069 (4.52)**  -0.016 (-0.95)  0.085 (11.99)**  -0.019 (-2.82) 
        
Commuting time ↓ 0.038 (1.96)*  -0.039 (-1.91)*  0.023 (2.77)*  0.017 (1.93) 
        
Public Sector to Private sector 0.065 (1.71)*  -0.054 (-1.29)  0.045 (2.59)*  -0.021 (-1.21) 
        
Satisfaction with Payment  ↓ -0.078 (-4.62)**  0.193 (9.64)**  -0.043 (-6.60)**  0.154 (21.72)** 
        
Satisf. with security ↓ -0.052 (-3.05)*  0.157 (7.76)**  -0.052 (-8.21)**  0.149 (20.93)** 
        
Sat. with the work it self ↓ -0.15 (-9.70)**  0.30 (16.19)**  -0.092 (-15.35)**  0.299 (42.58)** 
        
Unconstr. --> Constrained -0.026 (-1.53)  0.097 (4.54)**  -0.028 (-4.43)**  0.084 (11.61)** 
        
P. Time to F. Time Transition 0.011 (0.35)  -0.076 (-2.29)*  0.011 (0.85)  -0.010 (-0.76) 
        
Job Change between t and t-1 0.069 (4.52)**  -0.016 (-0.95)  0.085 (11.99)**  -0.019 (-2.82)* 
        
Private sector to Public Sector 0.019 (0.48)  0.041 (0.87)  0.0018 (0.11)  0.022 (1.21) 
        
Job Opps 0.043 (2.95)*  0.0635 (3.87)**  -0.0046 (-0.89)  0.031 (5.89)** 
               
Number of Observations :  4302  30231 
Log likelihood:   -3592.4518  -25841.943 
Pseudo R square :  
 
0.2287   
 
 
0.1875 
Notes: T statistics are given as absolute values. *,**,*** denote significance at 5%  , 1% and <1% respectively. Specification also includes year dummy variables 
 
 
Table 3.10 – Job Satisfaction Profiles, ordered probit estimation. BHPS , 1991-2004 
                      
 Spec (1) Spec(2) within jobs Between jobs
variable coef t stat coef t stat coef t stat coef t stats 
neither sat. or disat. with payment 0.104*** 4.86 0.109*** 5.20 0.032 0.62 0.146** 2.85 
satisfied with payment 0.207*** 16.00 0.215*** 16.83 0.246*** 8.04 0.231*** 7.54 
neither sat. or disat. with security 0.229*** 9.97 0.226*** 9.96 0.257*** 4.76 0.261*** 4.71 
satisfied with security 0.328*** 20.50 0.314*** 19.92 0.387*** 10.34 0.373*** 9.45 
neither sat. or disat. with the actual work 0.470*** 19.55 0.468*** 19.73 0.671*** 11.45 0.447*** 7.69 
satisfied with the actual work 0.800*** 45.66 0.803*** 46.28 0.968*** 22.39 0.850*** 20.47 
Job tenure 0.021*** 8.25 -0.017*** 7.74 0.021** 2.65 0.060*** 6.50 
Job tenure squared -0.000602*** 6.31 0.0005489*** 6.49 -0.000737* 2.06 -0.00211*** 5.16 
age 0.002** 2.91 0.002** 2.97 0.003 1.96 0.003* 2.39 
sex -0.041*** 3.51 -0.041*** 3.49 -0.041 1.60 -0.057* 2.06 
hours2 -0.076*** 6.89 -0.085*** 7.77 -0.049* 2.02 -0.103*** 3.98 
hours3 -0.032 1.44 -0.021 0.97 0.025 0.39 -0.013 0.28 
jbopps -0.038*** 3.42 -0.054*** 4.91 -0.011 0.41 -0.036 1.41 
bonus -0.015 1.28 -0.028* 2.40 -0.017 0.63 -0.022 0.83 
child2 -0.004 0.28 -0.01 0.72 -0.012 0.38 0.02 0.62 
child3 -0.02 1.48 -0.024 1.80 -0.012 0.38 -0.003 0.11 
house -0.001 0.05 0.008 0.55 -0.029 0.83 -0.006 0.19 
union 0.033** 2.66 0.034** 2.76 0.04 1.43 0.007 0.25 
spouse2 0.007 0.38 0.009 0.48 0.028 0.62 0.006 0.13 
spouse3 0.024 1.84 0.023 1.77 0.008 0.27 0.00046 0.02 
change 0.421*** 27.04   0.275*** 7.94 0.806*** 23.77 
jbft -0.00045 0.07 -0.001 0.18 0.012 0.68 0.007 0.36 
Observations 42467 43779 8463 8259 
Log likelihood -66364.813 -68528.4 -12310.1 -13347.29 
LR chi square 5169.95 4531.59 1077.87 1751.37 
Notes : T statistics are given as absolute values. *,**,*** denote significance at 5%  , 1% and <1% respectively. Specification includes year and educational dummy variables 
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Chapter 4 
 
Employees’ earnings profiles in the private and the public sector  
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4.1 Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to explore whether there are any significant differences 
on average in the earnings profiles between employees in the private and the public sector 
in the UK. The motivating force of this study is the fact that the relative literature is 
surprisingly weak, although the issue of wage differentials has been addressed 
substantially in the labour economics literature in terms of gender, age and ethnicity (for 
instance Blinder, 1973, Butler, 1982).  
 
It is apparent that any potential wage differentiation between such groups is best 
explored within rather than between firms. The reason is that each firm has unique cost 
conditions, faces different demand circumstances and, in general, is characterised by a 
plethora of special attributes that can potentially lead to different wage realizations 
between workers with generally the same characteristics. And of course, several other 
parameters can lead to invalid arguments if a researcher does not take them into account. 
For example, wage differences between employers in the same firm can be explained by 
differences in education, special skills, firm specific training and the employee’s position 
in the firm’s managerial chart. Even if two employees have identical profiles in terms of 
observable characteristics (education, training, tenure, sex e.t.c.), any differences in 
remuneration could be the result of different abilities and/or effort at the job place. This 
parameter is unknown to the researcher, but visible to the employer only to the extent that 
monitoring mechanisms exist and provide efficient means of measuring how well 
workers perform their assigned tasks. These mechanisms become important especially 
when firms assign a wage on the basis of an implicit contract that does not involve a 
specific target but implies general duties within the firm. In this case, agency costs and 
shirking may arise. Examining within firms wage differentials can be better explored 
using a data like the Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS) that provides 
matching between the employer and the employee.  
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When the discussion comes to differences in wages across firms, even when all 
the other relative issues are kept constant, wage differentials might be the result of 
efficiency wage considerations. Under this, it pays the firm to offer wages above the 
market clearing level in order to stimulate enthusiasm across employees to boost 
productivity and to reduce the probability of quits, especially when training costs are high 
and labour supply scarce. In fact, Krueger and Summers (1988), using a fixed effects 
setting, propose the efficiency wage theory as an explanation for the significant variation 
in the inter-industry wage structure they encounter in their data.  
 
As mentioned above there has been a noticeable contribution to the literature from 
studies analyzing wage differentials either within (for generally similar employees) or 
between firms.  However, examining wage differentials, being essentially a static 
exercise, does not reveal much information about the life-time evolution of wages. 
Moreover, even if you assume that two employees who work for different employers start 
with the same wage, there is no reason to believe that the slope of their earning profiles 
will necessarily be the same36. A difference in the slope could involve several issues such 
as on the job-training and promotion opportunities. The term slope expresses the rate at 
which earnings are increased and in a linear specification this rate remains constant.  
 
When comparing earnings profiles between firms a degree of heterogeneity is 
expected. In this sense, there might be firms that offer a high starting wage but with a 
fairly flat earnings profile while the opposite could be true for other firms. Of course, 
especially in large establishments, there is a large number of offered jobs that correspond 
to a variety of skills, educational backgrounds, previous experience and so forth. 
However, even after accounting for this heterogeneity (to the extent that the available 
data allow for this), there must be a firm specific curve that gives an average idea of how 
earning profiles differ between firms and whether this divergence could result from 
                                                 
36 In most of what follows, we will be using the term “earning profiles” instead of the more precise (and 
compatible with Mincer’s (1974) analysis) experience-earnings profiles since various proxies have been 
used for experience like age, tenure and years in the labour force.  
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factors that characterize the operation of the firm it self or even the sector within the firm 
(or organization) operates.   
 
 The scope of this chapter is to examine whether the wage-earning profiles of the 
public sector is statistically different from the profile that (on average) is offered to the 
workers who choose to follow a career path in the private sector. If such a difference is 
supported by the data, we need to explain it with reference to the special characteristics of 
each sector. These characteristics, provided that can be efficiently identified and 
separated, are well possible to attract workers with different preferences or objectives. 
For example, if on average public sector offers a more secured working environment, 
workers that dislike risk are more likely to end up in such a job place. This logic can also 
be extended to account for a variety of other non-pecuniary aspects such as working 
hours, the ability of using own initiative, the actual work it self and so forth. At the same 
time, the private sector employment choice can be related to issues that are more 
pecuniary in nature such as the actual wage, the promotion opportunities (if this is related 
to a wage promotion) and the possibility of performance payment.  
 
In what follows, section 2 presents the literature of earnings profiles with 
reference to the two main theories that explain the upwards sloping experience earnings 
curve, namely the human capital theory and the agency theory. Section 3 discusses the 
nature of employment in the public and private sector. We differentiate between the two 
sectors by highlighting that employees in each sector have a different motivational basis. 
This argument is supported by a variety of studies (for instance Karl and Sutton, 1998, 
Crewson, 1997, Wright 2001). We also show, using a UK dataset, that there is a 
significant difference between public and private sector employees in the values they 
attribute to a list of job characteristics. In sections 4 and 5 we briefly describe the data 
and we estimate the probability of being employed in the public sector. In sections 6 and 
7 we estimate the relevant earnings profiles for the public and private sector and we also 
discuss the issue of selectivity and the estimation results. Section 8 concludes.  
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4.2 Earnings profiles considerations 
 
The analysis of earning profiles has been greatly influenced by the seminal work 
of Mincer (1974). Mincer proposed an earnings equation in which work experience enters 
the specification in a quadratic form but schooling years remain a linear explanatory 
factor of the (log) wage.  This specification implies a non-linear relationship between 
experience and earnings in which earnings increase at first (although at a decreasing rate), 
reach a peak point and then decline. In fact, a researcher would follow Mincer’s approach 
if he/she wanted to control for career earnings growth. In other words, the main idea was 
that what lies behind the earning experience relationship is a process of human capital 
formation. 
 
Subsequent research tried to deviate from human capital considerations and 
placed emphasis on the incentives that both employees and employers face. In particular, 
seminal work by Lazear (1979,1981) and Lazear and Moore (1984) promoted the idea of 
“deferred payment” as a means of reducing the worker’s incentive to shirk. In this sense, 
the employer pays at the beginning of the contractual relationship a wage that is below 
worker’s marginal productivity and at the same time below the wage that this worker 
could find in alternative working places. At the end of the contract, the worker is paid 
above his/her marginal productivity. This kind of contract provides an incentive for 
employees to provide maximum effort since if they shirk and get caught, they will loose 
earnings in excess of their productivity at the end of their contractual relationship. It is 
apparent that if a contract like this comes into force, the employer would have a reason to 
terminate the employment relationship at the particular point of time when productivity 
becomes equal to the wage. However, such an action would send a negative signal to the 
market concerning the reliability of this firm and thus make it more difficult to attract 
workers in the future.  
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The view that earnings and productivity should diverge in order to mitigate 
agency problems is supported by the empirical findings by Kotlikoff and Gokhale (1992) 
who compare the earnings between salespersons and managers in relation to their 
productivity37. The earnings profile of salespersons, whose effort can be inferred by 
outcomes, was almost identical to their (easily verifiable) productivity. On the other 
hand, managers experienced a wage that was below their productivity at first and a wage 
above their productivity at later stages, exactly as Lazear and Moore (1984) suggested. 
 
Topel (1991), provided important empirical contribution in the field by supporting 
the hypothesis that earnings rise as the result of acquisition of specific human capital. In 
addition, he highlighted explicitly the endogeneity of seniority. In a strict econometric 
sense an endogenous variable is potentially correlated with some unobserved variables 
that are necessarily included in the error term, either because of structural 
misspecification or because of data unavailability. For example, an employee who is 
highly satisfied with the working environment (unobserved element) might prefer to stay 
in a job even if the wage path does not perfectly match his/her preferences. In other 
words, the variable ‘seniority’ is capturing satisfaction with non pecuniary aspects of the 
job and does not completely reflect self-selection into high seniority due to rising 
earnings profile. Consequently, the issue of selection bias that some authors cite (for 
example Abraham and Farber, 1987) although present, would alleviate some of its bias 
effects on the estimated coefficients, provided of course that the unobserved 
heterogeneity has been taken into account.  
 
Leaving agency theory and human capital considerations aside, an alternative way 
to explain rising earnings over the life-cycle had been proposed initially by Frank and 
Hutchens (1993) and Loewenstein and Sicherman (1991). The idea that is also adopted 
and tested using a US dataset by Neumark (1995) is that individuals may prefer a rising 
                                                 
37 The issue of productivity measurement remains ambiguous, Kotlikoff and Goghale (1992) infer the age-
productivity relationship by observing the compensation of workers who are hired when old since,  
according to their logic, those workers are being given exactly their marginal products.  Alternatively, if 
avalaible data allows for that, one could observe the wage differentials between workers who are doing 
exactly the same job but are hired on a different contractual basis (i.e. explicit,emplicit).  
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earnings profile (implying rising consumption) if they are not disciplined savers and they 
need an exogenous influence in order to achieve their desirable intertemporal 
consumption plan. There can also be cases that some people prefer a rising profile than a 
more flat one, even if the latter implies a higher discounted present value. This is 
supported by survey data from the above mentioned papers. In particular Neumark (1995) 
takes into advantage a special feature of the US fiscal environment that includes the 
deduction of a certain amount of the wage income at source. Each employee then fills a 
form that describes the rest of his/her financial and demographic conditions which finally 
determine the amount of refund he/she will receive from the federal government. It is 
clear that an individual can alternatively under-withhold in the sense of deducting the 
minimum allowed amount from his/her wage and pay additional income taxes at a later 
point. According to this study, the majority of taxpayers over withhold (and consequently 
receive a refund) which according to Neumark (1995) can be viewed as a reflection of a 
forced saving mechanism as he finds that those who over withhold are indeed on a 
steeper wage profile. However, his findings should be treated with caution because they 
are based on the assumption that over-withholding and the choice of a steeper profile are 
complements. In other words, over withholding depicts a stable picture of preference 
towards future consumption which is also reflected in the wage profile. But for some 
individuals a steep wage profile (implying low wage at low tenure) could be a sufficient 
means of forced saving by it self and thus over-withholding could prove excessive. In 
such a case, no relationship between refunds and steepness would be expected. 
Additionally, at low tenure, people on a steep profile who decide to over withhold at the 
same time is well possible to face liquidity problems.  
  
A point of consideration is the exact nature of the variable that accounts for the 
human capital formation and results in a rising earnings profile. Since job mobility is in 
most data sets observable38, sufficient ground exists for testing whether there could be 
alternatives to firm-specific experience (tenure). Instead, one could use the overall 
                                                 
38 In the BHPS apart from identifying if there has been a job termination, information is also provided for 
the reason of this termination.  
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employment experience or the industry specific human capital (for instance Parent, 
2000).  Moreover, some studies have used age minus the years of schooling as a proxy 
for the employee’s experience. The validity of this approach should be based on the 
assumption that there is no delay in entering into employment when finishing education. 
This can be very close to reality for some countries like Britain where the activity rate for 
the first month after leaving continuous education is 95.2 %, Eurostat (2000)39. 
Additionally, an employee should not have a serious disruption in his/her working life as 
this could significantly have an impact on his subsequent earnings evolution. Staying idle 
in employment terms for a relative long period can be expected to have a negative impact 
on earnings for many reasons since the employee stays significantly behind (in relation to 
his former colleagues) in the process of acquiring firm-specific training.    
 
The empirical research that followed Mincer’s (1974) work did not significantly 
challenge the quadratic perception but was primarily focused on the factors that could 
potentially have an impact on the slope of the earnings curve. A well cited exception is 
the frequently cited work by Murphy and Welch (1990). They argued that the quadratic 
form would understate early-career earnings growth and overstate mid-career growth. For 
this reason they proposed cubic or quartic alternatives that fitted their data better. They 
also claimed that squared experience would imply a constant decrease of wage growth 
over time, which was inconsistent with their analysis and the dataset they used. However 
this may not be a result that can be generalised in all circumstances. Card (1999), using 
the current population surveys (CPS),  plots actual earnings means corresponding to 
different age groups (ranging from 16 to 66 years old) along with an estimated curve that 
results from a Mincerian type equation. He finds that age-earnings profiles for US men 
and women are reasonably approximated by a variant of the standard human capital 
earnings function. In addition he argues that had a cubic specification been used instead, 
it would have understated the earnings for young workers, belonging to specific 
educational groups. The Mincerian equation (or variants of it) has been universally 
                                                 
39 Evidence is based on the Labour Force Survey that was conducted in 2000 and can be found on 
Eurostat’s web site : ec.europa.eu/eurostat
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accepted and is considered a useful analytical tool to depict the intertemporal earnings 
path. One important aspect is the selection of the explanatory variables and the way these 
variables are correlated with wages. Potential explanatory variables apart from tenure and 
overall working experience (that account for firm-specific capital and general capital 
respectively) could involve demographic/individual, educational and firm characteristics.  
 
 The issue of earning profiles can not be considered to be static. The business 
cycle can definitely have an impact on earnings growth depending on whether the firm 
would prefer to make young employees or senior employees redundant. Freeman (1979), 
for instance, explains how the demographic boom in the post Second World War 
America affected earnings profiles. Essentially, this is a matter of labour supply. As more 
and more young employees compete for employment, entry level salaries would be 
suppressed. To the extent that a firm can substitute young employees for more expensive 
older workers, the earnings profile should be expected to become flatter. But perfect 
substitutability would be a rather extreme assumption due to the accumulated experience 
and firm-specific training of senior employees. And similarly, not all firms are exposed to 
the same level o macroeconomic vulnerability. Consequently firms that do not usually 
have to adjust to demand conditions are expected to have a more stable age structure.  
 
 It is clear that what plays an important role in determining the shape of the 
earning profiles is profit maximizing decisions that could potentially favour one cohort of 
employees against another, with profound effects on the experience-earnings profile. But 
the discussion so far abstracts from institutional explanations as well as reasons to do 
with the choice of some employees to join firms that offer a payment directly related to 
their performance. A specific-task job, paid upon completion of the task is an example. 
As far as institutions are concerned, few things about unions have been mentioned 
previously. Most of the existing literature focuses exclusively on how unions affect the 
earnings profiles in the private sector. For example, Booth and Frank (1996), using the 
BHPS, find no differences in the earning profiles between workers who are covered by a 
trade union and those who are not. According to their study, a noticeable difference 
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appears when the union negotiates and states clearly its demands. To be more specific, 
when explicit seniority scales exist, then earning profiles become steeper, which could be 
evidence that unions tend to benefit senior rather than younger workers. This result tends 
to support the theoretical explanation of discriminating monopoly and challenges the so 
called “right to manage” model.  In earlier work, though, Freeman and Medoff (1984) 
concluded that unions lead to a flatter wage profile. Moreover, an important aspect that 
may have been omitted from the analysis is the non-pecuniary aspects of a job that unions 
negotiate on behalf of their members, and this can be biased in favour of senior workers, 
leading to an even steeper profile 
 
 One other aspect that needs to attract some attention in the earnings profiles 
discussion is the relation between productivity, seniority and wages. The way that the 
marginal productivity of labour for an employee changes over time is not clear, despite 
the substantial empirical and theoretical literature that has explicitly tried to shed light on 
this matter. And it has not just been a strictly economic issue, since psychologists have 
conducted numerous experiments trying to understand whether productivity declines as a 
result of physical fatigue, a psychological effect, or both. In relation to the former, we can 
refer the reader to a fairly recent study by Deary et al (2000) who found that individuals 
(regardless of their ability) are subject to the same age-induced changes in cognitive 
functioning. Further, Schwartzman et al. (1987), found that verbal abilities remain 
virtually unchanged, while reasoning and speed abilities decline with age. In addition to 
these findings, the psychological factor should not be underestimated. Increased tenure in 
the firm can induce psychological exhaustion especially in the case of routinely repeated 
tasks. Our results in the previous section also revealed that whoever changes job, either 
within or between firms, enjoys increased job satisfaction, even keeping the important 
aspects of the job constant (wage, job security).   
 
In general, the idea of diminishing productivity which mentioned above if 
compared with the quadratic function of earnings reveals that the well known 
maximization principle (at least in a competitive framework) which equates the marginal 
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productivity of an employee with his wage need not necessarily hold at a particular 
moment of time. In fact, an employee at the beginning of his/her career is paid below his 
marginal productivity while at later stages the spot wage exceeds the value of his/her 
marginal product. However, in a discounted life-time setting, employers equate the 
present expected value of a worker’s compensation to the present expected value of 
his/her productivity. From a theoretical point of view, Becker and Stigler (1974) and 
Lazear (1981) highlight agency aspects of an employment relationship that leads to the 
mismatch between productivity and earnings: in firms where performance monitoring is 
not adequate and thus employees have incentives to cheat, a steep earnings profile would 
increase the cost of shirking and consequently introduce a good reason why employees 
should think twice before adopting adverse behaviour. This reasoning is supported by 
Lazear and Moore (1984) who report that earning profiles are flatter for self employed 
workers, compared to those who receive their compensation from an employer. Also, in a 
recent UK survey, Brown and Sessions (2006) using three separate datasets find 
significant evidence supporting the idea that potential agency costs is a primary 
explaining factor for the steepness of the earning-experience curve. Their estimation 
shows that earning profiles for employees who are in any kind of performance related 
payment (PRP) scheme lies between the profiles for “regular” payment employees and 
the self-employed. In other words, employees in PRP would be less keen in reducing 
their performance since such action would have a clear impact on their earnings. This 
impact of course is, by definition, 100% direct in the case of self employed. The agency 
theory has already been mentioned in Chapter 2 with a particular emphasis on the work 
of Kahn and Lang (1992) as a potential explanatory factor for hour constraints. 
Intuitively, when older workers receive earnings in excess of their marginal products, 
they are likely to be under-employed and desire to work more hours. Yet, our previous 
findings indicate the opposite. Older workers, at least in the UK, tend to be over-
employed which is an indication that older workers are paid less than their marginal 
productivity. Empirical findings by Kahn and Lang (1992) also support this view.  
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Although the shape of the earnings profile does not attract much controversy in 
the literature and is almost universally accepted, what seems to have an unclear pattern 
(mainly from a theoretical point of view) is the intertemporal difference between earnings 
and productivity. This ambiguity though is not restrictive for the purpose of our analysis, 
since what lies in the epicentre of our attention is the relationship between seniority and 
earnings, in the public and private sector. It also becomes clear that certain aspects of an 
employment relationship can not lead a priori to a steeper or a flatter earnings profile. It 
is rather a matter of the extent at which these characteristics (for e.g. unionism, security, 
agency problems, payment schemes) can be found in the sectors under examination and 
whether they interact with various individual or firm observable and unobservable 
characteristics.  
 
The stability of employment relations has also been offered as a reason that can 
potentially affect the earning profiles. In countries where there is a strong employment 
culture supporting long tenures, earning profiles should be steeper. This argument was 
offered by Hashimoto and Raisian (1985) who compared the US and the Japan labour 
market. Their results strongly supported the firm-specific human capital hypothesis since 
for Japan, an additional year of tenure was found to increase earnings more than an 
additional year of general experience did. The opposite was the case for the US. Clark 
and Ogawa (1992) extended Hashimoto and Raisian’s work, trying to find if this pattern 
of earning profiles remained stable in subsequent years. The logic of their analysis is very 
similar to the previously mentioned work by Freeman (1979) since they highlighted 
specifically the demographic factors and whether young and old employees are perfect 
substitutes in the production function. Although they confirmed the results by Hashimoto 
and Raisian (1985) using 1981 data, they found substantial declines in the value of an 
extra year of job tenure. As they explain, increases in the age of mandatory retirement 
may have led to a flatter earnings profile. We will show later in this chapter that our UK 
evidence show much more stable employment relations in the public sector, compared 
with the average tenure in the private one. In the same token, separations are less frequent 
in the public sector and also, the percentage of people who are actively looking for a new 
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job significantly smaller. These descriptive findings could lead to potential explanations 
about the shape of the earnings profile curve, consistent with the logic of the above 
mentioned studies.  
In conclusion, the arguments as well as the empirical findings can be summarised in 
the following points:  
 
1) Rising earnings profiles can be the result of human capital accumulation. The 
exact nature of this accumulation (firm-specific, industry-specific or general) can 
be different for individuals and depends not only on personal components but also 
on firms’ characteristics. Experience and training in a firm can also be desirable 
for a different firm operating in the same industry, provided of course that some 
requirements are met (for example similarities in  production techniques). 
2)  Rising earnings profiles can serve as a discipline device, preventing workers 
from shirking. When an employee’s output is not instantaneously verifiable 
(implying an incentive to shirk), the employer places his future wealth at risk as in 
case of being caught, he/she will loose future earnings that are in excess of his/her 
productivity.  
3) If we assume an employee’s output that is not directly verifiably, differences in 
the earnings curve slope between two workers in different firms (or sectors) may 
reflect a tendency to substitute higher future earnings with other job parameters 
that might be more important for an employee, like job security, promotion 
opportunities and so forth.   
4) Selection into a lengthy employment relationship could be considered dependent 
on the wage growth. Generally, the more rapidly the wage grows, the more likely 
that the employee will not change job. At the same time, employees with higher 
ability or enthusiasm are also well possible to have higher experience and 
seniority. Consequently the two separate problems that arise come of the form of 
sample selection and potential endogeneity.   
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In this chapter we primarily try to explore if there is a significant (on average) 
difference in the earnings profiles between the two sectors of employment, the public 
sector and the private. Further, by analysing the conceptual and operational differences 
between public and private we suggest that some employees are not sorted into either 
sector in a random manner. It is rather some distinct characteristics of the public or 
private sector are more or less appealing to certain categories of the population. Since we 
estimate wage equation, these characteristics will be related to the earnings profile as a 
potential trade-off. An example of such a trade-off could be non-pecuniary employment 
aspects and the rate of wage increases. Assuming that some employees are more 
interested in non-pecuniary aspects than others and that public sector offers them, then 
these employees would be expected to seek employment in the public sector.  Our 
analysis is based on the assumption that if someone wants to find a public sector job there 
are not any supply-demand restrictions for doing so.  
 
From an econometric point of view we need to control for all those factors that can 
have an impact on the slope of earnings profiles in order to highlight the above argument 
and also to account for the potential self-selection into the public sector.  The scope is to 
find a curve that could on average describe the pattern of earnings dynamics in the 
private and public sector and explain the possible reasons for any observed differences. 
 
 
4.3 Public and Private Sector 
 
 In this section we provide justification for our choice to distinguish between the 
two sectors in the earnings profile study. The difference between public and private is 
primarily conceptual. It refers to the logic that a public agency needs to accomplish tasks 
that are not necessarily placed within a market framework. Such tasks may include the 
provision of education, health, administration, social security and so forth.  These areas 
of public sector interest are in line with the idea of promoting social efficiency and thus 
can be totally different from the profit maximizing goals of a private firm. Ben and Gaus 
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(1983) suggested that public and private vary along at least three dimensions: (a) interest, 
(b) access and (c) agency. Interest refers to distinguishing whether gains or losses are 
communal or restricted to individuals. For example, the non excludability property of 
public goods ensures that any benefits from the provision of these goods will not be 
restricted within a limited group of individuals. Access is linked to the openness of 
facilities, resources or information. Agency, according to the study above, refers to 
whether a person or an organization is acting as an individual or as an agent for the 
community as a whole.  
 
 Apart from the three criteria mentioned above, someone could provide a public 
sector definition on an ownership/funding basis. Following this logic, public 
organizations are those owned by government, whether they are governmental offices 
(e.g. ministries), schools, hospitals or manufacturing firms. In the same token, public 
ownership requires public funding, meaning that the source of funding for public sector 
activities will be either the national budget or the (compulsory) offers of the local 
community members like the council tax. Notice here that this definition does not 
necessarily imply that public organisations are more subjected to heavily institutional 
controls of government as opposed to market oriented firms. In fact, privately owned 
institutions can also be heavily affected by governmental regulation. Public 
administration literature has been thoroughly examined the border lines between public 
and private, focusing on the various proposed definitions and explaining the fundamental 
differences40. However, the economic implications of this conceptual separation have 
been analyzed by economists, for instance, wage differentials between the two sectors 
(Katz and Krueger 1991) and the sector choice probability (Black, 1985) . Ehrenberg and 
Schwartz (1986) also attempted to decode the special attributes of the public sector. This 
study, although US oriented, provides a brief historical overview of the evolution of the 
public sector in the US and the various institutions that govern the issues related to how 
                                                 
40 For a comprehensive survey see Perry and Rainey (1988), “The Public-Private Distinction in 
Organization Theory : A Critique and Research Strategy” in the Academy of Management Review.  
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wages are formed. They project public sector issues under the light of unionism and 
political insights.  
 
As far as unionism is concerned, there are several thoughts which turn our 
attention not only to the question of whether there is an active union at the workplace but 
also to the way these institutions affect the negotiation process over a range of issues (not 
just wage bargaining), the link between unionism and productivity and so forth. Although 
it could be difficult to quantify these effects, it must also be expected that the quality of 
the union plays a role not only in determining wage differentials between the sectors of 
economy, but also in the shape of the wage profiles. In this context, the word “quality” is 
crucial. It simply implies that from an econometrics point of view, adding a dichotomous 
variable for whether a union exists in the workplace, although probably sufficient in 
explaining some within-firm wage variation, would not help in identifying effects 
between sectors. Public sector unions can be different in their objectives and in the means 
of achieving these, than private sector unions. Freeman (1986), for example, provides an 
exhaustive survey on how public sector unionism evolved in the US. He emphasises 
particularly the broad consensus that the effect of public sector unions on wages is not as 
profound as it for the private sector and mentions that the union power in a public setting 
is de facto limited as in a case of a strike, governments continue to receive tax money 
whereas the receipts of employees may dry up.  This view reflects structural differences 
between the public and the private sectors.  
 
Finally, we should make a distinction between union density and union coverage. 
Although the percentage of employees who join a trade union may not be high, the 
outcomes of collective bargaining may be extended even to employees who are not union 
members. As Blanchflower and Bryson (2004) discuss, this fact consists a fundemendal 
difference between unionism in the US and the UK. In the UK, many more non-members 
work in workplaces that are covered by union agreements while in the US more union 
members are employed in workplaces where unions are not engaged in pay bargaining. 
According to Hildreth (2000), coverage and membership are less highly correlated in 
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Britain than in the US because there is less pressure on employees to become members 
where there is a coverage agreement. In any case, unionism in both UK and US has 
exhibited similar trends in terms of participation, political support, ability to influence 
wages and ability to spark industrial actions. (Freeman, 1995).  
 
The political environment under which the public sector operates is also 
important. The decision-making process (about issues such as the volume of production, 
quality, allocation of resources e.t.c.) does not always allow for efficiency considerations, 
but takes into account the political situation and objectives that are not necessarily market 
oriented. Although this kind of environment can still be analyzed in terms of labour 
theory that identifies principals and agents, the interdependence between these two parts 
is not always clear. It must be expected that policy makers’ utility is maximized only in 
the case of re-election and there is no other outcome that would be acceptable by them. 
This rule could allow for deviations from optimum decisions and mutual agreements 
between voters and politicians that do not necessarily promote political transparency. For 
instance, Borjas (1982) develops a model that takes into account the vote-maximizing 
bureaucrat in order to explain wage differentials between the public sector and the private 
one.  
 
These considerations can have implications on how the public sector operates. 
Either way, although the performance of a private firm is being considered by its owners 
more often on the basis of maximizing profits, the nature and the level at which this takes 
place in a public firm (or organization) is not exactly clear. This assumption by it-self 
may have several applications that alter fundamentally the working conditions between 
the public and private sector in many aspects. For example we mention the issues of job 
security, working hours, monitoring mechanism and earning profiles. 
 
The differentiation in the main objectives between the private and the public 
sector may not necessarily be stressed out implicitly. For instance, it is nowhere written 
that public firms or organizations are not interested in profits. Especially in the case 
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where those firms are listed in the stock market and shareholders are expecting behaviour 
consistent with the maximisation of their shares value. Consequently, it is essential to 
make a distinction between firms of the “narrow” (for example ministries) and “wide” 
public sector (potentially some utility firms)41. This categorization of economic activities 
within the public sector, although methodologically useful, is convenient for an empirical 
consideration only to the extent that the available data allow for this. In most of the cases 
we have to assume a high degree of homogeneity between public firms or organization, 
without this being really accurate. Even so, one can expect that at least some aspects of 
the employment conditions are fairly similar and thus some broad results can be derived. 
This again results from the assumption that public organizations often have missions with 
broader scope and more profound impact than is typically found in the private sector.  
 
The view that public sector is charged with promoting general welfare can have 
motivational implications as well. These implications stem from the fact that the 
participatory basis for public sector can be more idealistic than it is for an occupation in 
the private sector. In addition the outcome of the effort that an employee is exercising at 
the work place can have a direct consequence on an individual’s welfare and in extension 
to social welfare. For example, if a private sector employee undertakes the risk to shirk, 
the consequences of this action (provided he is not caught) are detected on the less effort 
he provides  and consequently on  the profits of the entrepreneur. On the other hand an 
NHS42 surgeon can not provide less effort than the best she can offer since shirking is 
possible to put the health of her patient in danger. It is clear that in this case, any 
incentive scheme (a bonus scheme for instance) would not stimulate a better performance 
since the maximum possible performance would have anyway been provided for 
idealistic and ethical reasons. For exactly these reasons performance monitoring and a 
performance related payment may be excessive in the public sector.  Burgess and Ratto 
(2003) mention the issue of introducing in the UK (for the first time in history) a national 
performance-related pay scheme for teachers. Under this scheme, teachers who have 
                                                 
41 A different base for differentiation within the public sector could be the federal state and local 
governments for the US or the local councils for the United Kingdom 
42 The National Health System (NHS) is the publicly funded health care system of England.  
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reached the maximum payment level are eligible to apply to pass a performance 
threshold. Their performance is assessed against various specific categories and if 
successful they receive an annual bonus of £2000 which they will receive until the end of 
their career, without needing to reapply. This scheme received a cold reception, 
particularly from teaching unions, for the same reasons we mentioned above: the social 
dimension of the teaching profession does not require financial incentives to induce 
effort.  
 
The composition of the public workforce is expected to reflect the nature of work 
in the public sector, attracting employees who desire greater opportunities to fulfil higher 
order needs and altruistic motives. If this is indeed the case, those who work in the public 
sector emphasize more on the work they are doing (satisfaction with the work it self) 
while private sector employees place the highest value on good wages.   
 
A comparison between public and private sector would then reveal differences in 
the job values that employees place on certain job aspects. It is reasonable to assume that 
job values changed over time, given changes in economic, social, technological and 
political conditions. In the public administration literature, Karl and Sutton (1998), 
focusing on the US, find that there is no difference between public and private sector 
employees in the importance placed on job security. A study by Rainey (1982) (again on 
US) was also along these lines. On the contrary, Crewson (1997) supported that public-
sector employees generally value job security less than private sector employees do. 
Finally, an econometric estimation by Bellante and Link (1981) using the PSID 
concluded that labor-force participants correctly perceive that less risk is attached to 
public sector employment. 
 
Table 4.1 provides evidence on the most important aspect of the job from the 
latest available wave (2004) of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). It is in fact 
the first time such a question is included in the questionnaire. In particular, there is a 
statistically significant difference between the two sectors in the percentage of workers 
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who report that total pay is the most important aspect of the job. In the private sector 28 
percent of employees reported that the total remuneration is the most important aspect of 
their job. The relevant figure for the private sector is 15.95 percent.  
What seems to be more important for public sector workers is the actual work it 
self. The corresponding figure is 38.07 percent which exceeds the private sector figure by 
almost 15 percentage points. It seems that a substantial fraction of public sector workers 
are attracted into public employment by the actual nature of their employment. Some 
examples could be employers in the police force/fire brigade, military personnel,  
 
 
 
Table (4.1)   
 
Most Important aspect of a job, BHPS 2004, Column % 
  
 
 
 Private Sector Public Sector Total 
       Job aspect  
Promotion prospects 3.04 (144) 1.81 (46) 2.61 (190) 
 Total pay 27.73 (1312) 15.95 (406) 23.61 (1718)  
Good relations with  
 9.72 (460) 8.37 (213) 9.25 (673) Manager 
Job security 23.37 (1106) 21.14 (538) 22.59 (1644)  
Using own initiative 7.52 (356)  8.68 (221) 7.93 (577) 
The work itself 22.53 (1066) 38.07 (969) 27.96 (2035)  
The hours of work 4.59 (217) 4.28 (109) 4.48 (326) 
 Something else 1.5 (71) 1.69 (43) 1.57 (114) 
    
 Total 100 (4732) 100 (2545) 100 (7277)  
  Notes :  1) Raw Numbers in Parenthesis 
 (2) Chi Squared test of independence show that the differences are significant at the conventional 5% level  
 
 
 teachers, nurses and so forth.  
 
 In terms of the rest of job aspects, we notice the similarity between public and 
private sector workers in the percentage of those who place job security as the more 
important aspect of a job. The relevant figures are 23.37% for the private and 21.14% for 
the public sector. However, what is not clear is whether job security is related to 
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institutional or to demand side factors. In other words, if by job security employees 
perceive either the inability of their employers to make them redundant (for example due 
to the presence of a strong union) or the ability of them selves to find a new working 
place. This ability depends both on employee’s own characteristics and on the demand 
for employment from the employers’ side. Both factors (institutional and demand side) 
has unavoidably a dynamic context though demand is expected to be less volatile that 
institutions. In this sense, public sector employment must be thought to be less risky since 
market conditions are less likely to affect the level of operations in the public sector or 
the legislatory basis of the public sector employment.   
 
What has been stressed out so far is that the labels “public” and “private” do not 
mean anything by themselves. What really matters is the associated employment 
characteristics that are discreet in nature and visible to employees. When an individual 
decides to join either sector, it must be assumed that the choice is based on his/her 
preferences towards the special characteristics of this job43. If for example the broad 
feeling in the labour force is that the public sector offers more stable jobs than the private 
sector, risk behaviour could be a primary suspect for anticipating how likely it would be 
for an employee to accept a job in this sector. Bellante and Link (1981), using US data, 
estimate the probability of choosing a public sector job in relation to the level of risk 
averseness. Their results show that public sector jobs were indeed chosen by the less 
risky employees. Dixit (2002, p. 716) also argues, using  incentive theory, that less risk 
averse, high ability employees will prefer a private sector employment where marginal 
incentives are more powerful. The term “marginal incentive” refers to the case where the 
payment is not just a fixed amount but also depends on the amount of output produced. 
Such a scheme can take the simple form of ( )y x β μχ= +  whereβ  is the fixed 
compensation and μ  denotes the marginal incentive. In this respect, the employer must 
choose the parameters of the problem in order to satisfy that worker will not decide to 
quit (participation constraint) and that he/she will exert the effort that the employer 
desires (incentive constraint). Assuming that α denotes the employer’s effort, the reason 
for an incentive scheme is that the output χ can precisely indicate the employee’s effort 
                                                 
43 We are also abstracting from labour demand constraints, so for each worker the difficulty of joining 
either sector is the same and consequently only preferences matter. This assumption may not be very 
realistic in labour markets where the supply for a sector exceeds the relevant demand.  
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since stochastic parameters can penetrate into the production process. Assuming that 
output χ equals α plus a normally distributed error with variance v, the employee’s cost of 
effort is quadratic, 21( )
2
c a ca=  and that both the employer and the worker are risk averse 
with R showing the level of risk aversion for the employer and r the level of risk aversion 
for the worker, it can be shown 1
1 ( )
Rcv
r R cv
+
+ +
44 that the marginal coefficient μ  is . Clearly, 
if the relationship between effort and output can be determined in all circumstances (v=0) 
then μ  is equal to 1 and the payment is just a fixed amount. The same also applies if both 
the worker and the employer are risk-neutral. But the more risk averse a worker is, the 
higher μ  becomes. Combining this observation with the above mentioned finding by 
Belante and Link (1981) we must expect that performance related payments and bonus 
schemes must be much more frequent in the private sector rather than in the public sector. 
This is indeed verified by our UK dataset as shown later in this chapter.  
 
If earnings profile for the public sector is flatter that the corresponding one for the 
private sector then one of the possible explanation could be that employees trade off the 
probability of excessive future earnings that the private sector offers for other job aspects 
like job security and employment stability that the public sector guarantees. With respect 
to the latter, Boheim and Taylor (2002) estimate (using the BHPS) that employers in 
public sector jobs have lower job exit rates than those in the private sector. Support (even 
stronger) in the same direction is given for South Italy by Pagani (2003). For private 
sector employees, if we accept that their jobs are less stable compared to those offered in 
the public sector, economic theory dictates that this decreased employment stability 
should be compensated. Consistent with the hedonic wage approach, this compensation 
can take various forms such as increased payment in the current period or the probability 
of having an increased level of income in a future time.  
 
Finally, different future discount rates could also influence sector selection. To 
make this more intuitive, suppose that two employees, A and B possess the same 
                                                 
44 See Varian (1992, p. 453-454).  
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characteristics in terms of education and other observable parameters like tenure, age, 
experience and so forth but differ in the way they discount future. Employee A discounts 
future at a higher rate than B, implying that A has a stronger preference for current 
consumption. Even if the discounted present value of the income streams in the two 
sectors is the same, employer A will choose this employment sector that offers higher 
earnings at the present time. This choice can be motivated by a differentiation in the 
slopes of earnings profiles between the two sectors. If public sector creates a smoother 
earnings profile (but payment starts from a higher level) then an employee who is in the 
need for present earnings will have an increased likelihood to choose a public sector job, 
to the extent of course that this choice can be easily implemented.  
The public sector comprises a variety of institutions of differing complexity and 
operational nature. In principle, the production of the public sector involves (apart from 
the necessary administrative tasks like ministries, tax collection e.t.c.) those goods that 
can have the characteristics of “public goods” namely non-rivalry and non-excludability. 
Because of the nature of the goods being produced in the public sector of the economy, 
public sector employees are positioned to derive a certain amount of utility by having the 
belief that working for a public firm is consistent with an idealistic or ethical purpose. 
This view contradicts the general theory of incentives which assumes that an employee 
derives satisfaction (utility) from the wage that the employee offers and disutility from 
the effort he/she is exerting on the job. It is rather more consistent with the notion of gift 
exchange (Akerlof, 1982). 
  
  
4.4 Data Description  
 
 Our data set is the British Houshold Panel Data (BHPS). BHPS is an annually 
collected (usually every September) representative UK sample that tries to keep track of 
the same individuals every year. Although a certain degree of attrition is unavoidable, 
this is kept at lower levels than similar panels such as the European Community 
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45Household Panel  (ECHP) or the German Socio-Economic Panel. If the cause of 
attrition is random, no problems should arise in terms of the unbiasness of the estimated 
coefficients. On the other hand, if there is a selective omission of certain categories of the 
population whose characteristics are of interest then the econometric estimation could 
lead to biased results. Greene (2008) discusses three levels of data missing. The first one 
arises when the missing values have no impact on the other non-missing values. This 
form of data missing (attrition) has been named by Rubin (1976) as the case where data 
are missing completely at random. The polar differentiation from this case is when the 
missing data are not missing at random. This form of attrition is closely related to the 
issue of selectivity that is discussed later in this chapter. For example, if the research 
question is to find the frequency at which university students make use of the university 
catering facilities, a survey that is being conducted in these catering facilities (rather than 
in any point on campus in random) would result in a biased estimation.  
 
Our interest in this chapter is placed on the selection of the employment sector in 
relation to the earnings-profile that each sector offers and consequently there is no a 
priori reason to believe that it had been more difficult to trace public sector employees 
over time than the private sector ones46. This logical argument can be also enhanced by 
two factors: 1) The BHP Survey is conducted at a household and not at a working place 
level.  2) The procedure of selecting households for participating in the survey is 
following a random process which is based on postcodes.47
  
 
 
4.5 Public Sector Choice 
 
                                                 
45 Nicoletti and Peracchi (2002) analyze the attrition process in the ECHP. It is worth mentioning that very 
high subsequent participation rates in Italy and Greece are due to the mandatory nature of the survey in 
these countries.   
46 We even used a weighted regression using the BHPS provided longitudinal weights to account for non-
random attrition without significant results alteration.  
47 For a more detailed technical report on BHPS see Taylor (ed.) et. al. (2007)  
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 This section aims to shed light on the particular characteristics of the 
public/private sector that attract employees into the one or the other. Certain issues have 
been mentioned before, like total payment, job security, working hours and so forth. 
Specific demographic groups could be keener in joining either sector if some of the 
employment characteristics match the desired preferences. For instance, some women 
could be more willing to be in a public sector job if this kind of employment guarantees a 
less stressful environment, more job security or better working hours.  
 
 The econometric specification is a binary probit that is using the British 
Household Panel Survey in a cross sectional as well as a random effects manner48. In 
particular, the econometric form of the sector selection takes the form: 
 
Secit = a + βTΧit + εit
 
The left hand side of the equation is a binary variable indicating whether the worker is in 
the public or the private sector. The vector X contains a list of all the relevant variables 
that could potentially affect the choice into a specific sector and β contains the relevant 
coefficients. In this analysis, the results correspond to the choice of public sector 
employment since the value “1” of the Variable “Sec” is assigned to the choice of public 
sector. Among the others, we control for all the usual suspects, namely age (in 4 
categories), sex , education, marriage, having children and having more than 2 children, 
performance payment , working hours constraints, unionism and promotion opportunities. 
In an augmented specification, we use subjective information on what the respondents 
perceive as the most important aspect of their employment. The reason for doing this is to 
examine (depending on the accuracy that data provides) if subjective preferences towards 
specific job aspects have any impact on the employment choice between working in the 
private or public sector.   
 
                                                 
48 A fixed effect probit approach would require the existence of a sufficient statistic allowing the fixed 
effects to be conditioned out of the likelihood.  To the best of our knowledge, such statistic does not exist. 
Even if there was, most of the variables would have dropped out since they are time invariant.  
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In this point it would be useful to make a distinction between the most desirable 
aspect of a job and the subjectively reported level of job satisfaction we used in the 
previous chapter. The former does not necessarily imply the latter. It simply states the 
subjective level of importance each individual is placing on certain job attributes. In other 
words, if a respondent assigns the maximum possible value to the importance of job 
security, we can not be certain if the actual job security in his/her working place is high 
or low. But if job security is low (in subjective terms) and at he same time the worker 
considers it as an important aspect of a job, we can assume that this individual would be 
willing to move towards a working place that is more close to his/her desired profile. The 
extent to which this event will occur depends on a variety of personal, economical and 
institutional factors.  
 
 From the BHPS, we select four main answers (out of the eight shown in table 1) 
that are given as options to the question “which of the following you consider as the most 
important aspect of your employment”. These are the actual pay, job security, the actual 
work it self and the working hours. It must be mentioned that this question was included 
in the last BHPS wave (2004), a fact that is profoundly limiting our econometric arsenal 
since no within groups variation can be used to account for the unobserved elements that 
are well possible to have an influence in the sector selection. Consequently a researcher 
must wait until more information is available from the subsequent BHPS waves 49. We 
estimate three sector selection models. Model (1) is utilizing the whole available time 
range (1991 - 2004) but not the four above mentioned variables that were used in an 
attempt to depict a more precise picture of the nature of sector selection. Alternative 
variables that can alternatively infer a sense of selectivity can be the performance 
payment, whether salary includes bonuses and whether the employer works more hours 
than he/she ideally desires. Specification (2) is solely focused on the 14th wave (2004), 
including the subjectively measured variables of the most important aspect of a job. 
                                                 
49 The BHPS sample will be continuing within the UK Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS), a new 
panel designed by ISER, University of Essex and funded by the ESRC. The UKHLS will provide the next 
generation of panel data for the UK and will be the largest household panel study in the world. (BHPS 
Update, spring 2007, ISER, University of Essex) 
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Finally, for reasons of comparison, specification (3) is a random effects (RE) version of 
(1).  
   
 4.5.1 Binomial Results 
 
 Table 4.2 presents the results from the pooled standard binomial (without RE) 
regression, model (1), the cross sectional specification for year 2004, model (2), and the 
RE results, model (3). Apart from these estimates and the relevant statistical information, 
table 4.2 also includes a column that shows the sub-sample public employment rates for 
various key groups within the population. These rates denote the proportion of the 
respondents with a particular attribute who have been classified in our data sample as 
public sector employees. For instance, the second row in the sub-sample rate column 
shows that 41.45% of all women in the BHPS sample work in the public sector. In 
contrast, only 21.32% of all men work in the public sector. Consequently, what this sub-
sample shows is the (unconditional) incidence of public sector employment and not the 
public sector employment structure which would refer in our study to the relative 
participation of each gender in the public sector. If this was the case, the two gender 
(percentage) contribution should add to a hundred.   
  
 
4.5.2 Public Sector Employment Incidence 
 
In general terms, the picture of our reference employee for the probit estimation 
shows a single male, less than 25 years old who has no formal educational qualifications, 
is unconstrained in the hours he works, does not receive any kind of performance 
payment, he is not a union member and leaves in London without being married or 
having children. Consequently, the estimated coefficients show the relationship between 
the probability of being a public sector worker and a particular attribute relative to the 
reference category. A positive coefficient indicates that an individual with that 
characteristic is ceteris paribus more likely to be in the public sector than individuals 
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without it. Moreover, the larger the estimated coefficient on a particular characteristic the 
greater is its contribution to the incidence of public sector employment.  
 
From all three specifications (models), it is clear that being a woman affects 
positively and significantly the probability of public sector selection. This comes to no 
surprise as from all women population, a 41.45% is employed in the public sector. The 
respective figure for men is just 22.32%. This observation could partially explain some 
following results concerning the relative impact of other factors to the incidence of 
employment in the public sector.  
When discussing the relationship between age and public sector employment we 
can certainly not overlook the fact that with reference to the group of employees between 
18 and 25 years old, senior employees are more likely to be employed in the public 
sector. In addition, the magnitude of the coefficient becomes even larger as we move to 
the age groups that include older employees. It seems that public sector employment is 
more frequent among senior workers but from the binary choice model we use we can not 
infer the exact reasons for which a significant proportion of senior workers ends up in 
public employment.  
 
 In relation to education, it is strongly evident from our results that higher 
education (for example a master’s degree or a doctorate) increases the probability that 
someone will be employed in the public sector. In this respect, the positive and highly 
significant probit coefficient is supported by the sub-sample public employment rate 
which is 60.63%. Again, it is difficult to decode the reasons behind this result and several 
explanations can be offered. For instance it may be the case that some public sector 
working places systematically create more jobs that require very high qualifications. For 
example, PhD holders are very likely to be employed at a university (public employment, 
at least in the UK) since a PhD degree is in most of the cases a vital requirement for such 
a job. Another explanation could be related to the special characteristics that a public 
employment at this high educational level offers such as a higher wage, desirable non-
pecuniary aspects, faster hierarchical evolution and so forth. The same logic applies to 
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50graduates. A university degree   significantly increases the public employment 
probability.   
 
  As far as non-university education is concerned, having a levels and o levels 
qualifications (implying finishing education at the age of 18 or less and not attending 
further education) is also associated with increased and significant probability of being a 
public sector employee, again taking as a reference category a respondent with no 
educational qualifications. However, a striking difference (apart from the magnitude of 
the estimated coefficient) between these two educational categories and the higher 
qualifications mentioned above is the corresponding sub-sample public employment rate. 
From all employed individuals who report either having a levels or o levels as the 
maximum educ. qualification, only a 24.75% is holding a public employment position.  
These educational levels can be very much associated with manual skilled and non-
skilled work which is more likely to be found in the private sector, in relative jobs. On 
the contrary, the more administrative nature of the public sector diminishes the chances 
of having employment of manual type to a great extent. To verify this we examine three 
occupational categories that are by definition not very demanding in terms of the 
educational qualifications: skilled occupations (e.g. a plumber), sales and customer 
service occupations and process, plant and machine operatives. Evidence from the BHPS 
indicates that these three categories combined account for a 35% of the total private 
sector employment. The corresponding figure for the public sector is just 4.26%. 
Consequently, taking these figures into consideration, the fact that the estimated 
coefficient on a levels and o levels are positive and significant might look at first sight 
puzzling. But what we should emphasize at is that the coefficients have been estimated 
with reference to having no education at all. If the reference category had been the high 
education instead, the coefficients on a levels and o levels would have been negative.  
 
                                                 
50 Unfortunately a more detailed breakdown of university degrees between first degrees, good degrees (like 
2-1’s) and average ones is not feasible within the BHPS.  
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 As expected, teaching and nursing qualifications are strongly associated with 
public sector employment. The corresponding sub-sample rate is the highest among all 
the variables we consider and reaches almost 70%. At the same time, very low education 
as implied by a CSE qualification51 is not a statistically significant contributing factor for 
public sector employment. In other words, for public employment, having even some 
qualifications is like having no qualifications at all.  
 
 Although marital status does not seem to be a contributing factor for the sector 
choice, the contrary is the case for having children. This fact (significant even at the 1% 
level but not having high magnitude) may be potentially reflecting job security 
considerations if there is a broad consensus among the members of a particular labor 
market that public sector employment is in fact providing more secured employment 
relations. At the same time, a more stable employment environment may be coming from 
factors affecting the supply side, the demand side or both. For instance, an institutional 
environment (possibly highly regulated) that prevents the public employer from making 
an employee redundant (in case of a low business cycle for example) is without question 
a source of employment stability. Also, such a working place is attractive for the 
employee who is less risk averse and is willing to sacrifice other job aspects for enjoying 
enhanced job security. The indication we have from the BHPS is that the average tenure 
for a private sector worker is 5.8 years while for a public sector employee the relevant 
figure is 6.75 years, with the difference being statistically significant.  
 
In specification (2) where subjective variables are used to measure the most 
important aspect of a job, reporting job security as the most important aspect of a job is a 
significant parameter for being in a private sector job. However, this result may indicate 
just a desire and can not be necessarily perceived as an indication for lack of job security 
in the public sector. On the other hand, as it is indicated in column (2), reporting payment 
as the most important aspect of a job increases the possibilities of being in the private 
                                                 
51 In this study we consider the BHPS classification of CSE 2-5 (Certificate of Secondary Education) as 
being inferior to GCE (General Certificate of Education) o levels.  
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sector with the contrary being true for the importance of the actual work. In addition, in 
specification (1) some proxy variables have been used to account for the fact that some 
employees might sort them selves into a particular sector for pecuniary reasons. These 
variables are capturing the possibility of a bonus payment or profit sharing scheme and 
the incidence of performance payment. They possess a negative and significant 
coefficient for the probability of being employed in the public sector. Again, in line with 
our previous reasoning, this could imply both a desire for a complementary payment 
scheme which satisfies the desire for increased remuneration. It is also worth mentioning 
that when then subjective measure about whether payment is the most important aspect of 
the job enters the specification, (column 2); the variable which refers to the performance 
pay looses all of its significance.  
 
52Finally, being a worker in a unionized working place  is, according to our results 
(in all three specifications), the most contributing factor which affects the selection of 
public employment. Undoubtedly, this variable is possible to represent a large range of 
unobserved monetary and non-monetary aspects of a job. At the same time it is also true 
that it is extremely rare not to find a union in a public sector job. According to our BHPS 
sample, a union exists in 87% of public sector employment places while the relevant 
figure for the private sector is around 50%. Nevertheless, there is a high possibility that 
some workers choose public employment for the particular characteristics that this sector 
offers if these characteristics are associated with the existence of a working place union, 
for example better working conditions. The same logic is possible to apply to women’s 
selection of public sector employment. Being a female is highly raising the probability of 
being a public employee which again raises the suspicion that selection into this sector is 
not dictated by a totally random process. To conclude, the probit estimation (in all 3 
versions) also includes year as well as regional dummies. Although the resulting 
coefficients for the former do not indicate any intertemporal influence in the sector 
selection, the regional dummies turn to be statistically significant. This inclusion is 
                                                 
52 The reason for selecting the existence of union in the working place (instead of just whether the worker is 
a member of union or not) is to account for cases where an employee is covered even if he/she is not a 
union member.  
 144
related to the fact that a large fraction of the core public sector employment (central 
government) is located in the capital (London). On the other hand, there could be certain 
governmental attempts to displace some parts of the public employment from areas where 
unemployment is low and move them into regions where the private sector’s contribution 
is diminishing (Henley and Thomas, 2001).  
 
 
 
4.6 Earnings Profiles Estimation 
  
 After having estimated the factors that have a statistically significant impact on 
the choice of employment sector, we estimate a standard Mincerian equation of the form: 
 
Ln wit = βT Xit + αΕit + bE2it + εit
 
53, Xrepresents the monthly wageWhere wit it is a vector of personal characteristics and 
workplace characteristics including education, occupational status and industry dummies 
and Εit symbolises the labour force experience that each person possesses. As we have 
explained before, different studies use different meanings of the term “experience”. In 
this work, following Brown and Sessions (2006) we experiment with age, respondent’s 
age less his/her age when finished full-time education and job tenure. By using various 
proxies to account for experience, we may have the possibility to detect the relative 
importance of specific and general human capital accumulation in the public and the 
private sector. If, for example, in the private sector we compare earnings profiles when 
using tenure and age as proxies, we could argue that for this particular sector what 
matters more in terms of wage promotions is the sector specific capital and not the 
generally accumulated human capital if the tenure variable produces a more steep profile 
than the age one.  In other words, while in the private sector skills and experience may 
                                                 
53 Monthly wage has been adjusted for working hours and consequently the results are the same as if we 
were using hourly data. Although in the BHPS there is a variable indicating whether an employee is 
compensated on an hourly or a salary basis, information for almost half of employees in unavailable. 
Additionally, monthly wage is expressed in 1991 terms using the corresponding CPI for each year.  
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not be directly transferred when an employee moves jobs; in the public sector these skills 
may be more interchangeable.  
 
An additional note on the earnings specification concerns the way education 
enters this specification. When the parameter of interest is the way education affects 
earnings, it is not exactly clear whether people who have high education would have 
gained approximately the same amount of money had they not achieved the same 
education. It has been suggested that high ability individuals are those who, at the same 
time, select higher education. If this is the case, OLS estimates would be upwards biased. 
Becker (1964) though understated these concerns. After adjusting for ability bias 
(measured by the IQ level) and taking into consideration the family background (parents 
with college education) he concluded that education by it self is sufficient in explaining a 
very significant part of earnings. He also suggested that what employers reward in terms 
of earnings is not the ability per se but the knowledge associated with educational 
attainment. In this sense, an econometric estimation should not control for measurements 
of knowledge and skills, otherwise the true effect of educations on earnings would be 
eliminated54.  
 
55 Even if highly educated workers are generally more able  than those who do not 
hold a university degree, it is not really clear if this kind of ability differential is needed 
by firms. Moreover, if instead of a piece-rate payment regime a fixed payment is in force, 
wage differentials would be free from any ability differentials. These differentials could 
then be a result of a signalling effect and in this case OLS estimates would correctly 
depict the causal effect of education on earnings. Even if OLS estimates are biased due to 
the endogeneity of education, this problem can be mitigated if there is either a 
measurement error in the education variables or/and a sample selection bias (in the sense 
that people with more education are more likely to be employed). As Dearden (1999b) 
                                                 
54 In Becker (1964, p86, footnote 25) 
55 Again Becker (1964) provides evidence that show that college graduates have on average a higher IQ 
level (120.5) in comparison to high school graduates (106.8). However a significant ground of criticism 
exists (beyond the scope of this study) for the suitability of IQ tests to measure ability in relation to earning 
from employment.  
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discusses, these biases to a large extent cancel out with the potential ability bias so, 
overall, OLS provides quite reasonable estimates of the returns to education.  
 
  In the Mincer equation, education enters the specification in a linear form. The 
implication of this approach is that each additional year of schooling has the same effect 
on earnings. In other words, this means that the effect on earnings from adding two more 
years of education when you already have 9 is the same as adding two more years of 
education when you already have 12. But usually, the latter means university education 
(assuming that school starting age at the age of 6) which is expected to have higher 
returns on earnings than for example 3 years of education at the age of 15. UK results that 
support this view (that possessing a university degree yields a significant boost in 
earnings) can be found in Blundel et al (2000,2005) and Mcintosh (2006)56. In other 
words, studies that simply measure the length of the educational attendance miss out an 
important qualitative jump when higher education is pursued. In the same sense, a year in 
addition to university education, normally a master’s degree, is also likely to result in a 
non-linear effect in relation to the earnings someone would get by just having the 
standard university education. However, the exact magnitude of this impact is likely to be 
determined mostly by the labour market forces. In any case, the inclusion of dummy 
variables to account for different educational qualifications can depict non-linearities in 
any direction and thus can prove more realistic in terms of the impact of each of these 
educational level on earnings.  
 
In this study we will be using 6 educational dummy variables which account for 
various levels of education with reference to not having any education at all, obviously 
apart from the compulsory schooling years dictated by the law. The highest educational 
category refers to those individuals who hold a higher degree, namely a masters 
qualification or a PhD. Unfortunately we can not make a distinction between these two 
degrees which are obviously very different in nature. At the same time, no information is 
                                                 
56 This study also proposes a method to decompose the effect of education on earnings between an age 
effect and a cohort effect.  
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given about the quality of the A levels a respondent holds. A levels exams are taken at the 
age of 18 by those individuals who remain at school and are the primary root to 
university education. GCSE (General Certificate of Secondary Education) exams are 
usually taken at the age of 16 in up to 10 or 11 subjects. They replaced the O level GCE 
and the CSE in 1986. However, the BHPS coding in terms of the highest achieved 
qualification continues to use the old terminology. In this case, we consider that an O 
level qualification corresponds to a GCSE grade between A and C while a CSE 
qualification is associated with a GCSE grade of D or lower. In our sample (and 
consequently in our results) the term “Other higher qualifications” refer mainly to non-
university technical or professional qualifications like the Higher National Certificate 
(HNC) and the Higher National Diploma (HND). HNC and HND are both associated 
with vocational training but differ in length. HNC lasts for a year and is roughly 
equivalent to first year of university while the duration of HND is two years and 
corresponds to second year of university.  
 
 An additional covariate is a variable that indicates if there has been an annual 
wage increment. This inclusion aims to account for cases where the employee moves to a 
negotiated higher payment scale after a year. However, we do not control for promotions 
since that would drastically reduce our sample size57 and in any case a promotion is not 
always associated with a wage increase. 
 
 
4.6.1 The issue of self selection into a particular sector 
 
A major issue of concern when we want to estimate a causal relationship in 
economics is selectivity and to be more precise self-selectivity58. When individuals sort 
themselves into categories in a non-random manner it can have serious implications for 
                                                 
57 From the employment history record of the BHPS we can identify the reason for stopping previous job 
(including promotions).  For all 14 waves, information is available for 20000 individuals in contrast to our 
full working sample which consists of approximately 96000 individuals.  
58 An excellent exposition of the issue is provided in Manski , 1995, “Identification Problems in the Social 
Sciences”, Harvard University Press, pp 21-50 
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econometric estimation. The reason is that the error term will not be zero on average and 
this fact will result in biased estimates. A classic example that clearly illustrates the 
problem is the estimation of wage elasticities. If a researcher estimates a relationship 
between wages and hours of work without taking into account that for some members of 
the labour force hours of work equals zero then the resulting estimation would be 
upwards biased, since within the sample of workers it is natural to assume that that the 
average value of the error term is positive. As Killingsworth (1983, p.80) argues, “It 
would be somewhat surprising if one did not find that tastes for work were higher, on 
average, in a sample of workers than in the general population”.  
 
Likewise, in the previous chapter we mentioned a potential explanation for why 
women report higher job satisfaction than men: A large percentage of women choose to 
work only if the working conditions are consistent with their expectations which will 
imply a higher job satisfaction.  
 
For our study which deals with the earnings profiles in the public and the private 
sector a similar logic applies. We need to take into consideration that there might be some 
unobserved parameters that can have an impact on both the dependent variable (the 
natural logarithm of wage) and the probability of choosing a sector. This notion is 
consistent with what we mentioned earlier, that a non random selection into either sector 
can be the result of the preferences of workers towards specific employment 
characteristics of these sectors.  
 
The case of non random selection can be problematic only in the case where the 
selection rule has an impact on the dependent variable. If for example the dependent 
variable is the wage and marital status is one of the explanatory variables, it will not 
matter if there is an increased likelihood of married people ending up in the sample, as 
long as there is no relationship between being married and wage.  In this case the 
selection rule can be said to be ignorable (Rubin, 1976). However, in terms of our 
analysis, selection bias can be a source of biased estimations if employees sort them-
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selves into a specific type of employment (sector) based on their preferences towards 
wage.   
 
 The standard procedure to tackle this selection bias problem is to estimate the 
model, taking into consideration the selection rule. It is mentioned in the literature as the 
Heckman two-step procedure, due to Heckman (1979). To be more specific, assume that 
the relationship under examination is given by '1 1 1ipr i iw x β ε= + '1ix where  is the vector of 
characteristics and is the monthly wage for the ithiprw  employee who is working in the 
private sector. The selection equation is of a simple probit type, having a binary 
dependent variable indicating private sector employment. It can take the form 
'
2 2 2i ih x iβ ε= +  where  indicates the sector of employment and ih '2ix is a vector of 
variables upon which the sector choice is based. Obviously, we are interested in the 
conditional expected wage given that a person is working in the public sector or more 
formally:  
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where φ  is the probability function of the normal distribution and Φ  is the corresponding 
cumulative density function. We are naturally interested to examine if the term  12σ  (the 
covariance between the two error terms) statistically differs from zero so we calculate the 
term 
'
2 2
'
2 2
(
( )
i
i
x
x
)φ β
βΦ by using the predicted probability of an individual i at time t to be 
employed in the private and public sector. The two-step procedure needs a careful 
implementation since the choice of dependent variables in both equations is likely to 
affect the magnitude and the significance of the covariance of the error terms. For reasons 
of identification, there should be at least one variable affecting the probability of being in 
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the public sector but not the wages. Even if there is no exclusive restriction, identification 
can be provided by the non linear functional form of the selection equation, since the 
wage equation is linear. In any case we are interested in the unobserved parameters that 
have both an impact on the selection and the earnings profiles so the more relevant 
dependent variables we use in the selection equation the better since we do not want the 
mills ratio to pick up any observed parameters. The lambda term should be linked only 
with unobserved heterogeneity that is jointly distributed, given that this distribution is 
assumed to be normal. In this respect, our selection equation additionally includes 
controls for marital status, children, satisfaction with working hours and promotion 
opportunities. These variables are intuitively separated from the earnings function which 
is mainly defined in terms of experience and educational characteristics although 
someone could argue in favour of a plethora of interrelations like education and marital 
status or promotion opportunities and education. Finally, the variable that indicates 
unionism is located in both equations but with different meaning. Although in the 
selection equation being a union member can be related to pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
reasons, in the earnings function it has only an impact on wages. We believe that this 
conceptual separation can prove strong for identification purposes.  
  
 
4.7 Results and policy implications 
  
 Table 4.3 presents our empirical findings on the shape of earnings profiles using 
the above described wage equation and before and after accounting for selection bias. 
Random effects coefficients for experience and experience square give a clear indication 
of the significance of the quadratic specification. The hypothesis of the difference slopes 
in the earnings profiles between the private and the public sector is also verified. Even 
after using different proxies for experience (age, years in the labour force, job tenure) and 
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accounting for self-selectivity into the public sector, wage profiles in the private sector 
are steeper than in the public sector.  
What we were also particularly interested in is whether there was a relevant type 
of non random self selection into public employment motivated by non-pecuniary aspects 
of employment. As we saw before, the probit equation for the choice of sector yields very 
significant coefficients, especially for the union variable. We speculate that this variable 
(among the others) can be a sufficient statistic that summarises a large proportion of the 
differentiation between the two sectors. In other words, workers may be joining the 
public sector because of the characteristics of this sector that are largely influenced not 
just by the existence of the union in the workplace but also by the quality of the union. To 
grasp this notion better, we compare the results from specification (1) that accounts for 
sectoral selectivity and is using job tenure as an experience proxy with the results coming 
exactly from the same specification but without the inclusion of the selectivity terms. 
Although in the first case the profile that public sector employment generated was less 
steep that the corresponding profile for the private sector, when non-random selection 
was taken into account both profiles became much more similar. As it is clear from 
figures 4.1 and 4.2, public sector profile moved (slightly) upwards and at the same time 
private sector profile moved (significantly) downwards. To place this differently, when 
the (implicit) factors that have a simultaneous impact on the choice of the employment 
sector and the wage are taken into account, differences in the earnings profiles became 
smoother, resulting in the convergence of the profiles.  
 
 When it comes to experience-earnings profiles (as approximated by the years in 
the labour force), results show that the private sector profile is steeper that the public 
sector one, even after accounting for self selection (figure 4.3). Of course, this result must 
be treated with caution as it is based on the assumption that the employee started working 
immediately after finishing his/her education and also that has never experienced  any  
unemployment spells. Nevertheless, it might be a sign that past experience seems to be 
appreciated and rewarded in the private sector, providing some evidence in favour of the 
hypothesis of the importance of a general accumulated human capital. Consequently, this 
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steep profile may have been generated through a continuous process of competition in the 
labour market which includes monetary rewards, job changing and promotions59.   
 
As far as the public sector is concerned, a flatter evolution of wages could result 
from a public-sector wages plan that is more homogenous in nature and abstracts from 
bonus payments, profit sharing schemes or overtime compensations. In fact, from our 
BHPS sample it is evident than only 10% of public employees receive any kind of bonus 
payment or profit sharing. The relevant figure for the private sector reaches 42%. This 
public sector homogeneity can also be a result of a more coordinated level of wage 
negotiations and explicitly set combinations of seniority scales and wage promotions. In 
fact, around a quarter of public sector employees is under the "pay review" regime, a 
governmental scheme to replace collective bargaining in certain areas of public sector. A 
Review Body makes independent recommendations on pay after considering evidence 
from the relevant parties (typically government, employers and unions), with 
expectations that the Government will honour those recommendations and the unions will 
not pursue national industrial action. At present there are six review bodies that cover 
approximately 26% of the total 5.8 million employed in the UK public sector. The 
existence of these Review Bodies is evidence that payments in the public sector are more 
homogenous than they are in the private sector. This fact could be by it self a good 
explanation about the form of the earnings profile we estimate for the public sector. 
Although a more detailed breakdown is not possible due to data limitations, we would 
expect a less dispersed distribution of wages in the public sector than in the private 
sector. In other words, in the private sector, productivity, qualifications or seniority may 
be rewarded differently and according to the individualistic speed of capital formation, 
market conditions, business cycle and so forth. However, private sector payments may 
abstract from these considerations since review bodies propose an annual increment that 
would apply to most employees in the certain public areas, abstracting from human 
capital (and of course agency) considerations 
                                                 
59 The reason for not adding promotions as an explanatory variable has to do with the amount of 
observations that would be lost due to this inclusion. However, experimenting with a variety of different 
potential covariates did not alter the results dramatically.  
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Finally, when experience is approximated by age, the generated profiles are 
similar to the ones produced when using the years in the labour force as a proxy for 
experience. The magnitudes though (and the steepness) has been raised as shown in 
figure 4.4.   
 
 The policy implications of our findings have two main components. The first is 
directly related to the on going debate about the involvement of the private sector in the 
provision of public services while the second component refers to the reforming of pay 
and working conditions in the public sector. A detailed examination of the political 
process behind public sector reformation is above our intentions. However, fundamental 
theoretical differences between the two main political parties do exist: The reform of 
public services had been central to the labour party's agenta since 1997 while the 
Conservative Party had always been thinking about public sector as being compatible 
with the idea of a minimalist state. Labour's policy is based on the belief that state 
intervention and investment is essential and integral to enhanced competitiveness. On the 
other hand, for Conservatives, an expansion of the public sector is viewed as jeopardizing 
both competitiveness and employment, Bach (2001). These theoretical perceptions 
should in principal have an effect to the relative earnings profiles only if we assume that 
the formation of human capital in the private sector is slow and that the evolution of 
wages is based on human capital. However, we have no reason to believe that human 
capital is not accumulated in the public sector at the same speed as it does in the private 
one. What can actually be proposed as an argument for the need of reformations is the 
recognition that public sector has suffered decades of underinvestment and this fact can 
actually be an obstacle for competitiveness. In any case, the actual means that public 
servants are using while currying out their duty may not be of severe importance when 
examining earnings profiles. These resources rather affect other aspects of public sector 
operation such as safety and/or productivity. But what could actually differentiate the 
earnings profiles in this respect is the extent to which human capital is linked to the actual 
payment. The non-competitive nature of public sector may imply that that payment is not 
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actually related to human capital and at the same time workers are attracted in the public 
sector for mainly non-pecuniary reasons. 
  
 4.8 Conclusion 
 
 Using the 14 available BHSP waves (1991-2004) we tried to estimate the 
experience-earnings profiles for the public and private sector in attempt to isolate 
similarities or differences. Panel Data regressions showed that in all the specifications we 
experimented with, public sector constantly and significantly generated a steeper profile 
than the corresponding profile of the private sector. The explanation we offered for this 
result is that employees may be exchanging a steeper profile (like the one that is offered 
by the private sector) with more attractive to them non-pecuniary job aspects. Although a 
very detailed breakdown can not be achieved at this point, mainly due to the non 
availability of necessary data, our empirical strategy offers an adequate approximation. 
When tenure is used as a proxy for experience, comparing earnings profiles before and 
after correction for selection bias offers an explanation for the slope difference of the two 
sectors. A similar sequence can not be plausible when using years in the labour force and 
age as proxies, because of the complexity of relationships that these variables are 
encapsulating. Nevertheless, the evidence in favour of the slopes differentiation remains. 
Finally, in terms of policy implications, a policy maker that will try to change the nature 
of employment relations in the public sector must understand that for some employees it 
is exactly these employment relations that have attracted them to public sector at first 
place. Consequently, either job mobility must be anticipated or decreased levels of job 
satisfaction which can be associated with adverse employee behaviour.  
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Model 1 
  
Model 2 
  
Model 3 
 
           
Variable 
Sub-
sample 
rate  Estimate T stat  Estimate T stat  Estimate T stat 
Male 22.32  - -  - -  - - 
Female 41.45  0.583*** 44.252  0.633*** 13.94  1.557*** 26.385 
no children 30.82  - -  - -  - - 
child2 33.64  0.064*** 3.426  -0.007 0.114  0.155*** 3.301 
child3 34.41  0.100*** 5.324  0.061 0.938  0.166** 3.151 
Unconstrained 32.81  - -  - -  - - 
Over employed 31.44  -0.110*** 7.837  -0.131** 2.757  -0.118*** 3.725 
Underemployed 32.28  0.117*** 4.765  0.223* 2.352  0.223*** 4.498 
No promotion opps. 28.80  - -  - -  - - 
Promotion opportunities 35.74  0.049*** 3.587  0.021 0.445  0.070* 2.263 
No bonus payment 40.84  - -  - -  - - 
Bonus payment 11.05  -0.974*** 60.813  -0.964*** 17.453  -0.990*** 27.02 
Age 18-25 18.36  - -  - -  - - 
Age 26-45 33.13  0.324*** 15.006  0.364*** 4.682  0.437*** 8.067 
Age 46-55 39.45  0.523*** 20.902  0.490*** 5.627  0.813*** 11.548 
Age >56 36.69  0.682*** 22.246  0.651*** 6.538  1.078*** 11.935 
Union member 55.37  1.471*** 105.652  1.539*** 31.824  2.344*** 61.286 
No union member 9.79  - -  - -  - - 
Unmarried 28.15  - -  - -  - - 
Married 34.85  0.006 0.401  0.09 1.79  0.110* 2.464 
London 38.47  - -  - -  - - 
South east  28.55  -0.188*** 6.84  -0.181 1.715  -0.291** 2.866 
South West 26.38  -0.256*** 7.941  -0.334** 2.763  -0.511*** 4.007 
Midlands East 24.54  -0.382*** 12.505  -0.451*** 3.899  -0.704*** 6.049 
Midlands West 27.70  -0.361*** 10.98  -0.415** 3.175  -0.585*** 4.455 
Manchester and Merseyside 30.89  -0.256*** 7.112  -0.17 1.305  -0.381* 2.552 
North 29.64  -0.356*** 12.874  -0.415*** 3.915  -0.565*** 5.211 
Wales 35.70  -0.151*** 5.161  -0.126 1.239  -0.025 0.224 
Scotland 37.17  -0.135*** 4.922  -0.185 1.87  0.028 0.266 
No education 23.90  - -  - -  - - 
Higher degree (Msc, Phd) 60.63  1.162*** 28.654  1.116*** 8.026  2.744*** 17.661 
Other Higher qualifications 32.94  0.446*** 19.685  0.480*** 5.484  0.794*** 9.876 
University degree 51.28  0.928*** 35.785  0.919*** 9.32  2.026*** 20.303 
Teaching/Nursing qualifications 69.98  1.027*** 28.313  0.887*** 6.096  2.342*** 17.21 
GCE a levels 24.75  0.239*** 9.117  0.259* 2.54  0.399*** 4.313 
GCE o levels 24.76  0.201*** 8.615  0.128 1.333  0.294*** 3.458 
CSE 2-5 15.89  -0.003 0.084  0.380** 2.623  -0.109 0.785 
Commercial qualifications 27.75  0.102* 2.253  0.12 0.664  0.423* 2.57 
Other qualifications 15.23  -0.366*** 3.7  -0.652 1.468  -0.126 0.398 
No performance pay 32.54  - -  - -  - - 
Performance pay 26.57  -0.137*** 5.953  -0.074 1.091  -0.314*** 5.886 
Table 4.2  
Probability of Public Sector Employment (Probit regressions) 
 Wald  chi2 
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other job aspects 34.62     - -    
Most important aspect : payment 24.34     -0.379*** 5.552    
Most important aspect : security 33.81     -0.073 1.105    
Most important aspect : work it self 48.85     0.173** 2.814    
Most important aspect : hours 34.24     -0.151 1.43    
Constant term   -2.472*** 52.504  -2.618*** 15.84  -5.807*** 36.048 
Log likelihood   -26050.303  -2240.5831  -15439.8 
Year Dummies   YES  NO  YES 
Random Effects   NO NO  YES 
Sample Size (No of Groups)  63332 5513  63332(13835) 
Pseudo R2  0.34338 0.3778    
         6315.61 
Table 4.2 continued 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N
 *, **, *** denote significance at 5% , 1% and <1% respectively 
otes:  Absolute t values reported  
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 Private Sector Public Sector  Private Sector Public Sector 
 (1)  (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2)  (3) 
Variable                                  
                
sex -0.541***  -0.569*** -0.578*** -0.480*** -0.516*** -0.518***  -0.572*** -0.599*** -0.609*** -0.514*** -0.533***  -0.538*** 
 (49.76)  (52.01) (52.98) (27.28) (28.86) (28.98)  (52.94) (55.76) (56.96) (30.92)   (31.63)     (31.89)    
job tenure 0.094987***    0.00959***    0.012166***   0.009485***    
 (9.73)    (7.69)    (12.26)   (7.64)    
job tenure2 -0.0002744***    -0.00025***    -0.00036***   -0.00025***    
 (6.80)    (4.80)    (8.86)   (4.79)       
Years in Labour Force   0.03463***   0.02328***    0.03375***   0.02664***   
   (33.41)   (13.62)    (36.61)   (14.25)   
Years in Labour Force2    -0.00077***   -0.00060***    -0.00078***   -0.00061***   
   (36.28)   (16.15)    (39.13)   (16.81)      
Age    0.07225***   0.04856***    0.080917***    0.04957*** 
    (39.17)   (16.77)    (43.17)    (17.52) 
Age2    -0.00088***   -0.00058***    -0.00098***    -0.0006*** 
    (39.98)   (17.77)    (43.74)    (18.53)    
union 0.178***  0.169*** 0.168*** 0.306*** 0.272*** 0.269***  0.082*** 0.081*** 0.079*** 0.195*** 0.190***  0.188*** 
 (21.34)  (19.09) (18.95) (18.58) (14.89) (14.67)  (14.12) (13.82) (13.61) (19.42) (18.72)  (18.54) 
Higher Degree (MSc, Phd) 0.736***  0.779*** 0.717*** 0.716*** 0.575*** 0.697***  0.667*** 0.667*** 0.631*** 0.639*** 0.623***  0.607*** 
 (23.04)  (23.15) (22.82) (21.42) (16.44) (20.53)  (20.44) (20.17) (19.87) (19.89) (18.28)  (18.73) 
Other higher qualifications 0.242***  0.235*** 0.247*** 0.381*** 0.314*** 0.374***  0.223*** 0.202*** 0.223*** 0.349*** 0.330***  0.335*** 
 (18.75)  (17.37) (19) (17.36) (13.61) (16.58)  (16.96) (15.04) (17.12) (16.22) (14.60)  (15.24) 
University degree 0.507***  0.541*** 0.523*** 0.566*** 0.453*** 0.558***  0.471*** 0.471*** 0.475*** 0.511*** 0.499***  0.490*** 
 (27.43)  (27.96) (28.05) (21.67) (16.42) (20.62)  (25.22) (24.45) (25.62) (20.28) (18.60)  (18.96) 
Teaching/Nursing 
qualifications 0.231***  0.216*** 0.228*** 0.515*** 0.415*** 0.524***  0.137*** 0.107*** 0.128*** 0.451*** 0.447***  0.448*** 
Table 4.3: Estimation results : Dependent Variable, Log Monthly Earnings 
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 (7.41)  (6.99) (7.50) (18.21) (14.39) (18.30)  (4.36) (3.50) (4.20) (16.52) (15.89)  (16.35) 
GCE A levels 0.133***  0.167*** 0.185*** 0.255*** 0.224*** 0.264***  0.138*** 0.152*** 0.192*** 0.246*** 0.225***  0.251*** 
 (9.24)  (11.16) (12.64) (10.32) (8.73) (10.42)  (9.41) (10.12) (13.01) (10.07) (8.87)  (10.03) 
GCE O levels 0.125***  0.014*** 0.155*** 0.211*** 0.176*** 0.211***  0.070*** 0.126*** 0.118*** 0.191*** 0.162***  0.189*** 
 (9.20)  (9.64) (11.34) (8.94) (7.26) (8.80)  (5.22) (9.03) (8.63) (8.21) (6.78)  (7.99) 
CSE 2-5  0.005  0.003 0.051** -0.055 -0.586 -0.050  -0.053 0.0001 0.021 -0.056 -0.090**  -0.049 
 (0.25)  (0.18) (2.43) (1.37) (1.40) (1.22)  (2.56)** (0.01) (1.05) (1.40) (2.20)  (1.22) 
Commercial Qualifications 0.125***  0.029** 0.10*** 0.111** 0.101** 0.117**  0.103** 0.083** -0.084** 0.107** 0.097**  0.113** 
 (4.21)  (3.29) (3.67)*** (2.35) (2.10) (2.50)  (3.40) (2.85) (2.84) (2.27) (2.04)  (2.42) 
Other Qualifications 0.044  0.023 0.04 0.094 0.146 0.076  0.004 0.031 0.045 0.137 0.130  0.119 
 (0.373)  (0.50) (0.90) (0.98) (1.50) (0.79)  (0.95) (0.66) (0.98) (1.43) (1.35)  (1.26) 
Annual Increment 0.051***  0.052*** 0.051*** 0.086*** 0.086*** 0.087***  0.057*** 0.057*** 0.056*** 0.088*** 0.088***  0.086*** 
 (11.62)  (11.79) (11.57) (13.68) (13.4) (13.62)  (12.98) (12.86) (12.57) (14.14) (13.89)  (13.67) 
Selectivity term -0.175***  -0.155*** -0.154*** 0.114*** 0.076*** 0.071***                                       
 (16.66)  (13.83) (13.84) (8.7) (5.48) (5.11)                                       
constant term 7.642***  7.453*** 6.397*** 7.112*** 6.427*** 7.218***  7.656*** 7.458*** 6.339*** 7.391*** 7.400***  6.609*** 
  (311.29)  (253.51) (141.16)  (93.79)  (62.2)  (85.27)   (307.83)  (257.9)  (144.56)  (108.72)  (101.18)   (72.15) 
Occupational Dummies YES  YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES YES  YES 
Industry Dummies YES  YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES YES  YES 
Year Dummies YES  YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES YES  YES 
R2 Within 0.1359  0.1452 0.1516 0.1102 0.1186 0.1224  0.1424 0.1508 0.1586 0.1092 0.1178  0.1216 
R2 Between 0.4674  0.4991 0.5014 0.4512 0.4535 0.4517  0.4547 0.4948 0.4989 0.4465 0.4521  0.4506 
R2 Overall 0.4629  0.4872 0.4895 0.4157 0.4267 0.4260  0.4534 0.4827 0.4860 0.4126 0.4266  0.4257 
Wald chi-square 14050.44  14961.29 15331.193 5667.36 5790.11 5849.19  14339.45 15381.0 15898.16 5748.96 5923.64  5990.66 
No of Observations 40529  38355 38255 19347 18693 18693  42073 39432 39432 20045 19331  19331 
No of Groups 10300  9842 9842   4956   4841   4841    10633   10058   10058   5099  4973  4973 
Notes :  1)Absolute  t statistics in parenthesis 
 2) *, **, *** denote significance at 5% , 1% and <1% respectively
Table 4.3 continued  
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 Figure (4.1):  Wage – Job Tenure Curve, BHPS waves 1-14 
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Diagram (4.2): Wage – Job Tenure Curve after correction for selection bias, BHPS 
waves 1-14  
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Diagram (3): Wage – Years in the Labor Force Curve, BHPS waves 1-14  
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Diagram (4): Wage – Age Curve, BHPS waves 1-14  
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Chapter 5 
 
 Transition to self employment and the exogeneity of Windfalls 
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5.1 Introduction 
 
Self-employment has long been considered by politicians as a convenient tool for 
the reduction of unemployment and a source of job creation.UK government for instance 
provides financial support in the form of transfer payments to those unemployed who 
would be willing to set up their own business (Duggan, 1998) while similar schemes exist 
in almost all European Union countries. In the relevant literature there have been 
numerous studies with contradictory conclusions as to whether promotion of self-
employment is indeed a decisive parameter for unemployment reduction and jobs growth. 
European Commission’s green paper (2003) on “Entrepreneurship in Europe” highly 
supports the notion of self employment and refers particularly to Netherlands and US. 
Evidence from the former indicates that between 1994 and 1998, 8% of fast-growing 
firms created 60% of employment growth within existing enterprises while in the US, 
350000 fast-growing firms created two-thirds of all new jobs between 1993 and 1996. 
  
Counterarguments are primarily based on econometric estimations which 
formalise the scepticism as to whether a positive relationship between transition to self 
employment and unemployment rates should be expected. Blanchflower (2000) 
conducted an extensive survey for 24 OECD countries, founding contradictory results 
between them. A statistically positive correlation was established for Austria, Denmark 
and Finland while for the UK, Germany, Belgium and Sweden, the opposite was the case.  
This last result for Sweden was also confirmed by Lindl and Ohllson (1996). Using data 
from 1981, reported a negative correlation between unemployment and self-employment 
which means that the higher the economic activity is in a country, the more self-
employed individuals there will be.  
 
 Although economists failed to converge into a consensus about the impact of 
labour market conditions on the self-employment rate, the opposite seems to be the case 
about the importance of liquidity constraints in the decision of individuals to start up their 
own business. Well cited studies by Evans and Leighton (1989) and Evans and Jonavonic 
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(1989) present results showing that keeping some personal and demographic parameters 
constant, people with greater family assets are more likely to switch to self-employment 
from employment.  
 
 A growing concern in the literature about the potential usefulness of wealth as self 
employment predictor comes from the fact that this variable is likely to be correlated with 
omitted factors that may themselves be affecting the probability of transition. For 
example, particularly motivated and ambitious individuals may be both wealthier and 
more likely to take the plunge into self-employment.  In this sense, studies like Holtz-
Eakin et al. (1994a), Holtz-Eakin et al (1994b) for the US and Blanchflower and Oswald 
(1998) for the UK have used unanticipated “windfall” payments as a predictor of self-
employment entry and survivor. These payments are considered to be purely exogenous 
and consequently reveal the true impact of liquidity constraints in the decision to transmit 
into self-employment.  
 
 Nevertheless, the view that windfall payments can be considered to be 
exogenously given can easily be criticised. Leaving inheritances aside, (although the 
actual level of which may reveal information in a loose sense about a potential inherited 
ability), a lottery winning requires that the recipient of the prize has taken a discrete 
decision to participate into an action that involves risk. Given that setting up a business 
from scratch is also a risky choice, there could also be a correlation between this type of 
windfall and the self-employment decision. Obviously, a participation in a lottery may 
not necessarily imply a risk-loving behaviour. Someone who is in a bad financial 
situation is possible to see a lottery as his last hope to exit distress. Consequently, what 
we would actually need in order to obtain a rough idea about the risk-loving side of a 
lottery is the amount actually spent on it, as a proportion of his income. We would also 
like to know how frequently someone is participating in a lottery. Playing once per year 
can not give as any idea of someone's tendency to adopt risky decisions. But an 
information that a person is constantly participating in gambling and is actually devoting 
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20% of his annual income in these activities can be very informative. In this respect we 
would speculate that this person may be more likely to transmit to self employment, even 
if a large lottery gain is not realised. Due to data limitations we can have only 
information about the lottery receipt and not the amount spent on the lottery which is 
obviously restrictive.  
 
The exogeneity of windfalls has also been considered in a very recent paper by 
Georgellis et al. (2008). In particular, these authors examined if personal specific 
attributes like risk averseness, emotional intelligence and social awareness can cause 
individuals to behave in such a way as to affect their exposure to ostensibly random 
effects. Their results indicated, among the other, that happier respondents, those who 
provide care for a non-residential person, those who are active in a social, voluntary or 
other community group and those who report that they have someone who would 
potentially help them in a crisis, are all significantly more likely to enjoy a concurrent or 
future windfall, ceteris paribus. This finding questions the validity of windfalls as 
instruments for modelling the impact of wealth on individual transition to self-
employment.  
 
The scope of this paper is to contribute to the literature in two distinct ways: 
 
• Firstly, to assess if the inclusion of variables capturing the social 
characteristics of an individual has any statistical power in predicting the 
subsequent transition into self employment, conditional upon receiving a 
windfall. If this is indeed the case, it could be suggested that the self-
employment incidence is not exclusively driven by windfalls per se but part of 
the trend can be attributed to these social characteristics which are essentially 
related to personality traits and risk behaviour.  
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• Secondly to examine how the issue of job satisfaction affects the previously 
obtained estimates on the probability of becoming self-employed. The idea is 
that even if liquidity constraints do not exist, an employee who is happy with 
his/her working place would be willing to transmit to self employment 
anyway.  
 
 This work is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a background of self 
employment with a particular reference to self-employment motivation. Section 3 
summarises the relevant literature in the area, focusing in particular on the relative effect 
of windfalls in the prediction of self-employment spells. Section 4 describes briefly the 
data and explains the methodological approach. Section 5 presents the results while 
section 6 concludes.  
 
 
 
  
5.2 Moving into Self-Employment 
 
The question why someone would decide to become self-employed could be 
answered if we consider a vector of parameters. Self employment literature highlights 
both pecuniary and non pecuniary motivation. The former is related to the opportunity 
that self employment may provide for excessive (compared to full employment) earnings 
while the latter can be seen as a chance for the individual to set his or her own schedule, 
to work independently, to answer to nobody and to avoid (or escape from) an 
unemployment incidence.  
 
Rational behaviour implies that the utility that someone derives from self 
employment should exceed the corresponding utility from alternative states, namely paid 
employment and (only to the extent that this is voluntarily) staying out of the labour 
force. More strictly speaking, the discounted present value of the self employment utility 
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streams over the life time should be higher than the present value of the utility that an 
employee receives during his working life. This more narrow definition aims to take into 
account the possibility that self-employment may not start paying off its full potential 
immediately but only after a certain period. In this respect, Dolton and Makepeace (1990) 
found evidence that the probability of self-employment depends positively on the 
differential between the expected self-employment earnings and paid employment 
earnings.  
 
The extent to which these expectations are finally realised is an open and 
challenging research question. Hamilton (2000) estimates (on a US dataset) that on 
average, a self-employed individual with ten years in business enjoy 35% less earnings 
than an average employee in paid employment and this result is not conditional upon a 
self-selection process of  low ability workers into self-employment. In addition, his 
results indicated that self employed have both lower initial earnings and lower earnings 
growth.  
 
Estimations of self employment earnings can nevertheless be problematic in some 
ways. Since there is a no explicitly defined salary, a researcher must necessarily rely on 
data with proxy validity. What is usually reported in the surveys is the net profit of the 
entrepreneur. However this variable can be deliberately underestimated for tax reasons 
and also exhibit significant variation depending on the investing plan and the exact 
method of the calculation of depreciations. Hamilton (2000) mentions also that 
supplementary compensation schemes for paid employees like pensions and health 
insurances are well possible to create problems in the interpretation of the earnings 
differentials. Finally, according to ‘superstar’ theory (Rosen, 1981) the distribution of self 
employment is very possible to be skewed so that the comparisons of mean earnings of 
self-employment and paid employment will be strongly influenced by a handful of high-
income entrepreneurial superstars. 
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5.2.1 Self Employment and Liquidity Constraints 
 
Apart from the fact that different individuals may be willing to transit into self 
employment for different reasons, there is also strong indication that a large proportion of 
the working population is frustrated on its desire to pursue entrepreneurship. According 
to earlier evidence from the International Social Survey Programme (1989), 63% of 
Americans, 48% of Britons and 49% of Germans expressed a desire to become self 
employed. More recent evidence from the Eurobarometer reconfirms these numbers 
which now rise to 69% for the US and 51 % for the fifteen European Union countries. A 
more detailed examination shows that self-employment desire reaches figures above 60% 
for Finland, Sweden, Belgium, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Ireland.  
 
In most of the OECD countries the actual self employment rate does not exceed 
15% (Blanchflower, 2000) which resulted in a significant number of studies trying to 
explain the reason why expressed desire is not transformed into an actual self 
employment transition. Liquidity constraints have been named as a primary suspect for 
this. Theoretical approaches (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981) have emphasized that insufficient 
starting up capital and/or access to credit markets can be a binding constraint on 
individuals’ choice between paid employment and self employment. Empirical studies by 
Evans and Jonavonic (1989) and Evans and Leighton (1989) also suggest how capital 
dependent is the transition to self employment while Taylor (2001) reinforces this view 
using the BHPS. In all cases, the estimation results indicate that the relationship between 
capital and probability of transition is positive but not monotonic. Evans and Jovanovic 
(1989) support empirically that initial wealth is an important parameter affecting the 
transition probability, if and only if there are liquidity constraints. This implies that in an 
economic environment with external funding opportunities, lack of initial assets is not 
necessarily a binding constraint. However, their theoretical model which precedes their 
empirical estimation is based on the assumption that individuals are risk neutral. But 
seeking liquidity from an external source unavoidably exposes the potential entrepreneur 
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to risk and this fact may have additional consequences for the decision to transmit into 
self employment.  
 
Table 5.1 provides subjective evidence from the European Commission’s 
Eurobarometer (2000) on the importance of several parameters in the self-employment 
pursue. Respondents were asked to rate on a 0 to 100 scale their personal evaluation of 
the practical difficulties in starting a business, judging from four discrete aspects, namely 
the lack of financial support, the complexity of administrative procedures, the difficulty 
in obtaining information and the unfavourable economic climate.   
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.1 – Practical difficulties in starting a business 
(EU -15) 
 B DK D GR E FIN F IRL I L NL A P SW UK
73 64 70 80 77 62 76 68 74 76 50 72 82 66 72lack of financial support 
                
71 72 70 72 68 65 76 61 75 65 55 66 80 75 64administrative procedures 
                
59 46 54 59 59 43 65 52 65 55 40 43 72 54 55information 
                
59 58 61 72 61 50 55 42 67 55 39 45 78 60 60economic climate 
                
                                
Source : Flash Eurobarometer 83, “Entrepreneurship”, European Commission (2000)   
 
 It is apparent that the lack of financial support is considered by individuals as a 
significant obstacle that is likely to constraint any entrepreneurship plans. A certain 
degree of homogeneity is noted between some countries but with few noticeable 
exceptions like the Netherlands and Poland. These subjective answers support the 
previously mentioned studies and emphasize the role of capital constraints on the 
transition decision to self employment.  
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5.3 Endogenous wealth and windfalls  
 
An important issue of consideration when estimating the transition probability is 
whether the initial wealth can be considered purely exogenous. A natural thought is that 
those who have high ability are at the same time more likely to have more wealth. In this 
case, the variable that captures pre-transition wealth will be also carrying the impact of 
the entrepreneurship ability that an individual may possess and consequently, the 
coefficient for the wealth variable will be upwards biased. In a similar consideration (but 
acting on the opposite direction), those employees who have larger endowments of ability 
may require less start-up capital than employees who might be less talented in 
entrepreneurship60.  One thought that can possible alleviate these concerns is that ability 
is not necessarily an exogenous parameter in the sense of a personality (time invariant) 
characteristic. Although personality traits can be part of an individual’s ability to be a 
successfully businessman, several other self-employment aspects can be learned either 
through education or during the paid-employment experience. Consequently, variables  
that indicate whether the potential entrepreneur have had managerial duties in the past, 
the years of education or in a broader sense the age of the individual can be indicative of 
the self-employment probability and possibly moderate the endogeneity issue that the 
correlation between pre-transition wealth and unobserved ability is likely to imply. 
 
Due to the growing awareness of the endogeneity problem, attention has recently 
shifted to “windfall payments” as a predictor of self-employment transition. These money 
receipts are less likely to be correlated with individual ability and personality traits and 
hence reveal the extent to which liquidity issues can discourage individuals in setting up 
their own firm. A significant part of the literature has been focused on inheritances as this 
type of windfall is more likely to be purely exogenous and in any case is easily accessible 
within most data sets. Other forms of windfalls may include a personal accident claim, 
                                                 
60 On the other hand, Astebro and Bernhardt (1999) suggest that a greater stock of human capital raises the 
optimal level of initial capital investment in the business, implying that entrepreneurs with greater ability 
will require more funding to accomplish their investment plans.   
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redundancy payments and a lottery gain. What makes windfalls particularly useful as a 
tool to assess the liquidity problem is the fact that they are totally unexpected. In these 
sense, if insufficient sources of funding is an important constraint for entrepreneurship, a 
windfall should act significantly and positively in the probability of transition to self 
employment.  
 
The positive relationship between windfall gains and the probability of self-
employment is supported in a numerous of studies. Holtz-Eakin et al (1994a, 1994b) 
estimate that an inheritance increases the probability of entry into self employment from 
paid employment and also that an existing entrepreneur will stay in business. However, 
an interaction between the individual wealth and the amount of inheritance showed that 
the greater the individual wealth, the smaller the incremental effect of inheritance. This 
suggests that wealthy and non wealthy respondents react quite differently to the receipt of 
a windfall. Similar results highlighting the positive effect of an inheritance can also be 
found in Blancflower and Oswald (1998), Burke et al. (2000, 2002) and Taylor (2001). 
These studies also emphasize the significance of the squared transformation of an 
inheritance which implies that the positive relationship between a windfall and self-
employment probability is decreasing in the amount of the receipt. A more recent BHPS 
study by Georgelis et al (2005), enhances these findings with gains of more than £20000-
£22000 reducing the probability of transition. Redundancy payments and inheritances 
raise the self-employment probability while lottery winds reduce the probability of 
transitions.  
 
Although the above mentioned studies support the hypothesis of liquidity 
constraints, some scepticism can be raised, particularly for specific types of windfalls. 
Lottery gains for example can imply that the potential entrepreneur is keen in exposing 
him/her self to risk. Consequently, a positive coefficient of the lottery gains variable may 
not necessary imply funding problems but just indicate that since starting-up a business is 
by definition a risky choice, whoever has established a risky past is more likely to 
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transmit to self-employment. A similar argument can be supported for layoff 
compensation. If the redundancy is not the result of an economic downturn or an 
unsuccessful matching but results from inadequate individual’s ability, then any form of 
money flows in the form of redundancy compensation will not necessarily increase the 
probability of self employment.  
 
The extend to which windfalls can be considered to be exogenous has been 
recently examined by Georgelis et. al. (2008) Using data from the BHPS they found that 
characteristics such as age, education and race act significantly upon the probability of 
receiving a windfall. More interestingly, their results revealed that windfall gains are 
correlated with a variety of social activities and personality characteristics. Those 
individuals who actively participate in social groups, like religious, community groups 
are more likely to receive certain forms of windfalls, ceteris paribus. For example, being 
active in a voluntary group increases the probability of receiving an inheritance while a 
participation in a religious group is associated with an increased probability of receiving 
an insurance payment.  
 
Although it is difficult to provide intuitive explanation for some of these 
correlations, it is apparent that the social dimension of an individual’s activity is likely to 
affect incidents that are seemingly independent. Additionally, these social characteristics 
may be at the same time indicative for the decision that someone takes to transit from any 
labour force status to self-employment. For instance, in Georgelis et. al. (2008), a positive 
answer to the question “Is there anyone who really appreciates you” obtains a positive 
coefficient in the probability of affecting the receipt of an insurance payment. At the 
same time, an insurance payment is positively associated with self employment transition 
(Georgelis et al, 2005). Consequently, it is not clear whether an insurance payment acts 
independently on the probability of being self-employed and is not related to the fact that 
whoever has a high level of self esteem is more likely to receive a windfall and transmit 
at the same time.  
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 This is a primary gap that this paper aims to fill. We endeavour to ascertain the 
relative impact of variables that capture how socially active a person is on the probability 
that this person will become self-employed, conditional upon the receipt of a windfall and 
after controlling for various other relevant characteristics. If this probability does indeed 
depend on personality traits and aspects related to involvement into social activities then 
we would expect that the autonomous impact of windfalls on the self employment 
probability will reduce in magnitude and in some cases may become insignificant. Such a 
result would unavoidably cast doubts on a series of related studies which used windfalls 
as a self-employment predictor, in the hope that these payments would act exogenously 
on a self-employment event and would be uncorrelated with any unobserved parameters 
that affect the same event.    
 
 
5.4 Data Description and Empirical Strategy   
 
Our empirical estimation is based on data from the British Household Panel 
Survey. BHPS is considered to be representative of the British Population and its panel 
nature helps to identify for a single individual movements between various forms of 
labour market activity. Therefore we can easily identify the exact year at which a 
respondent entered or quit self-employment and additionally the labour market status that 
preceded this transition.  
 
Our sample consists of pooled data for 10 years, from 1994 to 2004. Windfalls are 
recorded annually with the exception of 1996. By the term “windfalls” we consider 
unexpected gains from one of the following sources: life insurance policy, pension 
layout, accident claim, redundancy payments, inheritance and lottery or any other forms 
of gambling. Other types of windfalls that can not be nested within these categories are 
recorded separately under the title “something else”.  
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Self-employment status is monitored annually by two BHPS variables, jbstat and 
jbsemp. The former is related to a plethora of possible outcomes which correspond to all 
possible employment states that an individual may be into. The latter asks only if the 
respondent considers him/her as being in self-employment or in paid employment.  For 
reasons of consistency we keep in the sample only those people who respond that they 
are self-employed in both questions.  
 
The empirical strategy that Taylor (2001) and Georgelis et al. (2005) adopt is to 
observe an individual at three distinct moments of time, t-1, t and t+1. Having recorded a 
respondent’s labour market status at time t-1, they assess how windfall payments 
received at time t affect the respondent’s labour market status at t+1. Then, they use a 
probit regression to assess the relative impact of a numerous of explanatory variables on 
the probability of transiting into self employment. Although this methodology is in 
general terms appropriate since it does capture labour market transition conditional upon 
previous labour market status and a windfall receipt, there is a case where a windfall may 
arrive after the decision to transmit in self employment has been taken. To be more 
specific, if for an individual the employment status at t-1 is, say, paid employment and 
the status at t+1 is self employment, then this individual qualifies for being characterised 
as someone who transmitted. However, if employment status at t is also self employment 
and given that windfalls arrive at t, we can not be sure whether this windfall payment 
came after the transition to self employment or before. For this reason, we are mainly 
experimenting with a specification which considers an employee as having been 
transmitted if his/her employment status at t+1 is ‘self employment’ while employment 
status at t is not. In comparison with the fist definition of transition, this one allows for 
less incidences of self-employment transition.  
 
Also, in a more detailed examination, we consider whether certain types of 
windfalls have an impact on specific types of self-employment and on the number of 
workers that the entrepreneur employees.   
 174
 Attention is restricted to survey participants aged between 18 and 60 to ensure 
that these are in working age and are not eligible to receive any lump sump payment 
associated with retirement from paid work. In addition we consider only those workers 
who work more than thirty hours per week. Our pool consists of almost 83000 
individuals from which 48% is women and 52% is men. Self employment accounts for a 
12.06% while there is a 19.76% average probability of receiving a windfall of any type 
with gains from lottery or any other kind of gambling being more common. From all 
individuals who consider them selves to be self employed 78.6% are men and 22.4% are 
women.  
We utilise a wide range of explanatory variables in attempt to control for all those 
parameters that can potentially affect the decision to move from paid employment to self 
employment. In this respect, apart from our main interest which is the amount of the 
windfall receipt, we account for race, age, sex, marital status, pre-transition employment 
status, family income, education (in 9 categories), receipts from dividends and interest, 
length of previous labour status spell, intergenerational effects and the number of 
children in the household. The usual year and regional dummy variables are also in place.  
 
As mentioned above, a noticeable difference between this study and previous 
research is the consideration of variables that are indicative of the amount of “social 
capital” that is associated with each respondent. Social Capital is a term which is used to 
describe aspects of the social life that have a positive impact on the individual well being. 
Obviously, since the word "Social" is used, these aspects are mainly related to our 
interpersonal relations with other people. Such relations can be found within a family, a 
neighbourhood, a local community, a religious group, a social group and so forth. As 
John Locke famously stated61, man is a social animal. Consequently, by nature we are 
entitled to create and promote relations with other people. The quality of these relations is 
vital for our happiness, mental well-being and life satisfaction. The social networks we 
                                                 
61 Paraphrasing Aristotle who argued that man is a political animal.  
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belong to include many of the social customs and bonds that define them and keep them 
together, are what we mean when we talk about social capital. It should be mentioned 
that someone may not be participating voluntarily in a social network. For example, 
being a member of a neighbourhood is simply dictated by the location of your property 
and you have no power to select your neighbours, although certain discretion may exist 
since there are high income and low income areas. We are also interested in social capital 
that is the result of the individual's discrete choice, since this choice can be indicative for 
his personality and may also reveal unobserved elements that can also have an impact 
(positive or negative) on his/her decision to transmit to self employment.  For example, if 
someone is active in a volunteer group, he may have strong feelings towards the ethical 
sides of life and thus choose to work in the public sector which is supposed to be closest 
to the idea of promoting the common good.  
 
We make use of an extensive variety of variables that are related to the 
respondent’s participation in social life and other that aim to proxy the immediate support 
network that is available to each potential entrepreneur62. In this sense we examine if the 
respondent is member of a religious, voluntary or any other community group, if he/she is 
active in a social group, if he/she thinks that there is someone who will listen, if there is 
someone that could help him/her and finally if there is someone who really appreciates 
him/her. Although these variables are informative for the social capital of each 
individual, they are recorded every two years, starting from 1995. In terms of the 
econometric estimation this will obviously have an impact on the sample size and also 
affect the number of the transition cases (the dependent variable), potentially resulting in 
misleading coefficients. And in any case we need to refer to roughly the same sample size 
in order to have a stable basis for comparison between a specification which includes 
social capital variable and one that does not.  
 
                                                 
62 We don't consider union membership as social capital variable. Although union can certainly be 
considered as a network, the choice to join it may be related to working conditions that the member is 
unhappy with.  
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In order to by-pass this problem we proceed in the following way: for each 
individual we end up with only one social capital value depending on whether this person 
has ever considered him self as being active in one of the relevant categories. 
Consequently, if a respondent replied for example in 1996 that he is active in a 
community group, we then consider that he has also been active in this group for all the 
available years, even if a previous or later response indicates that he was not active before 
or he is not active any more. The rational behind this assumption is that if there is 
anything that can relate social participation with self employment transition this is not the 
participation per se but the motivation or inclination for doing so. In this respect, if 
someone stopped being active in a group this could be attributed, for instance, to lack of 
available time or to not being happy with the particular social group environment. 
However the tendency or the desire of being active in a group does not necessarily fade 
away and this is part of a person’s character that we are particularly interested in.  A 
slightly differentiated logic applies to those variables that are used as a proxy the 
immediate support network available to the survey participant. In this case we calculate 
the average response for each person and then we assign the response value that is closer 
to the calculated average.  
 
Finally, in an important addition to self employment literature we include a 
variable that measure how satisfied people are with their job, prior to transit into self 
employment. It must be expected that an employee who is overall satisfied with his/her 
job would not be as determined to become self-employed as a non-satisfied employed, 
conditional upon the amount of windfall receipt. In this specification, the educational 
category which refer to those with commercial qualifications (458 observations) drops 
out since restricting the sample to only those individuals who report job satisfaction does 
not yield any observations (to serve as a comparison basis for estimation) in which both 
the educational dummy and the transition dummy obtain a value of ‘1’ .   
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5.5 Estimation Results 
 
Table 5.3 presents the results from deploying a weighted probit specification in 
which we regress a dummy variable indicating transition into self employment against a 
numerous of explanatory parameters, as explained in the previous section and described 
in table 5.2. In the first column of Table 5.3 the estimations do not include social capital 
variables which are included in the third column. The second column also includes 
dummy variables for the specific type of windfalls while in the fourth column 
(specification) we also consider the impact of job satisfaction. 
  
As it is evident from column one, we are in the position to verify the statistical 
significance of the amount of the windfall payments. The amount that someone receives 
as a windfall payment is positive and statistically significant. However, the squared 
version of windfall payments, although negative, as it has been documented in the 
literature, has only a very marginal significance with a t statistic of 1.52 which is 
consistent with the results from some specifications (using also the BHPS) that Georgelis 
et. al. (2005) experimented with. 
 
Sex and age are, as expected, decisive parameters for self-employment prediction. 
The former has a negative sign while the latter enters the equation positively with its 
squared transformation being negative and significant at the same time. This is in line 
with previous studies which also support the non linear age effect. We did not find any 
significant race effects or any particular relation between the number of children in the 
household and the probability of becoming self employed.  
 
From all nine educational categories (with reference to no education at all), only 
those who have a university degree and those who have obtained A-Levels are 
statistically more likely to end up into self employment. One thought about why the 
coefficient for individuals with higher education (for example MSc holders)  is not 
significant is that these people, due to their education, are in the position to negotiate for 
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better jobs and this makes the opportunity cost of self employment much higher. As far as 
individuals with lower education are concerned we speculate that these people may either 
end up in jobs that require vocational qualifications or lack the necessary education that 
could stimulate transition into some form of self-employment. 
Moving to self employment, according to our results, is much more possible if the 
future entrepreneur was either employed or unemployed before joining self employment, 
rather than being out of the labour force. This comes to no surprise since labour inactivity 
can be a discreet choice that is linked to several personal preferences that would exclude 
any kind of labour market activity anyway. However we observe that being unemployed 
is stronger than being employed in predicting self-employment in the next period. This 
can in a sense justify why governments are so keen in providing primarily financial help 
to unemployed in order to start-up their own business. There is also positive and 
significant evidence in favour of the hypothesis that if someone’s father has been self-
employed, he or she is more likely to become self employed as well. However we can not 
argue the same with statistical safety for the cases where the mother has been self-
employed.  
 
Apart from the windfall payments, we have used a number of other variables that 
aim to provide a snapshot of the general financial status of the individual. For this 
thought, not much statistical significance was encountered. To be more specific, we used 
a variable to account for both the labour and non labour income of the potential 
entrepreneur. It turned out to be insignificant. Similarly we included three categories 
annual income receipts from dividends and interest. Only the first one referring to an 
income of 1000 pounds or less was negative and significant. The rest, as well as an 
interaction term accounting for receiving an income from dividends of 2500 pounds and a 
windfall was insignificant.  
 
To conclude, two more dummy variables are present to account for managerial or 
supervisor’s experience in the paid job prior to the self-employment transition. They are 
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both negative and significant which makes sense since a manager’s position can be 
associated with a higher wage and workplace recognition and consequently increase the 
opportunity cost of transmitting into entrepreneurship.  
The second column of Table 5.3 is derived from exactly the same specification as 
the first column, with the noticeable exception of including six dummy variables which 
refer to the specific type of windfall that occurred. They are all insignificant which 
indicate that it does not matter what is the source of the receipt but the amount that 
associated with a windfall as it shown by the significance of the “payment” variable. And 
for some types of windfalls like gambling, we encounter receipts of even 50 pounds 
which can by no means be expected to have any impact on a highly capital dependent 
decision like the one to move to self-employment63.  
 
To our disappointment, the inclusion of social capital variables does not 
noticeably alter the results presented in columns one and two. Although some of the 
social capital variables are statistically significant, the impact and the significance of the 
amount of windfall remain unchanged. To be more specific, being active in a trade union 
and in a social group affect negatively the probability of becoming self-employed while a 
positive effect is evident for being active in a voluntary group. In this sense, these 
variables act independently on the transition probability and are possibly related to a 
variety of personality attributes and traits. This of course does not necessarily imply that 
windfalls are exogenous. It merely indicates that the moving into self employment from 
any other labour market status is affected independently by both the amount of windfalls 
and some of the social capital variables. This view does not contradict the results by 
Georgelis et. al. (2008) since these authors derived a positive relationship between certain 
forms of social capital and the probability of receiving a windfall. But as our results 
indicate, it is not the windfall incidence per se that matters but the amount of money 
                                                 
63 In an additional specification we interacted the amount of windfalls payment with the dummy that 
corresponds to the source of that payment. We got marginally significant results only for the interaction 
terms that involve earning from a lottery and an accident. They both have a positive coefficient which show 
that an increase in the payment for particularly these sources have a positive effect in the probability of 
self-employment transition.  
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received at each occasion. Consequently the significance of our social capital variable 
might possibly capture some issues related to each individual’s unobserved 
heterogeneity. 
 
Finally, we extend our analysis on windfalls by considering job satisfaction as a 
covariate in the equation that predicts transition into self employment, something that 
previous research did not take into account. Naturally, one should expect that job 
satisfaction is negatively correlated with the probability of moving into self-employment. 
This is one side of the coin. The other side refers to how the explanatory variables are 
affected by this inclusion. Clearly, we expect to encounter a differentiation to only those 
variables which, in some way characterise, the type of job someone possesses or his/her 
position within the job’s internal structure and are linked with the satisfaction that an 
employee derives from the working place.  
 
Results in the fourth column of table 5.3 verify that whoever is satisfied with 
his/her job is less likely to transmit into self-employment, ceteris paribus. The coefficient 
is negative and well established. In addition, there is again no significant alteration in the 
windfall payments’ coefficient.  However, what attracts our attention is how the two 
educational categories that were significant in the three previous specifications become 
now insignificant. Moreover, the first educational category that refer to individuals with 
higher education becomes insignificant and obtain a negative sign. This is probably 
emphasising our previous argument about the increased opportunity cost of highly 
educated people that is associated with a decision to transmit to self employment. In other 
words, even by keeping job satisfaction contact, someone with no education is more 
likely to become self-employed, since a highly educated person may engage into job 
search in order to find a new job consistent with his/her expectations which stem from the 
extensive direct and in direct cost of achieving such an education.  
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Finally, we also notice that the inclusion of job satisfaction reverses the sign for 
those who work as managers in their paid jobs. We perceive this as an indication that a 
manager is (on average) more happy with his/her job than a non manager. After 
controlling for job satisfaction, managers may wish to take advantage of their managerial 
experience in their previous paid job and start up their own firm.  
 
 
 5.6 Conclusion 
 
The motivation behind this chapter has its roots on a well established result in the 
literature, that insufficient starting-up capital discourages potential entrepreneurs from 
creating their own business. Due to endogeneity thoughts concerning the correlation 
between someone’s ability and initial wealth, attention has been placed on windfalls 
which can be considered to be exogenous. However a recent paper by Georgelis et al 
(2008) cast serious doubts on this and suggests that some variables associated with the so 
called “social capital” can significantly affect the probability of receiving a windfall. If 
these variables are also affecting the probability of transiting into self employment, then 
the endogeneity problem will still persist.  
 
Our results indicate that some of the “social capital” variables are indeed 
significantly related to an increased likelihood of transiting into self employment. 
However, the windfall payments’ coefficient remains virtually unchanged. We can 
therefore argue that the social capital variables act independently on the transition 
probability, even if they are associated with an increased probability of receiving a 
windfall. In other words, what matters for a movement into self employment is not the 
actual receipt of a windfall but the amount of money that results from the windfall. And 
this amount is intuitively separated from social capital characteristics like, for example, 
activity in social or voluntary community groups.  
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Table 5.2 – List of Variables and description 
Sex Dummy variable that takes the value ‘1’ if the respondent is female 
Age Variable indicating the age of the respondent 
agesquare Squared version of Age 
married Dummy variable taking the value ‘1’ if the respondent is married and ‘0’ otherwise 
payment Variable indicating the amount of money the respondent received from windfalls 
paymentsqr Squared Version of payment 
Race Dummy variable that takes the value ‘1’ if the respondent is white 
Dummy variable showing if the respondent was employed before S/E transition with reference to 
being out of the labour force Employed 
Dummy variable showing if the respondent was unemployed before S/E transition with reference to 
being out of the labour force Unemployed 
Income Amount of Labour and Non Labour income the respondent earned in the year prior to transition  
children Number of children in the household 
educ1 Higher Education (MSc or PhD) 
educ2 Any other higher qualifications  
educ3 University Degree 
educ4 Nursing qualifications 
educ5 A levels 
educ6 O levels 
educ7 Cse , grade 2-5 
educ8 Commercial qualifications 
educ9 Other qualifications 
div2 Annual income from dividends & interests : <1000 pounds 
div3 Annual income from dividends & interests : 1000 – 2500 pounds 
div4 Annual income from dividends & interests : > 2500 pounds 
interdiv Annual income from dividends & interests : > 2500 pounds X Windfall Payments 
Duration Duration (days) in labour market status prior to transistion 
Father S/E Takes the Value ‘1’ if the father of the respondent has ever been self-employed 
Mother S/E Takes the Value ‘1’ if the father of the respondent has ever been self-employed 
Manager Managerial Duties in current job 
Supervisor Supervisor/Foreman in current job 
Insurance Dummy variable taking the value ‘1’ if the respondent received an insurance payment 
Pension Dummy variable taking the value ‘1’ if the respondent received a pension 
Accident Dummy variable taking the value ‘1’ if the respondent received money from an accident claim 
Redundancy  Dummy variable taking the value ‘1’ if the respondent received a redundancy payment 
Bequest Dummy variable taking the value ‘1’ if the respondent received an inheritance 
Lottery Dummy variable taking the value ‘1’ if the respondent received a gamble payment 
Other Dummy variable taking the value ‘1’ if the respondent received any other ‘windfall’ payment 
Orgab Active in a trade union 
Orgaf Active in a religious group 
Orgag Active in a voluntary group 
Orgah Active in a community group 
Orgai Active in a social group 
listen2 Is there anyone who would listen to you : Yes, one person.  
listen3 Is there anyone who would listen to you : Yes, more than one person 
Appreciate2 Is there anyone who appreciates you : Yes, one person 
Appreciate3 Is there anyone who appreciates you : Yes, more than one person 
crisis2 Is there anyone who would help you in a crisis : Yes, one person 
crisis3 Is there anyone who would help you in a crisis : Yes, more than one person 
Jbsat Job Satisfaction from the current working place : Categorical responses from 1 to 7.  
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Table 5.3  
Estimation Results 
  
                       
            
 collumn 1  collumn 2  collumn 3  collumn 4 
 coefficient t-stat  coefficient t-stat  coefficient t-stat  coefficient t-stat 
variable                      
sex -0.35 9.45***  -0.36 9.52***  -0.36 9.18***  -0.38 7.56*** 
age 0.07 6.30***  0.07 6.29***  0.07 6.01***  0.04 2.84** 
agesquare -0.09 6.23***  -0.09 6.20***  -0.09 5.94***  -0.06 2.86** 
married -0.03 0.77  -0.03 0.75  -0.02 0.43  -0.11 2.16* 
payment 0.77 2.48**  0.96 2.43*  0.80 2.50**  2.07 2.09* 
paymentsqr -0.30 1.52  -0.41 1.70  -0.32 1.52  -2.85 1.44 
race -0.07 0.82  -0.07 0.78  -0.03 0.37  -0.08 0.64 
employed 0.17 3.16***  0.17 3.13***  0.19 3.38***  0.24 0.99 
unemployed 0.42 5.65***  0.42 5.64***  0.42 5.59***  0.55 1.39 
income 0.01 0.99  0.01 0.94  0.01 1.05  0.03 2.14* 
children 0.03 1.26  0.03 1.27  0.04 1.48  0.02 0.65 
educ1 0.16 1.52  0.16 1.53  0.16 1.47  -0.29 1.96* 
educ2 0.08 1.32  0.08 1.36  0.09 1.37  -0.11 1.35 
educ3 0.17 2.41**  0.17 2.41**  0.17 2.29*  -0.04 0.46 
educ4 0.09 0.77  0.09 0.77  0.08 0.66  -0.28 1.42 
educ5 0.13 1.88  0.13 1.92*  0.11 1.58  -0.03 0.27 
educ6 0.07 1.08  0.07 1.13  0.06 0.93  -0.10 1.06 
educ7 -0.03 0.29  -0.03 0.26  -0.03 0.27  -0.07 0.57 
educ8 -0.34 1.39  -0.34 1.38  -0.30 1.24    
educ9 0.03 0.15  0.03 0.15  0.08 0.37  0.07 0.22 
div2 -0.11 2.28*  -0.10 2.22*  -0.10 2.04*  -0.10 1.78* 
div3 -0.08 0.66  -0.07 0.59  -0.05 0.44  -0.09 0.60 
div4 0.03 0.63  0.04 0.67  0.03 0.54  0.03 0.44 
interdiv 0.04 0.13  0.08 0.24  0.09 0.26  -0.61 0.47 
duration -0.02 2.13*  -0.02 2.29*  -0.02 2.01*  -0.06 4.30*** 
father S/E 0.15 2.60**  0.16 2.59**  0.15 2.49*  0.15 2.04* 
mother S/E 0.09 0.82  0.08 0.83  0.08 0.80  0.00 0.02 
manager -0.10 2.18*  -0.10 2.21*  -0.12 2.42**  0.19 3.56*** 
supervisor -0.27 4.43***  -0.27 4.41***  -0.28 4.33***  -0.02 0.28 
Insurance    -0.06 0.49       
Pension    -0.20 0.82       
Accident    -0.05 0.26       
redundancy    -0.18 1.30       
Bequest    0.09 0.84       
Lottery    -0.03 0.59       
Other    -0.08 0.75       
Orgab       -0.23 3.74***    
Orgaf       -0.06 1.08    
Orgag       0.23 3.91***    
Orgah       -0.05 0.61    
Orgai       -0.11 2.36*    
listen2       -0.05 0.62    
Table 5.3 continued  
listen3       -0.11 1.21    
appreciate2       0.02 0.25    
appreciate3       0.0010 0.02    
crisis2       0.04 0.46    
crisis3       0.10 1.10    
jbsat          -0.05 3.34 
constant term -3.13 12.76   -3.13 12.71  -3.13 11.69   -2.48 6.18 
No of Obs 43807  43807  40871  31136 
LR χ2(d.f.) 297.42 (37)  302.39 (44)  322.94 (48)  178.68 (37) 
Log-likelihood -3012.97  -3010.49  -2805.75  -1775.61 
 
Notes: Probability of entering self-employment at time t+1 given not self-employed at time t and windfall receipt at time t.  
Probit Estimates with robust standard errors Year and nine regional dummy variables are also included 
Reported t-stats are in absolute values - *,**,*** denote significance at 5%, 1% and <1% respectively.  
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Chapter 6  
 
 Concluding remarks                          
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This work opens the discussion on some key domains in labour economics, under 
a British perspective. Using the well established British Household Panel Survey we 
provide new evidence for popular issues like the relationship between employment 
constraints and job mobility, job satisfaction, earning profiles and the effect of windfalls 
on the probability of transition into self-employment.  
 
Chapter two is an attempt to examine if hour constraint can be a decisive 
parameter, strong enough to stimulate job mobility. We particularly focus on young 
employees who may have different preferences towards labour supply and different 
expectations. Our results indicate that a noticeable portion of employees who are less 
than 25 years old is constrained in the dimension of working hours. However, our 
econometric estimation clearly shows that this kind of restriction does not bind, as far as 
job mobility is concerned. For prime age employees (who report over-employment to a 
large extent) over-employment can not significantly explain part of the reasons that 
potentially stimulate job mobility. It is rather underemployment who has some 
statistically significant power.  
 
 This analysis, although very informative for the relationship between hour 
constraints and job mobility, can be even more precise in terms of the employees’ 
preferences. Undoubtedly, for some workers, working hours can be a very important 
parameter that is correlated with job satisfaction and potentially with job mobility. An 
extension we suggest on this line would be to explicitly take into account the priorities 
that each worker places upon the attributes of his/her job. In this sense, a researcher can 
test if workers who consider working hours as very important in their subjective 
evaluation are more likely to change job if they are constrained. Again, a differentiation 
between young and older employees or between men and women could give very useful 
results.  
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 Chapter three discusses job satisfaction in the UK. The extensive use of subjective 
covariates is evident throughout the chapter in an attempt to provide a more accurate 
view on this issue. In particular we use (among other covariates) satisfaction with 
payment, satisfaction we security and satisfaction with the work it self. We challenge the 
objection that these subjective covariates may contain noise by arguing that they are 
essentially picking different things. In deed, adding one of these variables at a time has an 
effect on only those covariates that are intuitively related with them.  
 
 Additionally, for the completeness of analysis, we estimate a job satisfaction 
equation in a more conventional manner. Instead of adding subjective covariates as 
before, we include the wage and the reference wage. The latter is derived from a wage 
equation and aims to capture the potential dissatisfaction of the employee if his/her 
compensation is less than the average one for a worker with the same characteristics. Our 
results are in line with previous studies and clearly emphasize that the satisfaction of 
individuals is affected by the surrounding working environment.  
  
  An issue of consideration and a proposal for future research is an attempt to link 
chapter two and chapter three. In this respect we would like to examine if  those workers 
who are constrained in the hours they work and do not change job, receive some kind of 
compensation so that their total job satisfaction level remains above the subjective level 
which could stimulate job mobility. Although the notion behind a compensating 
differential is widely accepted in cases where the working place can be dangerous or 
unhealthy for the worker, there is no reason to have a priori beliefs that this is the only 
case where a compensating differential is applicable. On the contrary, workers in jobs 
that are not necessarily manual or life threatening are well possible to exchange adverse 
working conditions (like hour constraints) for other job characteristics. For instance, 
promotion opportunities or non monetary benefits can be sufficient for some workers to 
cancel out any negative effects from other unpleasant working aspects. Consequently, the 
analysis should be in the position to take into account the preferences of the individuals 
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and conclude if individuals with roughly the same satisfaction levels receive different 
wages conditional upon their preferences, their satisfaction with the job sub-domains and 
after controlling for the usual parameters like education, demographics and so forth.  
 
 Chapter 4 is concerned with the choice between the public and the private sector 
and estimates the relevant wage profiles for each of them. We run a probit regression to 
find evidence that being a woman, member of a union, senior age employee and well 
educated increases the probability of working in the public sector. We then take into 
account these results in order to correct for potential self-selectivity in choosing either 
sector. The estimated earnings profiles clearly indicate that the private sector offers a 
steeper earnings profile than the public sector. We attribute these differences to the 
different motivational basis for selecting to be a public sector employee.  
 
 Finally, our attention in chapter 5 is placed upon the effect that windfalls have on 
the probability of transiting from paid employment to self-employment. This issue has 
been thoroughly examined in the past since windfalls were considered to be exogenously 
determined and consequently not correlated with any special ability or inclination to run a 
business successfully. Moreover, if windfalls were found to be positively related to the 
probability of starting up a business, then additional validity would be placed on the 
liquidity constraints hypothesis. Our scope was to simultaneously consider the receipt of 
windfalls and social capital variables since recent research suggested a correlation 
between them. Our results indicated that some of the social capital variables significantly 
affect the probability of becoming an entrepreneur but not through the windfall channel. 
Consequently, although social capital may be affecting the probability of receiving a 
windfall, it acts independently on the probability  a self employment transition.   of    
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